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Solving the Apprendi Puzzle
KYRON HUIGENS*
INTRODUCTION

The Apprendi puzzle is presented by two conflicting lines of Supreme Court
authority, each of which has strong intuitive appeal and substantial constitutional support. On one hand, the Court has held, with only two qualifications,
that any fact that the state invokes to justify punishment must be proved beyond
a reasonable doubt to a jury, 1 with attendant constitutional trial rights such as
notice in charging.2 If the Constitution protects the traditional normative architecture of criminal law, then these must be substantial limitations that a state
cannot evade with mere changes in form.3 Specifically, the state cannot simply
declare that some elements of an offense are now "sentencing factors" that need
be proved only to the sentencing judge by a preponderance of the evidence.4 On
the other hand, the Court has recognized the validity of lodging sentencing
discretion in judges, as well as the prerogative of the sentencing judge to
exercise discretion on any factual basis or none at all. 5 Furthermore, the Court
has recognized the validity, indeed the desirability, of the state's making explicit
the facts, standards, and procedures on which judges exercise their sentencing
discretion. 6 From this perspective, if a sentencing judge can impose punishment
for no apparent reason, then there can be no objection if the state requires that
judge to impose punishment more explicitly and deliberately. 7 Thus, Congress
or the states should be able to designate "sentencing factors" and to provide for
their proof by a preponderance to the sentencing judge without traditional trial
protections and with little, if any, constitutional constraint. The Court has so
* Associate Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. I wish to thank Joseph
Kennedy, Eric Muller, Arnold Loewy, Ronald Miller, Andrew Taslitz, and Sara Sun Beale for their
helpful comments. Thanks also are due to the editors of The Georgetown Law Journal for their
insightful editorial assistance.
I. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) ("Other than the fact of a prior conviction,
any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.").
2. See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999).
3. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365-66 (1970) ("[C]ivil labels and good intentions do not
themselves obviate the need for criminal due process safeguards .... "); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S.
684, 698 (1975) ("Moreover, if Winship were limited to those facts that constitute a crime as defined by
state law, a State could undermine many of the interests that decision sought to protect without
effecting any substantive change in its law.").
4. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476.
5. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 251-52 (1949) ("And it is conceded that no federal
constitutional objection would have been possible if the judge here had sentenced appellant to death
because appellant's trial manner impressed the judge that appellant was a bad risk for society, or if the
judge had sentenced him to death giving no reason at all.").
6. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 89-91 (1986).
7. Id. at 92 ("We have some difficulty fathoming why the due process calculus would change simply
because the legislature has seen fit to provide sentencing courts with additional guidance.").
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held on a number of occasions, with an appropriate emphasis on the principles
of legislative primacy and federalism. 8
Apprendi v. New Jersey9 is only the latest round in a battle of two Court
factions defined by these positions, but it is appropriate for several reasons to
call this problem the Apprendi puzzle. Apprendi is by any measure a landmark
case-the point at which the battle turned dramatically in favor of the long-time
losers. 10 Apprendi holds that any fact, except criminal history, that increases the
available punishment for an offense beyond the applicable statutory maximum
penalty must be determined by a jury on proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 11
During the two decades before Apprendi in which the question seemed to be
settled to the contrary, courts and legislatures supposed that a valid sentence
could be imposed on the basis of some facts, not limited to criminal history, that
had been proved to the sentencing judge only by a preponderance. 12 The
Apprendi decision immediately affected thousands of sentences in cases pending appeal. 13 Furthermore, because the Apprendi principle is almost certainly
retroactive, 14 thousands of additional convictions may soon be vulnerable to
collateral attack on habeas corpus. 15 But this is only the beginning of the problem.

8. See id. at 86 ("[W]e should hesitate to conclude that due process bars the State from pursuing its
chosen course in the area of defining crimes and prescribing penalties." (citing Patterson v. New York,
432 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1977))).
9. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
10. See id. at 476 (Stevens, J.) ("At stake in this case are constitutional protections of surpassing
importance .. . .");id.at 524 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (describing Apprendi as "a watershed change in
constitutional law").
11 . Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
12. Id. at 564-65 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("For another thing, this Court's case law ... led legislatures to believe that they were permitted to increase a statutory maximum sentence based on a
sentencing factor.").
13. The proportion of pending appeals that were affected by Apprendi is difficult to estimate, but
even ten percent would be a substantial number. About 70,000 criminal appeals are pending at any
given time. The most recent figures available list the total number of mandatory appeals pending in
state intermediate appellate courts (most of which are criminal cases) as 47,336 in 1996; 51,109 in
1997; and 48,015 in 1998. NAT' L COUNCIL OF STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK Of STATE COURTS,
1998, at 96 ( 1999). The total number of discretionary appeals pending in state courts during the same
periods was 17,174 in 1996; 17,847 in 1997; and 18,647 in 1998. Id. at 97. The number of felony
convictions in federal courts is four percent of the number of state convictions. BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T Of JUSTICE, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 1996, at 2 (1999). So, in addition
to the approximately 67,000 criminal appeals pending in state courts, there are about another 3000
pending in federal court.
14. See infra Part III. F.
15. Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Apres Apprendi, 12 FED. SENTENCING REP. 331, 33 1 (2000)
("Apprendi threatens thousands of completed criminal prosecutions under dozens of existing federal
and state statutes."). King and Klein note that "[a]ltogether, some 400,000 federal, state, and local
inmates-almost a quarter of the overall inmate population-are serving time or awaiting trial for drug
offenses." Id. at 331 n.7. Many drug offense statutes and sentence enhancements, such as 21 U.S.C.
§ 841 (2000), are vulnerable under Apprendi. King & Klein, supra, at 331-32; see also Alan C.
Michaels, Truth in Convicting: Understanding and Evaluating Apprendi, 12 FED. SENTENCING REP. 320,
322-23 (2000) (describing federal drug convictions under§ 841 as particularly vulnerable to Apprendi).
King and Klein doubt that habeas corpus will be avai lable to most prisoners seeking relief under
Apprendi. King & Klein, supra, at 333-34. But see infra Part IIl.f.
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Neither of the two limitations set by Apprendi, pertaining to criminal history16 and statutory maxima, 17 respectively, can stand much scrutiny. Each of
the limitations is vulnerable to elimination once an appropriate vehicle for
overturning its supporting precedent arrives at the Court, and some Justices
already have signaled their readiness to do this. 18 If this were to happen, both
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and many state sentencing schemes would be
rendered unconstitutional. 19 All told, hundreds of thousands of sentences would
have to be reviewed and possibly vacated. 20 Among the beneficiaries would be
some of the most dangerous people in the country.
The solution offered here is a solution to the conceptual puzzle at the heart of
Apprendi. There is a principled basis on which to distinguish a jury's determination of facts in support of punishment from a judge's determination of facts in
support of punishment. The key is to understand what each institution is doing
when it makes its factual determinations and the constitutional implications of
fact-finding in these different functional contexts. The solution offered below
pursues the Apprendi Court's principled concern for fundamental fairness and
the preservation of the traditional normative architecture of the criminal law.
The solution rebuts the argument that the Apprendi dissenters and their predecessors on the Court have relied upon for half a century.

16. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
17. /d.at486-87&n.13.
18. See id. at 487 n. 13 (Stevens, J.) (expressly leaving open the possibility that McMillan may be
overruled); id. at 489 (stating that "it is arguable that Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly decided, and
that a logical application of our reasoning today should apply if the recidivist issue were contested"); id.
at 499 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that the Constitution requires the broad rule "that all the facts
which must exist in order to subject the defendant to a legally prescribed punishment must be found by
the jury"); id. at 520-22 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating his belief that the Almendarez-Torres and
McMillan cases were incorrectly decided); see also infra Part I.A (describing the relationship between
McMillan and Almendarez-Torres, and the two limitations contained in the rule of Apprendi).
19. See id. at 550-51 (O'Connor, J., di ssenting) (noting that "the Court does not say whether [federal
and state determinate sentencing] schemes are constitutional, but its reasoning strongly suggests that
they are not").
20. The total number of federal prisoners at the end of 1999 was 135,246. BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 1999, at I (2000). The vast majority of these prisoners
were sentenced under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and all of these would be affected by the
extension of Apprendi. The total number of state prisoners at the end of 1999 was 1,231,475. Id. Not all
of these prisoners were sentenced under a mandatory sentencing system. However, the number of these
prisoners that would be affected by an extension of Apprendi is likely to be substantial. Fourteen states,
including California, Florida, and Illinois, have determinate sentencing systems similar to the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1996 NATIONAL SURVEY OF
STATE SENTENCING STRUCTURES 4-5 ( 1998). All fifty states and the District of Columbia have mandatoryminimum sentencing for at least some offenses. Id. In 1994, Congress passed the Truth in Sentencing
Act, which encouraged states to adopt mandatory sentencing systems. See Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §§ 20102-20103, 108 Stat. 1796, 1816-17 (1994)
(creating the Violent Offender Incarceration and Truth-in-Sentencing Incentive Grants Program). The
Act has had a substantial impact on prison populations in those states. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Thurn IN SENTENCING IN STATE PRISONS 3-5 (1999); see also BUREAU OF JUSTICE
ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF STRUCTURED SENTENCING 100-13 (1996)
(describing impact of state structured sentencing systems on incarceration rates and prison crowding).
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The practical effect of my solution to the Apprendi puzzle, were the Court to
adopt it, would be to bring on the massive difficulties that Apprendi's detractors
fear. This prospect is no reason not to solve the puzzle. It seems likely that the
Court will take an incremental approach to solving its difficulties in this area,
instead of the global approach that my argument suggests. 21 Even so, the
eventual resolution of these difficulties will require an understanding of the
principles at the heart of the problem. Furthermore, I hope to persuade that
whatever the cost of a principled solution to the Apprendi puzzle may be, we
ought to pay it. If this attitude toward the actual social cost of theoretical
consistency seems cavalier, let me attempt to dispel that impression in two
steps: first, by indicating how far things have gone wrong; and second, by
suggesting a reason, elaborated upon at the end of this Article, why the practical
cost of my solution to the Apprendi puzzle is not as great as one might fear.
In one of the first articles to appear in Apprendi's wake, 22 Stephanos Bibas
argues that the practical effect of Apprendi's holding is to make federal defendants23 worse off. He points out that the combination of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines' "real offense" approach to sentencing and the incentives to plead
guilty created by the Guidelines leads to a situation in which the defendant's
only genuine opportunity to litigate the facts of the case occurs at sentencing. 24
Bibas makes a persuasive case that Apprendi eliminates this opportunity, even
while it does little to change the incentives to plead guilty.25 The result is that
the facts of federal cases may never be litigated at all. Bibas thus concludes that
Apprendi should be rejected at the first opportunity, because it fails to reflect the
"real world" of criminal justice in which plea bargaining predominates over the

21. See Michaels, supra note 15, at 323-25 (describing Apprendi as an incremental step toward a
broader rule).
22. Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas,
110 YALE L.J. 1097 (2001).
23 . Bibas repeatedly refers to "similar state [sentencing] systems" in an effort to broaden the impact
of his thesis. E.g., id. at 1153. The fact is, however, that there are no similar state systems. The states
that have adopted determinate sentencing in general have not adopted the Guidelines' real-offense
approach to sentencing. See United States v. Shonubi, 103 F.3d 1085, 1088 (2d Cir. 1997). Bibas's
thesis, as a result, is limited in its application to federal cases.
24. Determinate sentencing schemes such as the Guidelines are meant to eliminate disparity in
sentences by eliminating discretion in sentencing. But if a sentence follows rigidly, according to
formula, from the offense of conviction, then discretion is not eliminated; it simply is shifted from the
judge to the prosecutor, who can engage in "sentence bargaining." That is, the charge to which the
defendant pleads will be the sole determinant of his sentence, and the prosecutor controls the charge, or
charges, offered to the defendant. For this reason, the Guidelines operate on the principle of real-offense
sentencing, under which "relevant conduct" surrounding the offense of conviction-including uncharged crimes and "crimes" of which the defendant has been acquitted-is proved at a mini-trial for
purposes of sentencing. The theory is that if the sentence turns on these additional facts, instead of the
charge alone, then the prosecutor will not be able to exercise exclusive control over the sentence that
the defendant will receive. See KATE STITH & JosE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING
GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 132- 33 (1998).
25. Bibas, supra note 22, at 1152-68.
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trial of criminal cases. 26
I draw quite a different conclusion from Bibas's arguments. Apprendi attempts to restore the traditional normative architecture of the criminal law. If the
result of this effort is to make defendants in the federal criminal justice system
worse off, then we have a system that, simply put, is not a criminal justice
system at all. If the combination of plea bargaining and the Guidelines approach
to sentencing not only does not have, but also cannot be reconciled with, the
attributes of a recognizable system of just punishment, then the federal system
is merely an administrative regime for the efficient processing of undesirables.
The actual operation27 of the federal system before Apprendi bears this interpretation · even without the effects that Bibas anticipates. 28 We have created a
monster, 29 and we ought to destroy it.

26. Id. at 1100 ("Apprendi is symptomatic of criminal procedure's preoccupation with jury trials at
the expense of the real world of guilty pleas and sentencing.").
27. Some of the principal features of Guidelines sentencing are simply shocking to the unindoctrinated in their gross variance from established criminal justice norms. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note
24, passim. The Guidelines' real-offense sentencing philosophy permits offenders to be sentenced for
"guidelines crimes" that are not part of any democratically legislated criminal code, but are instead ad
hoc assemblages of facts that probation officers and prosecutors have deemed relevant to the actual
crime of conviction. The defendant can be convicted of these "guidelines crimes" without the benefit of
notice, a grand jury indictment, rules of evidence, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or any meaningful
opportunity to appeal. Federal prosecutors have frankly admitted that they have pursued and obtained
convictions on lesser offenses in order to sentence the offender to a more serious "guidelines
crime"-such as murder-that they could not prove as a genuine crime. See infra note 164 and
accompanying text. Furthermore, a "guidelines crime" can be a crime of which the offender previously
has been acquitted. See United States v. Watts, 519 U.S . 148, 149 (1997) (holding that a guidelines
crime premised on acquitted conduct need be proved only by a preponderance); Witte v. United States,
515 U.S. 389, 399-400 (1995) (holding that double jeopardy is no bar to sentencing on acquitted
criminal conduct).
28. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 24, at 103 ("Without principled foundation or application, the
awesome power of the state to inflict suffering is wielded as an exercise in bureaucratic regularity, for
which no one, ultimately, bears responsibility."); see also Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness:
Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 HARv. L. REv. 1429, 1431-32 (2001) (arguing
that the Guidelines, among other sentencing schemes, falsely presents purely prophylactic incapacitation as deserved punishment).
29. Other observers have reached roughly the same conclusion regarding the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. Judge G. Thomas Esele has called the Guidelines "a dark, sinister, and cynical crime
management program [that has] ... a certain Kafkaesque aura about it." G. Thomas Esele, The
Sentencing Guidelines System? No. Sentencing Guidelines? Yes., FED. PROBATION, Dec. 1991, at 16, 20.
See generally Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation,
58 U. CHI. L. REv. 901 (1991); Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines:
Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, IOI YALE L.J. 1681 (1992); Gerald W. Heaney,
The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to Disparity, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 161 (1991); Susan N.
Herman, The Tail That Wagged the Dog: Bifurcated Fact-Finding Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines and the Limits of Due Process, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 289 (1992); Elizabeth T. Lear, ls
Conviction Irrelevant?, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1179 (1993); Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Facts: Travesties of
Real-Offense Sentencing, 45 STAN. L. REV. 523 (1993); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Assessing the Federal
Sentencing Process: The Problem ls Uniformity, Not Disparity, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 833 (1992);
David Yellen, Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice: Real Offense Sentencing and the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 78 MINN. L. REV. 403 (1993); Deborah Young, Fact-Finding at Federal Sentencing: Why
the Guidelines Should Meet the Rules, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 299 (1994). Several prominent commenta-
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The cost of abolishing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the other
mandatory sentencing schemes probably would be high, but it would be astronomical if this abolition were carried out retroactively. Retroactive abolition
would entail the reversal of hundreds of thousands of final judgments and lead
to resentencing or release in all of them. Ordinarily, new rules of law are not
applied retroactively to final judgments, but exceptions exist for new rules that
embody fundamental principles of criminal law or that protect essential procedural rights. 30 My argument appeals to the fundamental requirements of just
punishment in order to restore both the due process right to proof beyond a
reasonable doubt and the Sixth Amendment jury right. The rule that I advocate,
then, would seem to apply retroactively. However, the exceptions to the rule of
nonretroactivity are meant to identify the unusual constitutional rule on which
long-standing consensus exists and that has been articulated as a new rule only
because it has never before been challenged. My solution does not run afoul of
these exceptions, because I do not seek to restore a constitutional consensus.
My argument is that a long-standing consensus should be dissolved in order to
free the Court from a stalemate. The Apprendi puzzle arises from a misconceived theory of punishment that the Court ought to abandon in favor of a more
adequate one. Were the Court to adopt my solution to the Apprendi puzzle, it
would mark a significant departure in the Court's jurisprudence that could apply
only prospectively. If so, then the cost of my solution would be lower than one
might fear.
The holdings of both Apprendi and McMillan v. Pennsylvania-the leading
statement of the rule contrary to Apprendi's-easily can be reduced to absurdities. As Part I argues, both factions on the Court have performed this exercise
on the other's position, but neither side seems to have recognized the obvious
implication of this exchange: that the problem has been misconceived by all
concerned. Both sides recognize that the question comes down to apportioning
the respective responsibilities of the jury and the judge in finding the facts that
bear on punishment. Their debate has centered on the historical practice of
committing some category of facts to one or another of these decisionmakers.
But a categorical approach is doomed because juries and judges determine the
same or similar categories of facts. The difference between them is the functional context in which each institution makes such determinations.
The Court has missed this point because of its notorious reluctance to
constitutionalize the substantive criminal law 3 1-a reluctance that seems to

tors have been equally critical of plea bargaining. See generally Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the
Criminal Def endant's Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 931
(1983); Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Y ALE L.J. 1131, 1196-99 (1991)
(arguing that the trial right is nonwaivable); George Fisher, Plea Bargaining's Triumph , 109 YALE L.J.
857 (2000); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 H ARV. L. R EV. 1037 (1984).
30. See infra notes 342-49 and accompanying text.
31 . See Louis D. Bilionis, Process, the Constitution, and Substantive Criminal Law, 96 MICH. L.
R EV. 1269, 1269 (1998) ("Criminal law scholars have pined for a substantive constitutional criminal
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involve a deep-seated aversion to the theory of punishment. 32 With the decision
in Apprendi, the time has come to take theory seriously. Without greater
conceptual clarity, the Court will continue to fumble this issue. Part II therefore
introduces some fundamental distinctions and concepts from the theory of
punishment and reconceives the problem on this basis. Part III solves the
Apprendi puzzle by these means.
The jury determines facts in the context of determining criminal fault. The
judge determines the same or similar facts in the context of determining a
proportionate punishment. Fault in wrongdoing and proportionality in punishment can be distinguished, as can the respective institutional roles of juries and
judges in finding facts that bear on punishment. Part III goes on to elaborate and
defend this argument by drawing the implications of this solution for the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, as well as for state mandatory-minimum and
"three strikes" sentencing schemes.
I. THE PuzzLE
By the time Apprendi was decided, the issue it presented was finely poised
between two equally defensible positions. Unfortunately, the Apprendi opinions
did little more than heighten the conceptual tension.
A. BUILDING THE PUZZLE

The issue behind the Apprendi puzzle is the constitutional definition of a
criminal offense. The issue arises in two different ways. In some cases, such as
Apprendi itself, a legislature has taken a fact that arguably is an element of a
crime and has designated it a "sentencing factor" instead. Because sentencing
receives less constitutional regulation than the criminal trial, this designation
has the effects of relieving the prosecution of the burden of proving its case
beyond a reasonable doubt, removing the question from the jury, and depriving
the defendant of other trial rights such as notice in the indictment and the right
to confront witnesses. 33 The same issue arises when the legislature takes a fact
that arguably is an element of a crime and designates it an "affirmative
defense." This has the effect of shifting the burden of persuasion on the issue to
the defendant, again relieving the prosecution of the burden of proving its case
beyond a reasonable doubt. 34
The notion of a sentencing factor has its roots in the 1949 case of Williams v.
New York. 35 In the course of sentencing Williams to death for murder, the trial

law ever since Henry Hart and Herbert Packer first embraced the notion in the late 1950's and early
1960's." (citing Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 401
(1958); and Herbert L. Packer, Mens-Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 SuP. CT. REV. 107)).
32. See Kyron Huigens, Rethinking the Penalty Phase, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1195, 1220-28 (2000).
33. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 96--98 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
34. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 225-27 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting).
35. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
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judge relied on a probation report that, among other things, accused Williams of
having committed thirty burglaries in the vicinity of the murder, which itself
had occurred during a burglary. On appeal, Williams objected to this information being used to sentence him, on due process grounds. 36 The Supreme Court
affirmed the death sentence. 37 The Court reasoned that the trial judge had
discretion in sentencing and that "no federal constitutional objection would
have been possible if the judge here had sentenced appellant to death because
appellant's trial manner impressed the judge that the appellant was a bad risk for
society, or if the judge had sentenced him to death giving no reason at all." 38
This being the case, there could be no constitutional objection to a procedure
that made the grounds of Williams's sentence explicit. Nor was there any
question for the Williams Court that the trial judge's discretion in sentencing
was well-founded. The Court described that discretion as a valid feature of
modem indeterminate sentencing schemes, under which the legislature sets a
broad sentencing range, a judge sets a maximum sentence within this range, and
a probation department determines the actual amount of time served by an
inmate, depending on his progress in reformation and rehabilitation. 39 "Retribution," the Court wrote, "is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law.
Reformation and rehabilitation have become important goals of criminal jurisprudence. "40
The Court seemed to contradict Williams a few years later in Specht v.
Patterson. 41 Specht was convicted in Colorado of indecent liberties, a crime
carrying a maximum penalty of ten years. But Specht was not sentenced for that
offense. Instead, he was sentenced under a separate statute, the Sex Offenders
Act, 42 to an indeterminate term of one day to life. This sentence rested on a
finding by the trial court, based on a probation report and entered without a
hearing, to the effect that Specht was a danger to the public.43 Specht challenged this sentence on due process grounds, and the Court reversed. Even
though the purpose of the Act was to incapacitate sex offenders, the Court held,
the sentence constituted punishment. 44 That being so, due process required the
presence of counsel, a hearing, and the confrontation of witnesses. 45 The Court
distinguished this case from the "radically different situation"46 presented in
Williams, apparently on the ground that Specht involved a new and formally
distinct proceeding to determine the defendant's dangerousness, instead of an

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 245.
Id. at 252.
Id.
Id. at 248-49.
Id. at 248.
386 U.S. 605 (1967).
Cow. REV. STAT. ANN.§§ 39-19-1 to -10 (1963).
Specht, 386 U.S. at 607--08 .
See id. at 608--09.
Id. at 609-10.
Id. at 608.
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ordinary sentencing. 47 But it is difficult to see this distinction as making a
constitutional difference. Both cases involved the imposition of punishment.
Williams's principal rationale was that if a trial judge may impose a sentence
without stating any reason, then the defendant is no worse off-indeed, he is
probably better off-if the sentencing judge makes her reasons explicit. This
rationale covers the standards and procedures at issue in Specht no less than the
sentencing procedure at issue in Williams.
In re Winship 48 seemed to cement the broad principle underlying Specht: that
the Due Process Clause protects the traditional normative architecture of the
criminal law. The Winship Court held that "the Due Process Clause protects the
accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged."49 In its
opinion, the Court stressed the fundamental unfairness of imposing criminal
liability on civil standards of proof. 50 It relied on the reasonable doubt standard's status under common law as an essential safeguard against erroneous
deprivations of liberty, 51 and it quoted Justice Frankfurter's assertion that the
standard is "rightly one of the boasts of a free society." 52 Likewise, Justice
Harlan wrote in his concurrence that the criminal law is "bottomed on a
fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an
innocent man than to let a guilty man go free." 5 3
Winship stands not only for the constitutionalization of the reasonable doubt
rule, but also for the rule that this requirement cannot be evaded by formalistic
distinctions. Samuel Winship was a juvenile. He was convicted on proof by a
preponderance of an act that "if done by an adult, would constitute a crime." 54
In response to the State's contention that this was not a crime, but a matter of
juvenile delinquency, the Court stressed that "civil labels and good intentions do
not themselves obviate the need for criminal due process safeguards in juvenile
courts." 55
Mullaney v. Wilbur56 lined up squarely behind Specht and Winship even
though the issue was not the elements of an offense versus sentencing factors,
but instead the elements of an offense versus an affirmative defense. In Mullaney, Maine had defined murder and manslaughter as two degrees of felonious
homicide. A felonious homicide consisted of an unlawful (that is, neither
justified nor excused) killing, done with intent. The felonious homicide would
be punished as murder unless the defendant persuaded the jury, by a preponder47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 607--08.
397 U.S. 358 (1970).
Id. at 364.
See id. at 363--64.
See id. at 361--63.
Id. at 362 (quoting Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790,802 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
Id. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Winship, 397 U.S. at 360 (quoting N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 712).
Id. at 365--66.
421 U.S. 684 (1975).
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ance, that he had acted in the heat of passion; or, to put the same point in
converse terms, that he had not acted with malice aforethought. 57 If the defendant could carry this burden, then he would be punished for manslaughter
instead of murder. The Supreme Court held that this Maine law violated due
process because it placed the burden of proving an essential element of the
crime of murder-malice aforethought-on the defendant. 58
Even though Specht, Winship, and Mullaney seemed to have established a
strong line of precedent, the line they established was in significant tension with
Williams. The Mullaney opinion distinguished Williams on the ground that
Williams concerned sentencing, whereas Mullaney concerned the defendant's
guilt. 59 But in a separate passage, the Court also recognized the permeability of
this boundary. Arguing that substance controls over form and that a state cannot
redesignate and reassign offense elements at will, 60 the Court wrote:
Moreover, if Winship were limited to those facts that constitute a crime as
defined by state law, a State could undermine many of the interests that
decision sought to protect without effecting any substantive change in its law.
It would only be necessary to redefine the elements that constitute different
crimes, characterizing them as factors that bear solely on the extent of
punishment. 61

This conflicts with Williams because that case's central argument implies a
plenary power in the states to designate offense elements as sentencing factors.
If a sentencing judge has the discretion to impose a sentence for any reason
whatsoever or for no reason at all, then the sentencing judge can impose a
sentence implicitly on the basis of a fact that historically has been an element of
an offense. To require the judge to exercise discretion on such a basis explicitly,
and to require the proof of this fact to be by a preponderance, constitutes a net
constitutional gain, not a loss.
McMillan v. Pennsylvania62 elevated this implication of Williams to the status
of constitutional doctrine under the Sixth Amendment and Due Process Clauses.
Pennsylvania's Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act set a mandatory minimum
sentence of five years for certain specified felonies provided that the prosecution
proved "visible possession of a firearm." 63 This fact was to be proved at
sentencing, to the judge, by a preponderance. McMillan and others contended
that this way of proceeding violated Winship, because the visible possession of a

57. Maine construed its law to be that malice aforethought and the heat of passion were two sides of
a single coin. See id. at 686-87. The Court accepted Maine's construction as binding, in accordance
with long-standing constitutional doctrine. Id. at 69 I.
58. See id. at 703--04.
59. See id. at 697 n.23.
60. Id. at 699 ("Winship is concerned with substance rather than this kind of formalism.").
61. Id. at 698.
62. 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
63. Id. at 80-81 (citing 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 9712 (1982)).
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firearm was a fact on the basis of which the State proposed to stigmatize and
imprison them. But the Court rejected this argument on the rationale suggested
by Williams:
Sentencing courts have traditionally heard evidence and found facts without
any prescribed burden of proof at all. Pennsylvania has deemed a particular
fact relevant and prescribed a particular burden of proof. We see nothing in
Pennsylvania's scheme that would warrant constitutionalizing burdens of
proof at sentencing.
Petitioners apparently concede that Pennsylvania's scheme would pass
constitutional muster if only it did not remove the sentencing court's discretion, i.e., if the legislature had simply directed the court to consider visible
possession in passing sentence. We have some difficulty fathoming why the
due process calculus would change simply because the legislature has seen fit
to provide sentencing courts with additional guidance. 64

The McMillan dissenters stressed the point that the Court had made in
Mullaney: If the state has the unrestricted power to designate facts that justify
punishment as "sentencing factors" or "affirmative defenses," then it can evade
Winship's due process requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 65
Winship had rejected this kind of formalism: No matter what the state wished to
call it, any fact that the state invoked to justify punishment had to be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. In response, the McMillan Court conceded that
"there are constitutional limits to the State's power in this regard," 66 but it
expressly declined to say what those limits were. 67 Subsequently, lower courts
in need of guidance have taken it fr.om a passing remark in the McMillan
opinion that is almost comically unsuited to the role of a constitutional standard:68 "The statute gives no impression of having been ... a tail which wags
the dog of the substantive offense."69
The way to McMillan's holding had been eased considerably by Patterson v.
New York, 70 a case concerning an affirmative defense and one that severely
limited the holding of Mullaney. Patterson was convicted of murder, a crime
that, in New York, required the State to prove that the defendant had caused the

64. ld. at 91-92 (citing Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949)) (internal citation omitted). The
Court also reasoned that
[t]he Pennsylvania Legislature did not change the definition of any existing offense. It simply
took one factor that has always been considered by sentencing courts to bear on punishmentthe instrumentality used in committing a violent felony-and dictated the precise weight to be
given that factor if the instrumentality is a firearm.

ld. at .89-90.
65. See id. at 93-94 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at.103 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
66. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 86.
67. See id.
68. See, e.g., United States v. Murray, 67 F.3d 687, 690 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Mobley, 956
F.2d 450, 456 (3d Cir. 1992).
69. McMillan, 477 U .S. at 88.
70. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
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death of another person and had done so with intent. The criminal code allowed
the defendant the opportunity to reduce his crime to manslaughter, provided that
he could prove, by a preponderance, that he had acted under an extreme
emotional disturbance. 71 The Court recognized that extreme emotional disturbance is the modem restatement of the defense of provocation or "heat of
passion. " 72 The Court perceived that "[i]t is plain enough that if the intentional
killing is shown, the State intends to deal with the defendant as a murderer
unless he demonstrates the mitigating circumstances." 73 However, the Court did
not recognize that this made the New York law indistinguishable from the
Maine law struck down in Mullaney. The Court thought it a sufficient distinction to say that New York had defined a set of elements constituting murder, that
this set did not include "malice aforethought," and that New York had created
an "affirmative defense" of extreme emotional disturbance without reference to
these elements. Whereas Maine had treated heat of passion as the converse of
malice aforethought, New York had never treated extreme emotional disturbance as the flip side of any element of murder. 74 The Court decided that the
real defect in Mullaney, which was not present in Patterson, was that Maine had
shifted the burden on an acknowledged element of murder onto the defendant. 75
As the Patterson dissenters pointed out, this exercise in labeling was precisely the sort of formalism that Winship and Mullaney had rejected in their due
process analyses. 76 But the Patterson Court's formalism had the virtue of
serving the strong, countervailing constitutional values of federalism and legislative supremacy. If a state wished to provide the benefit of a defense or
mitigation in criminal cases, the Court argued, then it was surely within the
state's special competence over criminal matters to condition that benefit as it
chose: "The Due Process Clause, as we see it, does not put New York to the
choice of abandoning those defenses or undertaking to disprove their existence
in order to convict of a crime which otherwise is within its constitutional
powers to sanction by substantial punishment." 77 The Court had reasoned in this
way when it recognized the states' prerogative to impose the burden of persua-

71. Id. at 200.
72. Id. at 202; see also People v. Casassa, 404 N.E.2d 1310, 1314 (N.Y. 1980) (describing the state's
"extreme emotional disturbance" defense as based on the Model Penal Code's revision of the heat of
passion defense); MODEL PENAL CoDE § 210.3 cmt. 5(a), at 53-65 (1980) (describing "extreme
emotional disturbance" as a version of provocation).
73. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 206.
74. Id. at 215-16. However, as Justice Powell pointed out in his Patterson dissent, id. at 222 n.4
(Powell, J., dissenting), and as the Mullaney Court explicitly recognized, 421 U.S. at 689, the Maine
court had decided that malice aforethought was not an element of murder, but was only a policy
presumption underlying its homicide law. Thus, the elements of murder in Maine were essentially the
same as the elements of murder in New York. In this light, in particular, Patterson presented exactly the
same issue as Mullaney. See infra Part ll.e.
75. See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 214-15.
76. See id. at 224-25 (Powell, J., dissenting).
77. Patterson, 432 U.S at 207--08.
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sion of insanity on the defense. 78 Once it had cast New York's recognition of
extreme emotional disturbance in this mold, the Patterson Court saw no reason
to revisit that decision. 79
The Williams-McMillan line of cases reached its high-water mark in Almendarez-Torres v. United States. 80 Almendarez-Torres was charged with and pled
guilty to the crime of being found in the United States after having previously
been deported. At his sentencing, Almendarez-Torres admitted that he had been
deported because of three earlier convictions for aggravated felonies. This
brought his case under a different subsection of the offense statute than that
stated in the indictment and subjected him to a twenty-year instead of a
two-year maximum sentence. Almendarez-Torres was sentenced to eighty-five
months. 81 In his challenge to this sentence, he argued that the statute created
two distinct crimes and that he had not been charged with the one that carried
the higher maximum penalty. 82 The Court rejected this interpretation of the
statute and affirmed the sentence.
Invoking Congress's broad power to define crimes, defenses, and sentencing
factors, 83 the Court specifically rejected an argument based on the doctrine of
constitutional doubt. 84 Almendarez-Torres had argued that to read the statute to
permit an increase in the maximum sentence on the basis of a "sentencing
element" that had not been proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt would
cast the statute in a questionable constitutional light. 85 This argument was
substantial. McMillan had turned in part on the proposition that the sentence
enhancement in that case did not increase the maximum sentence. 86 Specht had
turned in part on the proposition that the sentence enhancement in that case did
alter the maximum. 87 Nevertheless, by means of stingy readings of Winship,
Specht, and Mullaney, the Court found no constitutional doubt in AlmendarezTorres.88 It arrived at this conclusion in spite of a grudging recognition that its

78. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798 (1952), cited in Patterson, 432 U.S. at 204.
79. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 207.
80. 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
81. Id. at 227.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 228.
84. Id. This doctrine of statutory interpretation consists of the rule that "[a] statute must be
construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional but also
grave doubts upon that score." United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 401 (1916) (Holmes, J.),
cited in Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 237.
85. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 237-39.
86. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 88 (1986).
87. See Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605,607 (1967).
88. Regarding Winship, the Court in Almendarez-Torres reasoned that the case did not say what
should count as an element, even if it did require all elements to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 240. But Winship clearly prescribed a substantive inquiry into this
question in its rejection of the State's argument that the facts proved there were not elements of a crime,
but only elements of a juvenile offense. See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text. Regarding
Specht, the Court relied on the distinction without a difference drawn in that case. See AlmendarezTorres, 523 U.S. at 241--42; supra notes 46--47 and accompanying text. Regarding Mullaney, the Court
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cases were in significant tension. Concerning Mullaney and Patterson, the Court
concluded, "The upshot is that Mullaney's language, if read literally, suggests
that the Constitution requires that most, if not all, sentencing factors be treated
as elements. But Patterson suggests the exact opposite, namely that the Constitution requires scarcely any sentencing factors to be treated in that way. " 89
Elsewhere, the Court wrote in a similar vein: "At most, petitioner might read
all these cases, taken together, for the broad proposition that sometimes the
Constitution does require (though sometimes it does not require) the State to
treat a sentencing factor as an element."90 The Court did not credit these
interpretations and, therefore, found no constitutional doubt. The dissenters
found constitutional doubt in more frank readings of Winship, Specht, and
Mullaney and in a full appreciation of the resulting tension between these cases
and the Williams-McMillan line. 91
One year later, in another case calling for statutory interpretation, the tide
turned. Jones v. United States 92 required the Court to interpret a federal criminal
statute that was distinguishable, but not significantly different from the statute at
issue in Almendarez-Torres. In both cases, good arguments could be made for
and against the view that the statute created several offenses instead of one
offense with several sentencing provisions. The difference was that the Court
found constitutional doubt in Jones, whereas it had harbored no such doubts in
Almendarez-Torres. 93 Behind this difference lay a different view of the historic
norms of the criminal law. Almendarez-Torres had been decided in line with
McMillan, in which the Court had written: "We reject the view that anything in
the Due Process Clause bars States from making changes in their criminal laws
that have the effect of making it easier for the prosecution to obtain convictions."94 But in Jones, the Court found constitutional doubt precisely because
the Government's reading of the statute would make it easier for the prosecution
to obtain convictions.
The constitutional question in Jones, according to the Court, was "whether
recognizing an unlimited legislative power to authorize determinations setting
ultimate sentencing limits without a jury would invite erosion of the jury's
function to a point against which a line must necessarily be drawn." 95 The Court

relied on the formalistic and implausible distinction drawn between the Maine and New York statutes in
Patterson. See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 240-41; supra note 74; infra Part 11.B.
89. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 241.
90. Id. at 242.
91. Id. at 256 (Scalia, J ., dissenting).
92. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
93. See id. at 251-52. Specifically, Justice Thomas had changed his view of the matter. He would
later publicly and forcefully repudiate his vote in Almendarez-Torres. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466, 520 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring).
94. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 90 n.5 (1986). Presumably, the Court took the same
view of the Sixth Amendment, given that the convictions at issue in McMillan had been challenged on
this ground as well.
95. Jones, 526 U.S. at 244.
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found that there was such a danger, and it drew such a line. In doing so, the
Court stressed the fact that, in the Founding era, the Crown had attempted to
ensure convictions by drafting criminal statutes so as to avoid jury decisionmaking. This was a prime motivation behind the Jury Right Clause. 96 The issue was
prominent in the Founders' political value system because of the influence of
Blackstone, who had condemned such measures, 97 and because of the trial of
John Peter Zenger, which had offered the colonists an object lesson in the power
of juries to counter government overreaching. 98 The Jones dissenters, of course,
perceived no such danger. On the contrary, they perceived a threat to the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and state mandatory-minimum sentencing schemes and,
more broadly, to the constitutional power of Congress and the states to define
crimes and prescribe punishments. 99
The Jones dissenters demanded that the Court state the constitutional principle that raised doubts about the Government's interpretation of the statute. 100
In order to oblige, the Court had to navigate around the holdings of McMillan
and Almendarez-Torres, but it did so with relative ease. The Court wrote,
[U]nder the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and
jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior
conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged
in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. 101

The Court had to concede that no prior case rested squarely on this proposition,
but it found constitutional doubt nevertheless. In Apprendi, with one minor
variation, 102 this proposition was elevated to an express requirement of the
Constitution.
Apprendi had been accused of shooting at the front door of an AfricanAmerican family in his neighborhood, and charged with twenty-three counts of
various weapons and assault crimes. None of the twenty-three counts alleged
that he had acted with a racially discriminatory purpose. Apprendi pied guilty to
three counts. The maximum statutory term available for the most serious of
these offenses, second-degree possession of a firearm for unlawful purposes,
was five to ten years. Apprendi was sentenced to twelve years in prison. This
sentence was based on the sentencing court's finding, by a preponderance of the
evidence in a closely contested hearing, that Apprendi had acted "with a
96. Id. at 247-48.
97. Id. at 246 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *277-79).
98. Id. at 246-47.
99. Id. at 271 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 266--09.
101. Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 n.6.
102. Apprendi, a state case, did not implicate the Grand Jury Clause, and due process limits on
charging in state cases were not litigated. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 n.3 (2000). As
a result, Apprendi did not create a constitutional requirement for notice in charging.
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purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of race,
color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity." 103 The court
made this finding under New Jersey's "hate crime" statute, which increased the
maximum penalty for crimes committed with such a purpose to twenty years.
The Supreme Court reversed Apprendi's conviction and sentence on the ground
suggested in Jones: "Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum
must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 104
The Apprendi Court, like the Jones Court, was motivated primarily by a
desire to preserve the traditional normative architecture of the criminal law.
Quoting Joseph Story and William Blackstone, the Court wrote,
"[T]o guard against a spirit of oppression and tyranny on the part of rulers,"
and "as the great bulwark of [our] civil and political liberties," trial by jury
has been understood to require that "the truth of every accusation, whether
preferred in the shape of indictment, information, or appeal, should afterwards
be confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of [the defendant's] equals
and neighbours .... " 105

Similarly, the Court noted, as it had in Winship, that the reasonable doubt
standard of proof had been a part of the law in England and the United States at
least since 1798. 106 In his concurrence, Justice Scalia noted that "the jury-trial
guarantee was one of the least controversial provisions of the Bill of Rights." 107

103. See id. at 469 (quoting N.J . STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (West Supp. 2000)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
104. Id. at 490.
105. Id. at 477 (alterations in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 2 JosEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 540--41 (4th ed. 1873); and 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 97, at
*343).
106. Id. at 478.
107. Id. at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia's regard for the Sixth Amendment jury
guarantee as a cornerstone of the original constitutional structure is clear in his dissent in Neder v.
United States, wherein he wrote:
Article III, § 2, cl. 3 of the Constitution provides: "The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of
Impeachment, shall be by Jury .... " The Sixth Amendment provides: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury .... " When this Court deals with the content of this guarantee-the only one to appear in
both the body of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights-it is operating upon the spinal
column of American democracy. William Blackstone, the Framers' accepted authority on
English law and the English Constitution, described the right to trial by jury in criminal
prosecutions as "the grand bulwark of [the Englishman's] liberties .. . secured to him by the
great charter." 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *349. One of the indictments of the Declaration of Independence against King George III was that he had "subject[ed] us to a Jurisdiction
foreign to our Constitution, and unacknowledged by our Laws" in approving legislation "[f]or
depriving us, in many Cases, of the Benefits of Trial by Jury." Alexander Hamilton wrote that
"[t]he friends and adversaries of the plan of the convention, if they agree in nothing else,
concur at least in the value they set upon the trial by jury: Or if there is any difference between
them, it consists in this, the former regard it as a valuable safeguard to liberty, the latter
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The Court made it clear that it regarded the notion of a sentencing factor to be
of a much more recent and distinctly inferior vintage. 108
Commentators and courts had read McMillan as a grant of power to the
states, and by implication to Congress, to define crimes and punishments as they
saw fit. 109 Apprendi turned this interpretation on its head by stressing two
aspects of McMillan that had passed largely unnoticed in the intervening years.
First, the McMillan opinion did acknowledge that due process imposes some
limits on legislative power to create sentencing factors, even if it left those
limits vague. 110 Second, the sentence enhancement law at issue in McMillan did
not authorize a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum for the crime; it
merely limited the sentencing judge's discretion within that range. 111 By emphasizing these two features of McMillan, the Court actually could invoke McMillan in support of its holding in Apprendi-a point of bitter irony to the
dissenters. 112 Statutory maxima would serve as the due process boundary on the
use of sentencing factors. In response to the dissenters' accusation that the Court
had overruled McMillan, Justice Stevens pointed out that the holding in Apprendi merely narrowed the rule of McMillan, confining it to the authorization
of the use of sentencing factors to support enhancements within a statutory
sentencing range. 11 3
Almendarez-Torres had been regarded by many members of the Court as a
logical and uncontroversial extension of McMillan beyond this limit. 114 In that
case, the sentencing factor of Almendarez-Torres's prior convictions for aggravated felonies had been used to justify a sentence of eighty-five months

represent it as the very palladium of free government." THE F EDERALIST No. 83, p. 426 (M.
Beloff ed. 1987). The right to trial by jury in criminal cases was the only guarantee common
to the 12 state constitutions that predated the Constitutional Convention, and it has appeared
in the constitution of every State to enter the Union thereafter. Alschuler & Deiss, A Brief
History of the Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. Cm. L. REv. 867, 870, 875, n.44
(1994).
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. I, 30-31 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (alterations in original).
108. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 478 ("Any possible distinction between an 'element' of a felony
offense and a 'sentencing factor' was unknown to the practice of criminal indictment, trial by jury, and
judgment by court as it existed in the years surrounding our Nation's founding."); id. at 483 n.10
("Rather than offer any historical account of its own that would support the notion of a 'sentencing
factor' legally increasing punishment beyond the statutory maximum-and Justice Thomas' concurring
opinion in this case makes clear that such an exercise would be futile-the dissent proceeds by
mischaracterizing our account."); id. at 485 ("It was in McMillan v. Pennsylvania that this Court, for the
first time, coined the term 'sentencing factor' to refer to a fact that was not found by a jury but that
could affect the sentence imposed by the judge."); id. at 494 ("That point applies as well to the
constitutionally novel and elusive distinction between 'elements' and ' sentencing factors."').
109. See, e.g., Bilionis, supra note 31 , at 1305.
110. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 86 (1986), cited in Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 486.
111. Id. at 88-89.
112. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 533-34 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
113. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 487 n.13.
114. See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 248-49 (1999); id. at 268-69 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting); see also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 535 (O' Connor, J., dissenting) ("[In Almendarez-Torres] we
squarely rejected the 'increase in the maximum penalty' rule.").
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following his plea of guilty to a crime that carried a maximum sentence of two
years. The Apprendi Court, however, chose to treat Almendarez-Torres as "at
best an exceptional departure from the historic practice that we have described." 115 The Court regarded criminal history as a genuine sentencing factor,
given that "recidivism ... is a traditional, if not the most traditional, basis for a
sentencing court's increasing an offender's sentence," 1I6 and given that criminal
history is not part of the commission of the offense. 117 The Court also stressed
that, unlike other facts that may serve as sentencing factors, criminal history is
itself the product of judicial proceedings that presumably met due process
requirements and is thus supported by "substantial procedural safeguards of [its]
own." 118 In this way the Apprendi Court put in place the second of its two
limitations on the broad principle that the facts that are used to justify punishment must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury.
The dissenters doubted, with reason, that the Court intended to observe either
of these two limitations for long. Even while Justice Stevens insisted that
Apprendi did not overrule McMillan, he refused to rule out that possibility. He
wrote, "Conscious of the likelihood that legislative decision may have been
made in reliance on McMillan, we reserve for another day the question of
whether stare decisis considerations preclude reconsideration of its narrower
holding." 119 Justice Stevens signaled that Almendarez-Torres might be confined
to its facts, when he pointedly noted that Almendarez-Torres had not contested
the fact of his prior convictions, and he cited this as one of the reasons that no
constitutional doubt had been raised in that case. 120 Justice Stevens also refused
to rule out the possibility that Almendarez-Torres might be overruled outright, in
stronger terms than he had used in connection with McMillan. He noted that "it
is arguable that Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly decided, and that a logical
application of our reasoning today should apply if the recidivist issue were
contested." 121 In short, the dissenters' anxiety over the fate of the WilliamsMcMillan line of cases was well-founded.
B. CONCEPTUAL TENSION

If Apprendi represents an unstable balance of power between two credible
lines of authority, then it is worth considering whether the entire problem has
not been misconceived. A close examination of the Apprendi opinions indicates
the depth of the stalemate in which the Court has been locked, because it reveals

115. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 487.
116. Id. at 488 (quoting Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 243) (internal quotation marks omitted).
117. Id. (quoting Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 244).
118. Id.
119. Id. at487n.13.
120. Id. at 488; see also id. at 490 ("Given its unique facts, [Almendarez-Torres] surely does not
warrant rejection of the otherwise uniform course of decision during the entire history of our
jurisprudence.").
121. Id. at 489-90.
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that the antagonists lack the conceptual resources they need to escape it. The
source of this deficiency is the subject of the next Part. For now, I wish only to
show how this deficiency is manifested in the Apprendi opinions.
1. Dueling Reductios ad Absurdum
Foremost among the signs of fundamental confusion is the fact that the basic
position of each side in this controversy can be reduced to absurdity in a few
quick steps. Concurring in Apprendi, and writing for the Winship-Mullaney
faction on the Court, Justice Scalia suggested the reductio ad absurdum of the
Williams-McMillan line when he wrote,
What ultimately demolishes the case for the dissenters is that they are unable
to say what the right to trial by jury does guarantee if, as they assert, it does
not guarantee ... the right to have a jury determine those facts that determine
the maximum sentence the law allows. They provide no coherent alternative. 122

The Williams-McMillan argument obliterates not only the right to a jury, but
also due process and other trial right guarantees. If a state legislature or
Congress has the authority to make any fact that formerly has served as an
element of a crime into a sentencing factor instead, then there is no logical
reason that it cannot make all offense elements into sentencing factors. For
example, a legislature may make any and all persons found in the jurisdiction
guilty of murder and then provide for sentencing based on whether an individual can demonstrate by a preponderance to the sentencing court that he did
not purposely cause the death of another person. This point was recognized as
far back as Mullaney, of course, when the Court noted that "if Winship were
limited to those facts that constitute a crime as defined by state law, a State
could undermine many of the interests that decision sought to protect without
effecting any substantive change in its law." 123
The essential point is not that there must be some limit on legislative power
in this regard. The McMillan Court acknowledged this much, even though it
refused to specify the limit. 124 The essential point is that the McMillan Court
refused to specify the limit because it could not do so. The Court lacked the
conceptual means to limit McMillan because the seminal argument of Williams
does not imply any such limits. The Williams-McMillan argument is that a judge
who has sentencing discretion may impose a sentence for any reason or for none
at all, and that it is therefore a constitutional gain to require the judge to make
her findings and conclusions explicit-even if the rights that adhere at trial are
not provided for in the sentencing procedure. If it is true that there are no limits

122. Id. at 498-99 (Scalia, J., concurring).
123. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684,698 (1975).
124. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 86 (1986).
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on a sentencing judge's discretion, then a sentencing judge can pick any
courtroom observer and sentence that person to life imprisonment. One objects,
of course, that even in a discretionary sentencing system the sentencing judge
must have a conviction of a crime on the record before she can sentence anyone,
and even then she may not exceed the statutory maximum allowed for such a
conviction. But it is important to notice that these are limits that the Williams
argument supposes, not limits that it implies. If we take the unreviewable
discretion of a sentencing judge as the standard by which we measure what the
legislature may do, then the legislature may evade any constitutional limitation
on punishment at will. The point is not that we are in danger of such oppression,
but only that the Williams argument logically does not rule it out.
The Apprendi opinion is vulnerable to a mirror-image reductio ad absurdum.
Justice Stevens's opinion does not remotely suggest a return to fixed felony
sentencing, in which the judge exercises no discretion in the determination of a
sentence and only imposes a sentence prescribed by law for each given offense.125 On the contrary, the Apprendi opinion supposes that discretionary
judicial sentencing is constitutionally valid. But if the sentencing judge exercises any discretion at all, then inevitably the judge will determine facts in the
course of exercising that discretion. It was incumbent upon the Apprendi Court,
then, to draw some boundaries between the jury's role in determining facts and
the judge's role in determining facts. In the Apprendi opinion, the statutory
maximum serves this purpose: The jury determines the facts that establish
which statutory maximum applies by virtue of the offense of conviction; the
judge determines the facts that set a sentence within this statutory maximum.
The difficulty is that the statutory maximum is entirely within the control of
the legislature, which means that the legislature retains all the power it needs to
evade Winship or to depart from the traditional norms of criminal law in any
other respect. The legislature needs only to increase the statutory maxima
throughout its criminal code, and then to use sentencing factors to mitigate
punishments downward. In her Apprendi dissent, Justice O'Connor pointed this
out and used New Jersey's hate crime law as an example. 126 New Jersey had
defined a weapons offense and, in the offense statute itself, had provided for a
statutory maximum of ten years. In a separate statute, the state had provided for
a sentence of up to twenty years for this same offense, among others, if the
defendant acted with a discriminatory purpose. Apprendi struck this system
down. But now the state could easily amend its statutory scheme to provide for
the twenty-year maximum in the offense statute itself. In order to obtain a
sentence at the lower end of this range, the defendant then could be required to
prove-to the judge, by a preponderance, and without trial rights-that he had

125. See John H. Langbein, The English Criminal Trial Jury on the Eve of the French Revolution, in
THE ThIAL JURY IN ENGLAND, FRANCE, GERMANY 1700-1900, at 13, 36-37 (Antonio Padoa Schioppa ed.,
1987) (describing the jury's sentencing role).
126. See Apprendi, 530 U .S. at 540--41 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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not acted with a racially discriminatory purpose. This would comply with the
rule of Apprendi and would reach the same result that the state originally sought
to attain. However, as Justice O'Connor pointed out, "[i]t is difficult to understand, and the Court does not explain, why the Constitution would require a
state legislature to follow such a meaningless and formalistic difference in
drafting its criminal statutes." 127
Justice Stevens offered the same reply to this argument that he had offered
fifteen years before in his McMillan dissent: There are political constraints that
will forestall the legislature's increasing statutory maxima to draconian levels
across the board. 128 As a matter of fact, this assumption is doubtful. In recent
years, the public has been not only willing, but also positively eager to impose
draconian sanctions on criminals. 129 But it is less important to see how this
reply is contingent on fact, than to see that it is contingent on fact. The problem
with Justice Stevens's reply lies not with the people, desperate and irrational as
their punitive impulses may be, but with the logic of using statutory maxima to
define a criminal offense for constitutional purposes. It is impossible to restrain
positive law by means of some other feature of positive law. Constitutional
adjudication requires a firmer foundation in principle and theory.
2. Weakness All Around

If these mirror-image reductios of the factions' principal arguments indicate
fundamental confusion or conceptual inadequacies, then one consequence of
these deficiencies is the weakness of the more detailed arguments that the
factions advanced in the Apprendi opinions.
The Apprendi Court preserved the holding of Almendarez-Torres, taking care
to distinguish recidivism as a sentencing factor from the offense element of a
discriminatory purpose. 130 Recidivism is a sentencing factor, the Apprendi
opinion said, not only because it is "a traditional, if not the most traditional,
basis for a sentencing court's increasing an offender's sentence," 131 but also
because it is not a part of the commission of the offense and it carries its own
due process imprimatur from the proceedings that produced it. 132 The Apprendi
dissenters doubted that either the holding of Almendarez-Torres or the limitation
on the Apprendi rule that reflects that holding would survive for long. 13 3 Their

127. Id. at 541.
128. Id. at 541 n.16; see also McMillan, 477 U.S. at 100--02 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that
political constraints exist that prevent legislatures from evading Winship's rule at will).
129. See generally Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity Through
Modem Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 829 (2000) (describing and analyzing draconian punishments
imposed as a result of anticrime hysteria in the 1990s).
130. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 486-90.
131. Id. at 488 (quoting Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 244 (1998)).
132. See id.
133. See id. at 541 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Given the pure formalism of the above readings of
the Court's opinion, one suspects that the constitutional principle underlying its decision is more far
reaching.").
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fear was justified because none of these reasons for excepting criminal history
from the Apprendi rule withstands scrutiny.
The notion that criminal history is sufficiently reliable for due process
purposes, so that trial-like standards of proof can be omitted, turns entirely on
the assumption that the pecson to be sentenced is the same person who collected
the c.rimirurl histozy in -question. But this fact itself needs to be proved, and this
qnestion of identity is sufficiently uncertain often enough to merit the protections cOf i&!te ;process and other trial rights 04-not to mention that identity is as
typical an offense clement as one may imagine. 135
A mOFe funclamental objection to the Apprendi Court's position on recidivism
is :that iit ,takes a categorical approach to the problem of offense elements versus
sentencing factors. Ev.e n if ,criminal history is :a ' 'traditional" sentencing factor
(though theOmnt dearly views tltis notion itself as an oxymoron), it also can be
an ·element •.o f .an offense. Modem analysis of offense elements rec~nizes that
they ifall int0 't!hree basic categories of fact: .conduct, results, and attendant
circumstances. 136 The ½ast category includes ciFcumstances that ·a re also features
of the offender, sec:h. as his age in the offense of statutory rape ·or his identity in
all criminal .cases. Criminal 'history .can wotl: like this: It is an attendant
circumstance element in .a ,p rosecution for an offense premised in whole or in
part on -recidivism. 137 In such a (Case, .criminal history is not traditionally part of
the .sentenoing ,decision and is a part of the commission of the offense.
The sterility of a categorical ap,proach affected a number of arguments made
in .the 1App1rendi .0pinions. The New Jersey hate crime statute imposed an
erihanced sentence if the defendant ·" acted with a purpose to intimida:te an
individual ,or group ·(i)f .individuals because of race, color, gender, handicap,
religion, sexual orientation, or ethnicity." 138 According to the Court, the word
"purpose" denoted a mens Tea.139 Such a culpability element, the Court concluded, was .manifestly one of ,the ,elements of the off.ense. As a constitutional
matter, ,the ,pr0secution could not be relieved of its obligation to prove this
element ibeyond a •reas01lable doubt to a jury. However, to the dissenters, such a
purpose was nothing more than a motive, which Justice O'Connor characterized
asJl "traditional" basis for an increased sentence 140 and as "one factor that has
'b
__ ;;:,i __ _ d ,_
- ..
I..
,.,,.,,.,,.,.J,,m.,n nl41 Th
al Wl!YS , e.en ,c©.11ti.1.llCAC d!}y <sentencrn.,g c0mtts :to l'Jear ,cm ;p.....u:.~.t.
e
Court;pointed to the use of,the ·-word ·"purpose" in the New :Jersey criminal code

134. See 14.lmenllar.ez:::rvrres, 523 U.S. ·at.268-69 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing evidence from
the legislative history of alien defendants with multiple aliases).
'135. Cf Almendarez:Torres, 523 US. at 230 (stating that recidivism "is as typical a sentencing
factor as·on:e:might•imagine").
136. See, e,g., MODEL PENAL CODE §2.02 cmt. '.l, at 229.(J98!i).
137. See, e.g., ·KAN. STAT. ANN.'§ 21-4204(a:)(2) (1995 & Supp. 2000) (defining offense of criminal
possession of a.fireann); •N.C. GEN. STAT.,§ ,14.33 :2 (19.9 9) (defining habitual misdemeanor assault).
138. N.J.'8TAT. ANN. ' §.2C:44-3(e)'(West ,19951).
139. <Apprenai v. ,United·States, 530 U:S. 466, 492 (2000).
140. . Id. at 554 (O'Connor, '.J.,,tlissenting).
141. ·Id. at 553.
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to describe an important kind of culpability. 142 But there was tmi reason. to>think
that the New Jersey Legislatme had fuis usage in mind when:. it passed the law,
particularly because the word had not been used in, the definition of an 0ffense.
The dissenters pointed to a previous hate crime case, Wfsrnf.l'sin v: Mi-'tchell; in
which the Court had referred to such a discruninat0ry purp@se as a motive. 143
But nothing in Mitchell p.articmarly. hmred on lifii.s cwmaete1U:zatioA'.,, ancl! Uil! any
event, the pnqx,se in the· Wisconsin statm.te had to' be .PJiOVed! to: a jµey;:_u441 'Flius,
neither side in Apprendi could adduce any compelling reason why a discriminatory purpose should be categorized as either an element on a sentencing factor. 145,
.Justice Breyer's dissent makes anothei; argument: that reveals-tfodneoherence
of a categorical approach to, the sentencing-fact0r'-veFsus;..offense-elemenb question. He argues that some facts must be sentencing factors. simpl~ as a:praatieal
matter. 146 To make· some faets elements, he, argues-,. "could: easily pihce the
defendant in the awkward (and conceivabty. unfafr) positi©n. oil'havirrg to deny
he committed the crime yet offer proof about how he c0mmitted it, e.g. , 'I did
not sell drugs., b1:1t I sold no more than, 500, giram.s-. •=147 This argument is a
variant on oae- that the Court made in Almendarez-Torres.. 'flier.e, the claim was
that recidivism is. better treated as a, semencing, faet©t: because. to, pfaae the
defendant's. criminal history before the jury w@uld prejudiee him iir the eyes of
the jurors. 148 The standard answer to both of these· arguments inv.ok~s- the
possibility of bifurcated proceedings, in which, the: j:ui:y. would- consider such
potentially prejudicial facts iA a separate proceeclin-g, following its consideration
of the main charge. 149 The flaw in this answer· is not only• that it concedes drat
the facts in question are indeed sentencing factors-for the seaond, trial' could

142. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 493 n.17 (citing N.J.. STAT. ANN. §. 2C:2"!.2~b)(,l) (West· 1999)); see also
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a) (1985) (setting forth the definition of "purpose" adopted by New
Jersey and listing it among the "Kinds of Culpability").
143. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 553 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
144. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 493 n.18.
145. These fruitless efforts to categorize recapitulated a· similar; and similarly Hollow, exercise in
Jones v. United States-; 5Q'6· U.3, 22T (l'g9g~1The· issue was joined in .that case·overrthe:term "serious
bodily injury." The Court acknowledged that Congress had treated serious ·bodily injury asaa sentencing
factor in some statutes, but it noted that serious bodily injury historically has been an element ·of
aggravated robberies. The Court considered. this, classification , to be. decisive in a case involving
car-jacking. Id. at 234-35. Serious bodily injury was therefore· an· offense.· element. The dissent,
however, was equally certain that "the harm from a crime-including whether the. orime, after· its
commission, results in the serious bodily injury or death. of a.victim-has long.been deemed. rele.vant
for sentencing purposes. Like recidivism,. it is 'as tygical a sentencing factor as-one might imagine."'
Id. at 256-57 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Almendarez-Torres v. United 'States, 523 U.S. 224, 230
(1998)). Both factions could and did cite extensive authority iil support of their positions. It seems not
to have dawned on anyone that serious bodily injury might be.both an offense element and.'a sentencing
factor, and that a categorical approach to the question was bound'to·be a,failirreall around.
146. See Apprendi, 530 l'.J.S. at 556-57 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 557 ..
148. See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 234-35.
149. See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 22, at 1143.
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not be characterized as anything other than a penalty phase-but also that such
bifurcated proceedings never have been constitutionally required. 150 As Justice
Breyer, citing Williams, points out, we have opted instead for the more efficient
alternative of discretionary judicial sentencing. 151
The real flaw in Justice Breyer's argument is that the dilemma he describes
does not distinguish sentencing factors from offense elements. Many offenses
contain compound allegations that a defendant may wish to deny in part and
concede in part. For example, in an ordinary burglary prosecution, the allegation is that the defendant entered upon property with the intent to commit some
felony. 152 Many of those accused of burglary are perfectly willing to concede
that they entered the property, but wish to deny that they had any felonious
intent. The position of such an alleged burglar is not logically different from
that of the alleged drug dealer who wishes to concede that he delivered drugs
but wishes to deny that he delivered a lot of drugs. The difference is that we
have not drafted our drug offense statutes in a way that makes this distinction.
The burglar's dilemma is resolved by means of the lesser included offenses
doctrine. 153 The alleged burglar can concede the unlawful entry without conceding that he committed burglary, because he can ask for an instruction on
criminal trespass. 154 Whether or not an alleged drug dealer can ask for a similar
instruction depends on whether the drug offense statutes are drafted in a similar
way. There is nothing in the nature of drugs or drug dealing that precludes
drafting the drug offenses in this way, or that necessarily assigns drug quantities
to the category of sentencing factors because of the unavailability of a lesser
included offense instruction.
The prejudicial effect of criminal history or recidivism also has been overstated. If criminal history is an element of an offense, then in a prosecution for
that offense the jury will hear the defendant's prior crimes alleged and will be
presented with evidence that he committed these crimes. 155 Justice Breyer
would argue that the defendant will be prejudiced by this. But how would this
differ from a prosecution for murder, in which the jury hears the allegation that
the defendant killed another human being and is presented with evidence that
this is so? Of course the defendant is prejudiced by this allegation, but not
unfairly so. There is no other way to conduct a murder trial. We do what we can
to minimize unfair prejudice by means of an instruction telling the jury that
allegations are no more than allegations and that nothing is to be inferred from

150. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183,221 (1971).
151. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 557-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
152. See, e.g., Tux. PENAL CooEANN. § 30.02 (Vernon 1994 & Supp. 2001).
153. See generally Kyron Huigens, The Doctrine of Lesser Included Offenses, 16 U. PuGET SoUND L.
REv. 185 (1992).
154. See, e.g., Mitchell v. State, 807 S.W.2d 740, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
155. See, e.g. , State v. Gill, 997 P.2d 710, 714 (Kan. 2000) (ruling that in prosecution for felon in
possession of handgun, right to stipulate to prior felony is waived if no stipulation is offered).
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the accusation itself. 156 If criminal history were an element of some offense,
then the same instruction would be given with respect to criminal history in any
trial on that offense. 157 There is nothing in an allegation of criminal history that
necessarily distinguishes it, as an allegation, from an allegation of murder, or
that precludes it from being an offense element instead of a sentencing factor.
Elsewhere in his dissent, Justice Breyer stressed the Williams argument and
offered an interesting variation on it. He acknowledged the danger that a
legislature may transform elements of crimes into sentencing factors, thereby
evading constitutional limits on punishment. However, Justice Breyer argued,
the problem is endemic: Any judge possessed of an ordinary amount of discretion over sentencing has a similar power. A judge may, for example, impose
consecutive maximum sentences on a multiple count conviction for embezzlement, based on her own finding that the defendant also had murdered his
employer. 158 From this "egregious example," 159 Justice Breyer concluded that
the solution to the problem the Court faced did not lie in restricting legislative
power to define elements and select sentencing factors, but rather "in sentencing
rules that determine punishments on the basis of properly defined relevant
conduct, with sensitivity to the need for procedural protections where sentencing factors are determined by a judge." 160 In other words, the solution lies in a
system such as the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 161
The difficulty is that the Guidelines themselves encourage and ratify egregious
violations of fundamental fairness in sentencing. Determinate sentencing schemes
such as the Guidelines are meant to eliminate disparity in sentences by eliminating
discretion in sentencing. But if a sentence follows rigidly, according to formula, from
the offense of conviction, then discretion is not eliminated; it simply is shifted from
the judge to the prosecutor, who can engage in "sentence bargaining." 162 For this

156. See PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INsTRucr10Ns FOR TIIE SIXTH CIRCUIT § 1.03(1) (1991) ("The
indictment is not any evidence at all of guilt."); see also United States v. Schanerman, 150 F.2d 941,
946 (3d Cir. 1945) (failure to give such an instruction is reversible error).
157. See, e.g., State v. Green, 493 So. 2d 588, 592 (La. 1986) (failure to give such an instruction in a
recidivist theft prosecution is reversible error). Of course, rules of evidence barring prior bad acts and
prior convictions would not apply to such an offense. See FED. R. Evm. 404(b), 609. These rules are
simply particular applications of the fundamental probative-versus-prejudicial calculus. When the prior
offense is an element of a crime, the prior offense is manifestly probative, and the problem of undue
prejudice must be addressed by an instruction to the effect that the allegations of the information or
indictment are not evidence.
158. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,562 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 562-63.
161. See Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon Which
They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REv. I, 8-14 (1988) (describing the Guidelines in similar terms). This
conclusion is not a surprising one, coming as it does from the principal architect of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines. See SnTH & CABRANES, supra note 24, at 58 (describing how the "Breyer draft"
was adopted by the original Sentencing Guidelines Commission and ultimately by Congress).
162. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 24, at 132.
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reason, 163 the Guidelines operate on the principle of real-offense sentencing, under
which "relevant conduct" surrounding the offense of conviction-including uncharged crimes and "crimes" of which the defendant has been acquitted-is proved at
a mini-trial for pwposes of sentencing.
The effects of real-offense sentencing include precisely the kind of sentencing that Justice Breyer called "egregious" in his dissent:
ff]he Guidelines provide an incentive for the government to go to trial on
only one count-the one most easily proved-and then effectively to "convict" the defendant on further "counts" through application of the "relevant
conduct" principle . . . . One brief recently filed by the government in the
federal appeals court on which one of the authors serves noted, with candor,
that the government had elected to prosecute the defendant only for robbery
and to wait until the sentencing hearing to prove that the defendant should
also be held responsible for an associated murder. 164

Justice Breyer's solution to the problem of legislative evasions of Winship is
thus no solution at all. As we will see, the reason that Justice Breyer's argument
is vulnerable in this way is the fact that, from a theoretical perspective, the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines are indistinguishable from the discretionary
sentencing system they replaced. 165
Justice Thomas's concurrence explicitly endorses the overruling of AlmendarezTorres and McMillan, 166 and implicitly acknowledges that this may entail
declaring unconstitutional the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 167 He advocates
the broad rule that "a 'crime' includes every fact that is by law a basis for
imposing or increasing punishment (in contrast with a fact that mitigates
punishment)." 168 Justice Thomas discusses an impressive body of authority
dating from the early nineteenth century in support of his argument. 169 In her
dissent, Justice O'Connor criticized this authority as irrelevant to the meaning
of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, given that the Amendments substantially
predate Justice Thomas's cases. 170 However, the problem with Justice Thomas's
authority is not that it is too young, but that it is too old. His nineteenth-century
authority, including that collected in several authoritative treatises by Joel
Prentiss Bishop, is from the era of jury sentencing and fixed felony sentenc-

163. But see Yellen, supra note 29, at 438-53 (arguing that the reasons for the adoption of
real-offense sentencing are not clear and that the system in fact has little effect on prosecutorial power
or the abuse of it).
164. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 24, at 140.
165. See infra Part II.A.I.
166. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 518-22 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring).
167. Id. at 523 n. 11.
I 68. Id. at 50 I.
169. Id. at 501-18 .
170. Id. at 527-28 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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ing. 171 With the advent of discretionary judicial sentencing in the late nineteenth
century, the rules changed. Cases having to do with jury sentencing are irrelevant to current sentencing practices. For example, Justice Breyer argues that
under a discretionary judicial sentencing system a judge may sentence a person
for an uncharged murder. This claim could be rebutted by a quotation from
Bishop's treatise-were it not for the last clause of the relevant passage, 172 and
but for the authority that Bishop cites. 173
This discrepancy in his authority means that Justice Thomas's argument
proves too much. In effect, he argues not only against the idea of sentencing
factors, but also against discretionary judicial sentencing of any kind. This is
just as the Williams-McMillan faction would have it: There can be no objection
to a legislature's picking out sentencing factors if discretionary judicial sentencing is constitutionally valid at all. Furthermore, and on a more fundamental
level, Justice Thomas's contention that aggravating facts must be proved to a
jury while mitigating facts can be proved to the sentencing court is vulnerable to
the same reductio ad absurdum that the Apprendi dissenters leveled against
Justice Stevens's opinion for the Court. Facts that aggravate punishment easily
can be rephrased as facts that mitigate punishment. Which way the fact will be
phrased in a criminal code is entirely up to the legislature. As a result, it is
reasonable to ask Justice Thomas, as well as the Court, "why the Constitution
would require a state legislature to follow such a meaningless and formalistic
difference in drafting its criminal statutes." 174

IL

RECONCEIVING THE PuZZLE

The Court's inability to draw a straight line from Williams through Apprendi
is a consequence of its inattention to the substantive criminal law and the theory
of punishment. The Court has used concepts--culpability, offense element,
mens rea, mitigation-that are poorly defined or ambiguous. These concepts

171 . See Adriaan Lanni, Note, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: An Idea Whose Time Has
Come (Again)?, l08 YALE L.J. 1775, 1990 (1999) (describing jury sentencing in noncapital cases as a
colonial-era innovation that persisted into the twentieth century); Note, Procedural Due Process at
Judicial Sentencing for Felony, 81 HARV. L. REv. 821, 821-22 (1968) (describing jury sentencing as an
early-to-mid-nineteenth-century institution).
172. Bishop writes that "the aggravating matter must not be of a crime separate from the one
charged in the indictment-a rule perhaps not applicable where the court determines, after verdict, the
punishment." I JoEL PRENTISS BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW § 948, at 572 (5th ed.
1872).
173. See id. at 572 n.4. All three cases clearly involve jury sentencing. In Ingram v. State, 39 Ala.
247 (1864), the trial judge "instructed the jury that they might look to the evidence of such [uncharged]
acts, 'in aggravation of the fine, but for no other purpose."' Id. at 253. In Baker v. State, 4 Ark. 56
(1842), the court stated, "Here the prisoner was found guilty upon both counts in the indictment; for
one of which, maiming, confinement in the penitentiary is the proper punishment, and to which he was
properly sentenced by the jury." Id. at 64-65 . In Skains v. State, 21 Ala. 218 (1852), the trial court
charged the jury that "they could not fine either of the defendants less than one hundred dollars, and
might fine them five hundred, or imprison them six months." Id. at 219.
174. Apprendi, 530 U.S . at 543 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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have led the Court into simplistic and untenable solutions to the problem of
defining a criminal offense for constitutional purposes. This Part will examine
five points from the theory of punishment that clarify the problem significantly.
Then, for purposes of illustration, this more sophisticated conceptual vocabulary
will be applied to the problem of offense elements versus affirmative defenses.
This discussion will point toward a solution of the Apprendi puzzle, to be
advanced in Part III.
A. THE RELEVANCE OF PUNISHMENT THEORY

1. Determinate and Indeterminate Sentencing
The Williams-McMillan faction is particularly anxious about the fate of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines because real-offense sentencing is threatened by
the unrestricted version of Apprendi that these Justices see in the offing. 175
Obviously, a real-offense sentencing system is inconsistent with a rule that
requires all facts that authorize or increase punishment to be proved to the jury.
However, several commentators have noted an irony in a reliance on Williams
to defend real-offense sentencing under the Guidelines. Williams is a product of
the indeterminate sentencing philosophy of the mid-twentieth century. As Williams itself shows, penal theory and policy in that era were oriented toward
rehabilitation and characterized by a conscious, indeed strident, rejection of
retribution or just deserts as the leading aim of punishment. 176 The law and
institutions of punishment reflected this philosophy: Judges set indeterminate
sentences so that prison and probation officials would have latitude in setting
rehabilitative goals and in determining when the offender had met those goals. 177
In contrast, the adoption of determinate sentencing schemes such as the Guidelines is said to have been motivated by a change in penal policy toward
retribution and away from rehabilitation. 178 The aim was "truth in sentencing"
so that criminals would serve the actual sentences they had received from the
sentencing court. 179 Thus, as one federal judge has noted, "Williams' whole
underpinning is the ... very system the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was

175. See id. at 549-50.
176. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949) ("Retribution is no longer the dominant
objective of the criminal law. Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have become important goals
of criminal jurisprudence."); see also K.G. Armstrong, The Retributivist Hits Back, 70 MIND 471
(1961), reprinted in THE PmLOSOPHY OF PuNISHMENT: A COLLECTION OF PAPERS 138, 139 (H.B. Acton ed.,
1969) (describing the mid-twentieth-century attitude of the educated elite toward retributive and
rehabilitationist theories, respectively); B.A. Wortley, The English Law of Punishment, in 4 THE
MODERN APPROACH TO CRIMINAL LAW 50, 58 (Leon Radzinowicz & J.W. Cecil Turner eds., 1945)
(disparaging retributivism as barbaric).
177. Alan M . Dershowitz, Indeterminate Confinement: Letting the Therapy Fit the Harm, 123 U. PA.
L. REv. 297, 298 (1974).
178. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 24, at 53, 55 (describing the influence of Commissioner Paul
Robinson 's " retributive" theory). But see infra note 187.
179. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 24, at 40 (describing the elimination of parole as one of the
objectives of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984).
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passed to destroy!" 180
From a theoretical perspective, the truth is both more complex and more
dismaying. In fact, the Sentencing Guidelines do not pursue a genuine retributive philosophy. Retribution as a goal of punishment implies strict proportionality. A consistent retributivist would find the infliction of any punishment greater
than the deserved punishment to be a violation of moral duty. 181 As Justice
Breyer, the Guidelines' principal architect, 182 frankly acknowledged, the Sentencing Guidelines Commission adopted no such philosophy and made no attempt
to determine proportionality in this sense because of the "inherent subjectivity"
of desert and proportionality. 183 Instead, the Commission purported to model
the Guidelines on prevailing sentences in the federal courts. 184 But as Kate Stith
and Jose Cabranes have shown, the Commission systematically set sentencing
ranges higher than these prevailing sentences. 185 Furthermore, as Stith and
Steve Y. Koh have demonstrated, the excessive sentencing ranges in the Guidelines reflect a legislative purpose to "get tough" with criminals, regardless of
proportionality and a principled retributivism. 186
The theory that actually animates the Guidelines is a simple-minded consequentialism.187 The aim is neither rehabilitation nor retribution, 188 but rather

180. United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393, 408 (8th Cir. 1992) (en bane) (Arnold, C.J., dissenting);

see also STITH & CABRANES, supra note 24, at 152 (quoting Judge Arnold and concluding that "[t]he old
and new regimes of 'real-offense' sentencing thus differ both in theory (rehabilitative versus punitive)
and in practice (discretionary versus mandatory)").
181. See, e.g., ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS 15-16 (1993) (describing the principle
of proportionality in a retributive punishment scheme as ruling out undeservedly severe punishments).
182. The final version of the Guidelines was referred to as "Breyer's draft." See STITH & CABRANES,
supra note 24, at 58. The basic approach of a strict, harm-based sentencing calculus was proposed in a
first draft by Paul Robinson, but that draft failed to gain much support because it was perceived as
overly complex. See id. at 53-54.
183. Breyer, supra note 161 , at 16.
184. See id. at 17-18.
185. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 24, at 59--66.
186. See generally Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative
History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 223 (1993).
187. Stith and Cabranes make the common mistake of taking the Guidelines' focus on the harm done
in offenses as evidence of a retributive approach to punishment. They describe Commissioner Paul
Robinson 's original proposal for a strict, harm-based sentencing calculus as being aimed at "retribution," STITH & CABRANES, supra note 24, at 53, and as "a deontological, just-deserts approach," id. at 59.
Just the opposite is true. A focus on harm is characteristic of a consequentialist theory of punishment,
whereas a deontological theory of punishment focuses on wrongdoing. See infra notes 267--69 and
accompanying text (explaining one of the philosophical origins of this difference). Robinson has made
his consequentialist philosophy quite clear in his subsequent work. See infra note 192 and accompanying text.
188. A great deal of confusion in the theory of punishment can be avoided by distinguishing
between the aims of punishment and theories of punishment. References to the deterrence theory of
punishment or the retributive theory of punishment are common, but deterrence and retribution-like
incapacitation, education in social norms, public catharsis, and so on-are merely aims or functions of
punishment. Whether and how any of these functions justifies punishment depends on a moral or ethical
theory that attributes a justifying effect to them. Theories of punishment, then, come in consequentialist, deontological, and virtue ethics models. Nor is the justification of punishment the only question
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lengthy incapacitation and an "economy of threats" deterrence. 189 The irony is
that this fact gives credence to Justice Breyer's reliance on Williams. The
rehabilitative sentencing philosophy of the Williams era also reflected a consequentialist theory of punishment-just a more sophisticated one. The aim of
punishment under both mid-twentieth-century indeterminate sentencing schemes
and late-twentieth-century determinate sentencing schemes was the maximization of social welfare. The difference lay only in the chosen means: a conscientious effort to reintegrate the offender into civilized society versus brute
deterrence and disheartened warehousing.
Given that a consequentialist theory of punishment lies beneath both
Williams and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, a better understanding of
this theory may help us solve the Apprendi puzzle. One feature of the
consequentialist theory of punishment is particularly relevant: It has no
independently viable conception of criminal fault. 19 Fault, desert, and
culpability are retrospective considerations: They pose the question whether
blame and punishment are appropriate in light of past wrongdoing. Because
consequentialism is inveterately forward-looking, it uses such concepts, if at
all, only in a derivative fashion . Thus, H.L.A. Hart argued that the concept
of desert does not serve any justifying purpose in punishment; it serves only
as a side constraint that maximizes liberty and social welfare. 191 Similarly,
Paul Robinson (one of the Guidelines' architects) has argued that culpability
is a feature of the criminal law because, by satisfying the widespread
intuition that only the culpable should be punished, the criminal law is more
effective than it otherwise would be in promoting social welfare. 192
One consequence of the uninterrupted dominance of consequentialist
conceptions of punishment through most of the last century was a failure to
develop an adequate understanding of desert and fault, or an adequate
vocabulary with which to translate these fundamental concepts into doctrine.193 This deficiency affected the theory and practice of both indeterminate and determinate sentencing. Thus, the vocabulary with which the

°

dealt with by a theory of punishment. Other outstanding issues include the nature of fault, the rationale
of excuse, the outlines of prohibitory norms, proportionality in punishment, and so on.
189. The term "economy of threats" was coined by H .L.A. Hart, and used to describe deterrence that
operates by explicit instrumental reasoning aimed at avoiding pain. H.L.A. HART, Legal Responsibility
and Excuses, in PuNISHMENT AND REsPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 29, 40-44 (1968).
Hart contrasts this with deterrence that involves the internalization of legal rules as obligations that
people incorporate into their other aims and plans. See id. at 44-50. The great achievement of Hart's
consequentialist theory of punishment was to explain this latter, more pervasive and important, kind of
deterrence. See Kyron Huigens, The Dead End of Deterrence, and Beyond, 41 WM. & MARYL. REv.

943, 984-87 (2000).
190. See Huigens, supra note 189, at 956--80.
191. See HART, supra note 189, at 39-40.
192. See PAUL H . ROBINSON & JoHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEWS
AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 85, 123-24 (1995); Paul H . Robinson & John M . Darley, The Utility of Desert,
91 Nw. U. L. REv. 453, 457-58 (1997).
193. See Huigens, supra note 189, at 966--71.
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Williams-McMillan and Winship-Mullaney factions have carried out their
argument-mitigation, culpability, element, sentencing factor, affirmative
defense-is plagued by vagueness and riddled with ambiguity. Therefore, in
the four subsections that follow, I propose to examine some of these terms
and replace them with a more rigorous vocabulary drawn from a nonconsequentialist theory of punishment.
2. Mitigation
The Apprendi dissenters feared that the rule stated by the Court-"Other than
the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt" 194--eventually would be stripped of its
limitations. The real Apprendi rule would then be the one stated in Justice
Thomas's concurrence: "[A] 'crime' includes every fact that is by law a basis
for imposing or increasing punishment (in contrast to a fact that mitigates
punishment)." 195 Certainly the Thomas formulation represents the core principle of Winship and Mullaney. However, the concepts of aggravation and
mitigation on which the Thomas formulation turns are problematic.
Any fact that seems to aggravate an offense can be framed as a mitigating
fact, depending on how the offense is defined. This is the point at the heart of
Justice O' Connor's reductio. If a state may not employ the aggravating fact of
serious bodily injury to enhance a sentence from a statutory maximum of ten
years to twenty years, then it can, instead, increase the statutory maximum to
twenty years and provide for the mitigation of the sentence if the offense did not
result in serious bodily injury. This mitigating fact need not be proved to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt under Justice Thomas's formulation of the rule
because mitigation is expressly excepted from that rule. But clearly the spirit of
the rule-and with it the constitutional requirements of Winship and Apprendiwill have been evaded.
Obviously, some term or terms other than "mitigation" and "aggravation" are
needed to get at the concern that lies behind the Apprendi rule, but as yet we
have no clear idea of what that concern is. As a starting point, we may notice a
further difficulty with the terms "mitigation" and "aggravation." While it is true
that all aggravating factors can be rephrased as mitigating factors , the converse
is not true. Some mitigators cannot be rephrased as aggravators. For example,
mental deficiency or disease not amounting to legal insanity is a common
ground for mitigating punishment. It appears as a statutory mitigator in most if
not all capital punishment schemes. 196 But there is no meaningful converse of
194. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
195. Id. at 501 (Thomas, J., concurring).
196. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE§ 190.3(h) (West 1999); Cow. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-1 l - 103(4)(b)
(West 1998); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW§ 400.27(9)(b) (McKinney 1994 & Supp. 2001 ); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-2000(t)(6) (1999). Mental disease or defect is listed in the original menu of mitigating factors in
the Model Penal Code's capital sentencing provision. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2 10.6(4)(g) (1980). The
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this rmtlgator. No capital punishment statute lists ordinary intelligence or
mental health as an aggravator. To take another example, youth is a mitigating
factor in punishment. Youth, too, appears as a mitigator in most if not all capital
punishment statutes. 197 However, none of these statutes lists maturity as an
aggravator, and it would be odd to find any sentence enhanced on the ground
that the offender is middle-aged or elderly. 198 The term "mitigation" is, then,
ambiguous. Sometimes it refers to a consideration that has an aggravating
converse, and sometimes it does not.
This ambiguity plays a role in Justice Stevens's opinion for the Court in Apprendi
and may account for some of the Winship-Mullaney faction's misplaced confidence
that its basic position is defensible. One of Justice Stevens's responses to Justice
O'Connor's reductio is the argument that "the principal dissent ignores the distinction
the Court has often recognized between facts in aggravation of punishment and facts
in mitigation." 199 This is a surprising argument given that, as we have seen, the
interchangeability of aggravation and mitigation is one reason that Justice O'Connor's
argument works. But Justice Stevens has in mind the other kind of mitigation, the
kind that does not have an aggravating converse, and he chooses an example that
makes his argument work. He writes,
If the defendant can escape the statutory maximum by showing, for example, that
he is a war veteran, then a judge that finds the fact of veteran status is neither
exposing the defendant to a deprivation of liberty greater than that authorized by the
verdict according to statute, nor is the Judge imposing upon the defendant a greater
stigma than that accompanying the jury verdict alone. 200

Veteran status, of course, has no aggravating converse. It is inconceivable that
any judge or legislature would increase punishment on the ground that the
offender never has served in a war. As a result, a statute that treated veteran
status as a sentencing factor would not be vulnerable to Justice O'Connor's
argument.
In order to see why mitigation and aggravation work in these ways, and to get
at the fundamental concerns of the two factions on the Court, we need to
examine the idea behind mitigation and aggravation-namely, culpability.

draft version of section 210.6 served as the model for most states' redrafting of their capital sentencing
statutes following the decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
197. Youth was listed in the Model Penal Code's original menu of mitigating factors. MODEL PENAL
CoDE § 210.6(4)(h) (1980). The consideration of youth as a mitigating factor also appears to be
constitutionally required. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 ( 1978).
198. Undoubtedly the words, "You're old enough to know better," have been spoken in sentencing,
but they obviously would explain a refusal to mitigate because the offender is young, but old enough to
be held responsible, rather than an intention to enhance a sentence because the offender is middle aged
or elderly. For example, the sentencing judge would not go on to say, "You're lucky you're only 30. If
you were 40, I'd throw the book at you, and if you were 50, I'd have to give you a life sentence."
199. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 n.16.
200. Id.
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3. Culpability
It is generally agreed that the question of defining a criminal offense for
constitutional purposes concerns not only the justification of punishment in the
individual case, but also the justification of a particular degree of punishment. 201 This concern ordinarily is called culpability-criminal liability, unlike
civil liability, requires culpability; punishment for a given offense generally
increases with the level of culpability associated with the offense.202 Culpability
is commonly defined as blameworthiness, but both culpability and blameworthiness are ambiguous terms.20 3 The resolution of this ambiguity sheds light on the
fundamental concerns of the Williams-McMillan and Winship-Mullaney factions, in part because it parallels the ambiguity of mitigation.
One kind of culpability turns on the definition of a criminal offense because it
consists of the presence of particular elements. For example, if a person shoots
and kills a figure in the woods, believing that it is a deer, and the figure turns out
to be a human being instead, then the killing is not a murder. A human being is
dead, but the shooter's belief that he was shooting at an animal precludes the
requisite finding that he had a purpose to kill a human being. 204 If the victim
was walking in the woods during hunting season dressed in brown clothing,
then the shooter probably would not be reckless or negligent either, precluding
liability for manslaughter. 205 Or suppose that a person suffers from insane
delusions and kills a human being in the belief that the victim is an evil spirit in
human form. This insane belief, too, will preclude a finding that the killer acted
with any of the kinds of culpability, such as a purpose to kill a human being,
required by the homicide statutes. 206 The kind of culpability that is missing in
these cases is commonly called mens rea, but as we will see below, a better term
for it is "fault."
A different kind of culpability, or its absence, can be discerned in cases in
which the elements of an offense, including fault, are present. Suppose, for
example, that a first-grader is angry with a classmate. He brings his father' s gun
to school the next day and shoots the other child, fortunately not fatally. When
he is asked why he did this, the child answers honestly that he wanted to hurt

201. See id. at 479- 82 ; id. at 498-99 (Scalia, J. , concurring); id. at 499-501 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 539-41 (O'Co nnor, J., dissenting); id. at 561-62 (Breyer, J., di ssenting).
202. See Paul H . Robinson, Foreword: The Criminal-Civil Distinction and Dangerous Blameless
Offenders, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 693, 706-08 ( 1993) (summarizing the traditional distinctio n
between criminal and civil law in terms of culpability as a prerequisite for punishment).
203 . Huigens, supra note 32, at 1238 (distinguishing two senses of culpability o r blameworthiness:
fault and eligibility for punishment).
204. See I PAUL H. Ros1NSON, CRIMINAL LAw DEFENSES § 62(b), at 246 (1984) (citing MODEL PENAL
CODE§ 2.04( l )(a) (1985)).
205 . See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2 10.3 ( 1980) (defining manslaughter as a homicide committed
recklessly); id. § 210.4 (defining negligent ho micide).
206. See I ROBINSON, supra note 204, § 64(a), at 272-79 (describing the defense of dimini shed
capacity in terms of the negation of a mental-state fault element of an offense by the defendant's mental
illness).
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the other child. All the elements of assault are present here, 207 but no criminal
liability will be imposed, because a child of six is not subject to the criminal law
at all. 208 Or suppose that a person kills a coworker because he suffers from the
insane delusion that he is John Wilkes Booth, that his coworker is Abraham
Lincoln, and that Lincoln's murder is historically inevitable. In this case, the
purpose to kill a human being is present, but in most jurisdictions the defendant
will be acquitted on grounds of insanity. 209 The feature missing from these
cases usually is referred to as culpability or blameworthiness, but both of these
terms are also commonly applied to cases in which fault is missing. In order to
avoid this ambiguity, it is better to refer to the kind of culpability that is missing
from these cases as "eligibility for punishment."
We refer to the absence of culpability in cases in which a person is simply
ineligible for punishment, such as a child's assault, and yet it seems odd to refer
to the mere fact that one is eligible for punishment as culpability. In contrast, in
cases in which fault is at issue, we talk not only about the absence of culpability,
but also, on the positive side (so to speak), about the varying degrees of
culpability. In this respect, the ambiguity in culpability between eligibility and
fault parallels the ambiguity in mitigation between mitigators for which there is
no aggravating converse and those for which there is a corresponding aggravator. The reason for this parallel, of course, is that culpability is the idea behind
mitigation and aggravation. A crime is aggravated when it is accompanied by a
high degree of fault-for example, when a homicide is committed purposely. A
crime is mitigated when the actor is less at fault, such as when a homicide is
committed negligently. And a crime also is mitigated or simply excused when
some attribute of the actor makes him ineligible for the punishment that
ordinarily would be imposed.
Mens rea is a poor term for fault because it denotes a mental state,
whereas in fact fault is not limited to mental states. Negligence, for example, is by definition not a mental state, but it is a well-recognized form of
criminal fault. 210 There is a school of thought that has contended that
criminal liability ought to be limited to prohibited acts accompanied by

207. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2ll.1(2)(b) (1980) (defining aggravated assault as purposely or
knowingly causing bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon).
208. Common law categorically prohibited criminal liability for a child under age seven, and
presumptively prohibited it for a child under age fourteen. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 97, at *23-24.
States generally provide juvenile court jurisdiction over young wrongdoers, with various age limits. See
2 ROBINSON, supra note 204, § l 75(a)-(b), at 321-30. A number of states also carry forward the
common-law limitations, although the effect of these provisions in light of juvenile court jurisdiction is
unclear. See MODEL PENAL CODE§ 4. IO cmt. 2, at 273-74 (1985).
209. See Christopher Slobogin, An End to Insanity: Recasting the Role of Mental Disability in
Criminal Cases, 86 VA. L. REv. 1199, 1208-14 (2000) (describing the insanity defense). Slobogin notes
that five states-Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nevada, and Utah-have abolished the insanity defense. Id.
at 1214.
210. See MODEL PENAL CODE§ 2.02(2)(d) (1985) (listing negligence among the "Kinds of Culpability").
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mental states. 211 The Model Penal Code's inclusion of criminal liability for
negligence was opposed on this ground. 212 But the prevailing view is that
negligence is a kind of fault, and this objective, or nonintentional, kind of
fault is in fact pervasive in the criminal law. Those who would have
barred negligence as a kind of fault have lost similar battles over felony
murder, 213 depraved heart murder, 214 transferred intent, 215 voluntary intoxica211. See, e.g., Jerome Hall, Negligent Behavior Should Be Excluded from Penal Liability, 63 CouJM.
L. REv. 632, 635 (I 963).
212. See MODEL PENAL CODE§ 2.02 cmt. 4, at 243-44 (1985).
213. Under the doctrine of felony murder, a defendant can be convicted of murder if a death occurs
in the course of his commission of a specified felony, even if the defendant is unaware of the risk of
death. See MODEL PENAL CODE§ 210.2 cmt. 6, at 30 (1980). In spite of vilification by generations of
commentators, see, e.g., James J. Tomkovicz, The Endurance of the Felony-Murder Rule: A Study of
the Forces That Shape Our Criminal Law, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1429, 1431 n.9 (1994) (collecting
critical commentary), and reformers, see, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. 6, at 29-42 (1980)
(offering a critical historical assessment of the rule, which in its pristine form is "indefensible in
principle"), the doctrine endures. The Model Penal Code itself incorporates the felony murder doctrine
into its definition of murder that requires a showing of recklessness under circumstances manifesting an
extreme indifference to human life. See id. § 210.2(l)(b) (providing that recklessness and extreme
indifference will be presumed when death occurs as the result of some felonies). It also is to be found in
its original form in most states. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-2(a)(3) (1994); ARK. CoDE ANN.
§ 5-10-IOl(a)(l) (Michie 1997); Cow. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 18-3-102(l)(b) (West 1999 & Supp. 2000).
214. The doctrine of depraved heart or depraved mind murder authorizes punishment for murder
when
the act [is] prompted by, or the circumstances indicate that it sprung from, a wicked, depraved
or malignant mind-a mind which, even in its habitual condition, and when excited by no
provocation which would be liable to give undue control to passion in ordinary men, is cruel,
wanton or malignant, reckless of human life, regardless of social duty.
Maher v. People, IO Mich. 212, 218 ( 1862). From the point of view of the intentional-states construction of fault, this doctrine is utterly baffling. See Bernard E. Gegan, More Cases of Depraved Mind
Murder: The Problem of Mens Rea, 64 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 429, 432-37 (1990) (describing the
unsuccessful efforts of some courts to reduce the doctrine to recklessness). This is because the doctrine
addresses a state of character instead of a state of mind. In such cases,
[i]t may become clear that the actor has a character flaw more blameworthy than that shown
by a single indiscretion; it may even be established that he simply holds human life without
value. This is not a specific mental state formed at the moment of action, such as intent or
reckless disregard. Rather, it is an immoral predisposition to harm.

Id. at 437. The doctrine persists in the Model Penal Code's category of murder committed "recklessly
under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of human life." MODEL PENAL
CODE§ 210.2(l)(b) (1980); see id. cmt. 4, at 22. It also is to be found in its original form in several
states. See, e.g., State v. Walton, 650 P.2d 1264, 1273 (Ariz. 1982); People v. Jones, 565 P.2d 1333,
1335-36 (Colo. 1977) (en bane); Lackey v. State, 271 S.E.2d 478 (Ga. 1980); State v. Sarabia, 348
N. W.2d 527, 533 (Wis. 1984).
215 . The doctrine of transferred intent deals with cases in which, for example, A shoots at B with a
purpose to kill B, but the bullet hits and kills C instead. Regarding C, A ought to be guilty of, at most,
manslaughter, but long-standing practice convicts A of murder in C's death. Doctrinally, A's purpose to
kill Bis "transferred" to C. See Douglas N. Husak, Transferred Intent, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
Pus. PoL' v 65, 66-67 (1996). This, it has been pointed out, is an "arrant, bare-faced fiction of the kind
dear to the heart of the medieval pleader." William Prosser, Transferred Intent, 45 Tux. L. REv. 650, 650
( 1967). Nevertheless, the doctrine survives in the Model Penal Code and elsewhere. See MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.03(3)(a) (1985); Anthony M. Dillof, Transferred Intent: An Inquiry into the Nature of
Criminal Culpability, I BuFF. CRIM. L. REv. 501 , 505--08 (1998).
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tion, 216 accomplice liability, 217 unreasonable mistake, 218 and strict liability.219 In each of these instances, fault is to be found not in a discrete mental
2 I 6. The construction of fault as intentional states implies that a severely intoxicated offender is
innocent because of his severe intoxication. That is, if a person is extremely drunk, he cannot act with a
fixed reference to any consequences. Logically, then, he cannot commit crimes that require him to have
an intentional state regarding prohibited consequences. The Model Penal Code braves this implication
when crimes of purpose and knowledge are concerned. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(1) cmt. I, at 354
(1985) (" [W]hen purpose or knowledge ... must be proved as an element of the offense, intoxication
may generally be adduced in disproof if it is logically relevant."). But the Code avoids this implication
when recklessness is concerned. The Code contains a prohibition on proof of voluntary intoxication to
negate the intentional state of recklessness, even though intoxication may well render a person unable
to recognize and consciously disregard risks. See id. § 2.02(2)(c) (defining recklessness as the
conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk). This inconsistency is justified with the
vague claim of a "general equivalence" between recklessness in getting drunk and recklessness while
one is drunk. See id. § 2.08 cmt. I, at 359. This solution parallels that of the common law, which
permitted proof of intoxication to rebut specific intent and barred its use to rebut general intent. Id. at
353-54. Constitutionally, a state may go further and prohibit proof of intoxication for crimes premised
on purpose and knowledge as well. See Egelhoffv. Montana, 518 U.S. 37 (1996). Compare Stephen J.
Morse, Fear of Danger; Flight from Culpability, 4 PsYCHOL. Pull. PoL'Y & L. 250, 251 (1998)
(expressing fear that Egelhoff represents a turn toward the incapacitation of dangerous persons in
disregard of fault or desert), with Huigens, supra note I 89, at 981-82, 1030-33 (defending Egelhoff and
nonintentional fault against similar rule-of-law objections).
217. The Model Penal Code requires a purpose to facilitate the principal 's wrongdoing for accomplice liability, having rejected a strong argument that knowledge of the principal's planned illegal
conduct should suffice. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 cmt. 6(c), at 3 I 3-20 (1985). However, many
jurisdictions punish accomplices on a mere showing that the accomplice should have known that the
principal would act illegally. See generally People v. Luparello, 231 Cal. Rptr. 832 (1987); Grace E.
Mueller, Note, The Mens Rea of Accomplice Liability, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 2169 (1988). This is the
equivalent of liability for negligence. Given that, for most crimes, the principal ordinarily must act with
a higher level of culpability than negligence, this is anomalous. It is not, however, constitutionally
objectionable. In the area of accomplice liability, as in the area of intoxication and as a constitutional
matter, the Supreme Court has separated the concept of criminal fault from mental states. See Tison v.
Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987) (holding that "major participation in the felony committed,
combined with reckless indifference to human life, is sufficient" to constitute fault for capital murder);
cf Andrew H. Friedman, Note, Tison v. Arizona: The Death Penalty and the Non-Triggerman: The
Scales of Justice Are Broken, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 123, 145-50 (1989) (arguing that Tison authori zes
liability without fault because the Tison brothers' conduct was neither purposeful nor reckless).
218. An unreasonable mistake precludes the formation of a culpable mental state, just as does a
reasonable mistake. One implication of this fact is that an alleged rapist who is so stupid and callous
that he cannot comprehend a woman 's nonconsent to sex is, for that reason, not guilty of rape. Many
jurisdictions have resisted this implication of the mental state's construction of fault. See SANFORD H.
KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND hs PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 327 (6th ed.
1995) ("Most of the recent American cases permit a mistake defense [to rape] , but only when the
defendant's error as to consent is honest and reasonable."); Harriett R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims
in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763, 849 (1986)
("[A] majority of courts here have adopted the rule that only a reasonable mistake is a valid defense."
(citing People v. Mayberry, 542 P.2d 1337, 1344-47 (Cal. 1975); and State v. Dizan, 390 P.2d 759, 769
(Haw. 1964))); Victoria J. Dettmar, Comment, Culpable Mistakes in Rape: Eliminating the Defense of
Unreasonable Mistake of Fact as to Victim Consent, 89 DICK. L. REv. 473, 483- 89 ( 1985) (summarizing cases outlining the unreasonable mistake defense in rape cases); see also Regina v. Morgan, 1976
A.C. 182 (affirming rape convictions of unreasonably mistaken rape defendants); Lani Anne Remick,
Comment, Read Her Lips: An Argument for a Verbal Consent Standard in Rape, 141 U. PA. L. REv.
1103, 1108 ("At least one court has even gone so far as to suggest that there is no mens rea for rape.").
219. Strict liability usually is defined as criminal liability without culpability or as criminal liability
without proof of a mental state, see, e.g., United States v. Cordoba-Hincapie, 825 F. Supp. 485 (1993)
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state, but in a broader set of facts 220 surrounding the offense. 221 In the
drafting of crimes, we usually do state the requirement of criminal fault in
terms of discrete mental states, but we do this for reasons of legalitybecause such rules are more likely to keep criminal liability within appropriate bounds in a constitutional democracy-and not because of the nature of
criminal fault. In some instances, we have found that rules about mental
states actually are not the best rules about fault. Death sentences, for
example, have seemed to be more defensible when they are the product of a
detailed inquiry into fault-based aggravating and mitigating factors than
when they are the product of a broad and vague inquiry into "malice
aforethought" or "premeditation." 222

(Weinstein, J.) (invoking both of these definitions), and usually is said to be unjust for precisely these
reasons, see, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE§ 2.05 cmt. I , at 283 (1985). But this is not quite right. As the
foregoing examples indicate, we impose criminal liability without proof of a mental state in many
situations. And in most cases of strict liability, one can identify some fault, usually negligence,
somewhere in the transaction. See Mark Kelman, Strict Liability: An Unorthodox View, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JusnCE 1512, 1516-17 (1983); Kenneth W. Simons, When ls Strict Liability Just?, 87
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1075, 1121-22 (1997). Strict liability is unjust because the prosecution is
relieved of the task of proving fault explicitly, while the defendant simultaneously is deprived of any
formal avenue of rebutting the inference that he was at fault. In other words, strict liability is
objectionable because it violates due process or the principle of legality.
220. Sometimes, the identification of intentionality with fault leads the devotees of an intentionalstates construction of fault simply to decree the existence of facts to match intentional states. For
example, suppose that a man has sex with a nine-year-old girl and believes that she is eleven. The law
defines sex with a person who is younger than ten as a class A felony, and sex with a person who is at
least ten and under twelve as a class B felony. Our defendant is guilty of neither crime on a strict
intentional-states construction of fault: The act occurred, but no corresponding intentional state can be
proved for the class A felony; the intentional state is present, but no corresponding act can be proved for
the class B felony. Section 2.04(2) of the Model Penal Code decrees guilt for the class B felony in such
cases because the defendant would have been guilty of the offense "had the situation been as he
supposed. " MODEL PENAL CODE§ 2.04(2) (1985).
221 . The Supreme Court has recognized this point, at least regarding homicide:
A narrow focus on the question of whether or not a given defendant "intended to kill,"
however, is a highly unsatisfactory means of definitively distinguishing the most culpable and
dangerous of murderers . . . . [S]ome nonintentional murderers may be among the most
dangerous and inhumane of all-the person who tortures another not caring whether the
victim lives or dies, or the robber who shoots someone in the course of the robbery, utterly
indifferent to the fact that the desire to rob may have the unintended consequence of killing
the victim as well as taking the victim's property. This reckless indifference to the value of
human life may be every bit as shocking to the moral sense as an " intent to kill."
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157 (1987).
222. Benjamin Cardozo offered this classic assessment of capital murder statutes that employ
premeditation to distinguish the most culpable murderers:
If intent is deliberate and premeditated whenever there is choice, then in truth it is always
deliberate and premeditated, si nce choice is involved in the hypothesis of the intent. What we
have is merely a privilege offered to the jury to find the lesser degree when the suddenness of
the intent, the vehemence of the passion, seems to call irresistibly for the exercise of mercy. I
have no objection to giving them thi s dispensing power, but it should be given to them directly
and not in a mystifying cloud of words.

BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, What Medicine Can Do for Law, in LAW AND LITERATURE 70, 100 (1931). The
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As noted, both sides in the Apprendi controversy recognize that the degree of
punishment varies with the degree of culpability. What the Justices have in
mind here, apparently, is degrees of fault. 223 But the point requires further
elaboration. Both kinds of culpability-fault and eligibility-are considered in
the determination of a proportionate punishment. For example, a defendant who
suffers from a mental illness that is not severe enough to merit an excuse may
be ineligible for a punishment as severe as that which would be imposed on a
healthy offender. In other words, the offender's mental illness mitigates his
punishment and does so in a way that does not have an aggravating converse.
However, we cannot determine proportionality solely on considerations of this
kind. Obviously, the gravity of the wrongdoing and the degree of fault entailed
in it also must be considered in the determination of a proportionate punishment. All else being equal in the cases of two mentally ill offenders, a
proportionate punishment for the one who murders will be higher than a
proportionate punishment for the shoplifter.
4. Elements
Both factions on the Court frame the Apprendi controversy as a matter of
designating which facts are elements of offenses and which are sentencing
factors. 224 The Apprendi rule refers to facts that increase the available sentence,225 and the Thomas formulation-which represents the unqualified core of
Apprendi-refers to facts that are the basis for imposing or increasing punishment. 226 But neither the idea of offense elements nor any of these categories of
fact is particularly useful in understanding the idea of a criminal offense or its
corollaries concerning burdens of proof. Punishment is justified for criminal
wrongdoing, but criminal wrongdoing is a matter of norms, not facts, and the
definition of criminal wrongdoing is never entirely confined to the elements of
an offense.
An emphasis on discrete facts in the analysis of the criminal law might be
appropriate if justified punishment followed automatically from the infliction of
certain harms. But it does not. As any competent analysis of inchoate offenses
and criminal fault will make clear, the infliction of harm is neither a necessary

drafters of the Model Penal Code dealt with this difficulty by means of Section 210.6 of the Code,
which provides for a bifurcated hearing following conviction for murder, at which the jury weighs
aggravating and mitigating features of the offense against one another in order to determine whether the
sentence will be death or something less. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (1980). This solution was adopted
by most ·states in the wake of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), and was approved by the
Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). Most aggravating and mitigating factors in
capital sentencing statutes are fault considerations. See Huigens, supra note 32, at 1268--69, 1272-75.
223. See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490-92 (2000) (discussion of "purpose" as a
ground for increasing punishment in the New Jersey hate crimes scheme).
224. See id. at 486--90; id. at 551-55 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 557-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
225. See Apprendi, 530 U.S . at 488-90.
226. See id. at 499-501 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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nor a sufficient condition for justified punishment. 227 We impose punishment
because a person has violated a prohibitory norm that has been properly adopted
as a positive law. Not all prohibitory norms involve harm, but all prohibitory
norms in the criminal law include the notion of fault. 228
The enactment of prohibitory norms into criminal law is not limited to the
statutory definition of criminal offenses. Very often, part of the prohibitory
norm is split off and enacted under the rubric of a justification defense. For
example, in the matter of homicide, the killing of another human being usually
is not done for a reason that makes the killing right instead of wrong. It would
make no sense to require the prosecution, in every case, to plead and come
forward with evidence that no such reason exists. However, if the defendant
acted in self-defense or within the scope of his legal authority, then indeed the
killing might have been right instead of wrong. 229 Because these instances are
rare, we require the defendant to plead and come forward with evidence of this
justification-which we could not do if the matter of justification were included
in the offense definition. 23° For this reason, we state justifications such as
self-defense and the lawful use of deadly force in separate defense statutes.
It is important to note, however, that even though the justification is not
included in the offense definition, and even though we impose the burdens of
pleading and production on the defense, the burden of persuasion on justification defenses rests with the prosecution. 231 That is, the prosecution must prove
the absence of self-defense, of lawful authority, or of other justification. The
reason for this distribution is very simple. The prosecution bears the burden of
proving that a crime has occurred, and a crime consists of the violation of a
prohibitory norm. The absence of justification is part of the prohibitory norm,
even though we enact it into law separately from the offense for the sake of
clarity and convenience.
Fault is an even more distinctive part of the prohibitory norm. Fundamental
fairness and the principle of legality-also known as due process-require us to state
227. In inchoate crimes, we impose criminal liability when no harm has been done. For example, in
its attempts provision, the Model Penal Code does not assess the proximity of the defendant's actions to
a completed crime. Instead, the Code asks only if the defendant has engaged in some conduct, however
minimal, that corroborates his criminal intentions. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (1985). This is not only
criminal liability without harm; it is very nearly criminal liability for thoughts alone. Conversely, we do
not impose criminal liability when a harm clearly has been inflicted, if we can find no fault or
culpability. See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605-06 (1994) (discussing the rule of statutory
construction that requires proof of fault in criminal offenses); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1)
(1985) (requiring proof of some kind of culpability regarding each material element of all Code
offenses).
228. The exception would be strict liability offenses, but even there one usually can find objective
fault considerations that justify punishment. See generally Kelman, supra note 219.
229. See 2 ROBINSON, supra note 204, § 13l(a), at 69-74 (explaining self-defense in terrns of the
balance of evils); id. § 142(e), at 135-38 (explaining defense of law enforcement authority in terms of
the balance of societal and personal interests).
230. Id. § 142(a), at 123-24 (explai ning that the burden of production for the defense of law
enforcement authority is on the defendant).
231. Id. at 124.
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in advance, in legislation, everything in the prohibitory norm that a person needs to
know in order to comply with that norm. 232 But this does not exhaust the prohibitory
norm. The criminal law not only prohibits certain conduct or the infliction of certain
harms; it prohibits certain conduct done with fault, and the infliction with fault of
certain harms. Even though fault is necessary to criminal wrongdoing, fault is an issue
ex post, in adjudication. Fault is an aspect of wrongdoing-having a purpose is not
against the law; having a purpose to kill is-but fault is a rule of decision or
adjudication, not a conduct rule. The matter of fault is addressed to legal authorities, in
order to guide their legal decisionmaking, not to the general public, in order to guide
ordinary conduct. 233 Even though mental states representing fault usually are included
in the definition of an offense, this is not done in order to guide conduct, but in order
to guide the adjudication of the charge. 234
Finally, there is a dimension of fault that is not stated ex ante in rules at all.
Just as there is more to fault than mens rea, there is more to the adjudication of
fault than the finding of mental states. As I will explain at greater length below,
fault is an inference to the effect that the person who has violated a prohibitory
norm has done so in a way that calls the quality of his practical reasoning into
question. 235 This inference is drawn in the course of the jury's adjudication of
wrongdoing, and for this reason, it escapes notice and analysis if one focuses, as
both sides in Apprendi did, on the statutory definition of offenses.
It is important to understand fault's relationship to the adjudication of wrongdoing because it tells us where the burden of persuasion for fault should lie. Just
as the burden to disprove justification rests with the prosecution because the
absence of justification is part of the prohibitory norm, so it is with fault. The
burden of persuasion on fault rests with the prosecution because fault is part of
the prohibitory norm and the adjudication of fault is inseparable from the
adjudication of wrongdoing.
5. Affirmative Defenses
The Williams-McMillan faction also would do well to examine more closely
the notions of "element" and "facts that justify punishment." This faction's
principal argument is vulnerable to the objection that it reduces due process and
other trial guarantees to nullities because legislatures can redesignate elements

232. See MODEL PENAL CoDE § 2.04(3)(a) (1985) (providing a defense of ignorance of law when a
law has not been published or otherwise made available prior to the conduct alleged).
233 . See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW § 6.7, at 491-92 (1978) (distinguishing
between primary norms and "an entirely distinct set of norms" directed to legal decisionmakers); Meir
Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L.
REv. 625, 625-31 (1984) (describing the distinction between conduct rules and decision rules).
234. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 233, at 649 (noting that offense definitions contain decision rules as
well as conduct rules); Paul H. Robinson, Rules of Conduct and Principles of Adjudication, 57 U. Cm.
L. REv. 729, 739 (1990) (distinguishing between "culpability mental elements, which function as part of
the principles of adjudication, and criminalization mental elements, which are a necessary component
of the .rules of conduct").
235 . See infra Part IIl.c.
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as sentencing factors or affirmative defenses at will. This difficulty could be
avoided if the argument appealed to some notion that was similar to an
"element" or "facts that justify punishment," but that was not entirely a matter
of positive law.
Consider the category of "affirmative defenses." The Justices define an
affirmative defense, as they do a sentencing factor, in opposition to an offense
element. Whereas the prosecution must prove offense elements, the defendant
must prove affirmative defenses. 236 But when it is used in this way, the notion
of an affirmative defense is essentially meaningless. The term "affirmative
defense" is triply ambiguous, because it can mean a defense that is not merely
the negation of the elements of the offense, a defense on which the defendant
has the burden of production, or a defense on which the defendant has the
burden of persuasion. Given that the question at issue in the Mullaney and
Patterson cases was who ought to carry the burden of persuasion, the term
"affirmative defense" was irrelevant on the second meaning and questionbegging on the first and third.
The Williams-McMillan faction would do better to focus on the nature of
wrongdoing, the ambiguity of culpability, and the different implications that
these theoretical points have for the assignment of burdens of persuasion.
We have seen that if the accused defends on the ground of justification, then
he contends in essence that his action was not wrong at all, but right. The
prosecution must disprove this claim because the prosecution always must
prove wrongdoing in order to justify punishment. Self-defense is an example
of this kind of defense. Similarly, one kind of culpability, fault, is a matter
for the prosecution to prove, by virtue of its being an aspect of criminal
wrongdoing. As a consequence, if the accused defends on the ground that he
is not at fault, then the prosecution must disprove this claim. Mistake of fact
is an example of this kind of defense. 237 But the situation is quite different
when defenses of eligibility for punishment are concerned. On eligibility
defenses-defenses based on claims such as insanity and minority, for
example-and on claims of mitigation that are analogous to eligibility
defenses, the defendant carries the burden of persuasion. 238
Eligibility for punishment, or nonexcuse, is a fact that justifies punishment,
but it is less a discrete doctrinal requirement than a necessary background
assumption that a system of just punishment makes. The general application of
the penal law to those who fall within its jurisdiction reflects a presumption that

236. See, e.g., Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 206 (1997).
23 7. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(1 )(a) (1985) ("Ignorance or mistake as to a matter of fact or law
is a defense if: (a) the ignorance or mistake negatives the purpose, knowledge, belief, recklessness, or
negligence required to establish a material element of the offense.").
238. See Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 797 (1952) (due process permits state to impose burden of
persuasion of insanity on defendant); In re Manuel L., 865 P.2d 718, 728 (Cal. 1994) (defendant bears
the burden of persuasion on claim of minority status); see also ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN§ 13-703 (West
2001) (defendant in penalty phase of a capital case bears burden of persuasion on mitigating factors).
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each member of society is capable of bearing the burdens that the law imposes-to respect property, not to kill other people, and so on. To claim an
excuse is to claim that one is extraordinary in this regard. It is to claim an
exemption from the general application of the penal law because the presumption of ordinary capability does not hold. The burden of persuasion is properly
assigned to the person who makes such a radical claim. The defendant who
invokes an excuse invokes a special kind of legal rule that effectively negates
the force of vast stretches of law. It makes sense for the law to guard such a rule
jealously and only rarely to permit a person to impose a legal obligation on all
others to free him from his own legal obligations. For this reason, the burden of
persuasion on defenses such as insanity is imposed on the defendant.
If the term "affirmative defense" has any meaning at all, then it is confined to
defenses that pertain to eligibility. Only for these defenses can one give a reason
grounded in theory and principle-as opposed to positive law-that the defendant, instead of the prosecution, should bear the burden of persuasion.
If the Williams-McMillan faction were to confine its use of the term "affirmative defense" to eligibility defenses and its use of the term "sentencing factor"
to eligibility-based mitigators, then its principal argument would not be subject
to the reductio advanced by the Winship-Mullaney faction. A legislature that
created such an affirmative defense, or that defined such a sentencing factor,
could give reasons for doing so. Even if the fact in question had served as, or
could be portrayed as, an offense element, these reasons would make it clear
that the offense had not been set on a slippery slope, and that the remaining
facts that justify punishment-those pertaining to wrongdoing and fault-were
not about to slide out of the offense definition and into the defense case or
sentencing. The legislature, and a court reviewing its work, could point to a
principled distinction between the fact that the legislature has chosen to treat as
an affirmative defense or sentencing factor, and those facts that it has not, and
logically cannot, remove from the offense definition.
B.

PAITERSON RECONSIDERED

The foregoing paragraph describes a preliminary solution to the Apprendi
puzzle in its suggestion that matters of wrongdoing and fault are for the jury and
matters of eligibility are for the judge to decide. This preliminary solution is
unlikely to be embraced by the Williams-McMillan faction because, in the
simplest terms, it seems to cede most of the disputed territory to the WinshipMullaney faction. Things are more complex than this objection supposes because the territory ceded to the Williams-McMillan faction is not insignificant,
and in any event, the territory of each faction (to push the metaphor one step too
far) overlaps considerably. But the objection does contain an important kernel
of truth. My solution to this puzzle does not involve a reconciliation of the cases
as they stand; instead, it entails overruling some of the cases because they are
misconceived and misleading. Choices of this kind are a necessary part of an.y
solution to this problem because the profound equipoise of competing lines of
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authority is the problem. No solution to the Apprendi puzzle can retain the sense
and objectives of both lines of authority without perpetuating most of the
difficulty.
Patterson v. New York, 239 among other cases, comes out differently when
properly analyzed. A demonstration of this reversal will serve to summarize and
illustrate some of the ideas presented in the foregoing section. The offenseelements-versus-affirmati ve-defense problem is simpler than the offenseelements-versus-sentencing-factor problem, yet the basic issue-the definition
of an offense for constitutional purposes-is the same. Therefore, the following
analysis of Patterson should set the stage for the similar but more complex
analysis that Apprendi requires.
The central distinction drawn in Patterson, by means of which the Court
freed the case from the governance of Mullaney, was patently unsound. The
distinction started from the premise that Maine had defined murder by reference
to the element of "malice aforethought," and then shifted the burden to the
defendant to disprove malice aforethought in order to mitigate the offense from
murder to manslaughter. 240 In contrast, New York had provided for an independently defined affirmative defense of "extreme emotional disturbance" that
would mitigate the offense from murder to manslaughter without shifting the
burden of persuasion on an element of murder to the defendant. 241 This distinction begs the question. The distinction turns on the idea that extreme emotional
disturbance is not an element of the offense, which in tum rests only on the idea
that it is an "affirmative defense." 242 Meanwhile, the notion of an affirmative
defense was defined, if at all, to mean only that the elements of the defense were
not elements of the offense. 243
The only way to escape this circularity is to give some content to the notion
of an affirmative defense. If extreme emotional disturbance were an eligibilitybased mitigator, then it would be a consideration genuinely independent of the
wrongdoing defined by the homicide statutes and a matter that a legislature
could, in a principled way, require the defendant to prove. The term "affirmative
defense" would be apt and meaningful and would genuinely distinguish New
York's law from Maine's. On the other hand, if extreme emotional disturbance
were a matter of fault, then it necessarily would be an aspect of wrongdoing
that, like the rest of the wrongdoing alleged, would be for the prosecution to
prove.
Patterson was decided incorrectly because extreme emotional disturbance is
unquestionably a matter of fault, not eligibility. To begin with, the mitigator of
extreme emotional disturbance has an aggravating converse. The Model Penal
Code's homicide provisions, on which the New York law in Patterson was
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

432 U.S. 197 (1977).
Id. at 212-14.
Id. at 215-16.
Id. at 206--07.
Id. at 205--06.
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based, 244 define murder initially as a purposeful or knowing killing and manslaughter as a killing done recklessly. 245 This basic structure of homicide
degrees defined by mental states is supplemented with provisions that adjust the
crime upward and downward, in mirror-image fashion, according to other,
objective fault criteria-specifically, certain attitudes of the offender. A reckless
killing that would otherwise be manslaughter is murder if it is done under
circumstances that manifest an extreme indifference to human life. 246 A purposeful or knowing killing that would otherwise be murder is manslaughter if it is
done under the influence of "extreme mental or emotional disturbance." 247
Fault, as we will see, is a matter of character, and the contrast here is between
the killer who is so coldhearted that he does not know or care that he kills and
the ordinary person of good character whose homicidal purpose is born of
extraordinary circumstances. Within New York's statutory scheme for homicide,
then, "extreme emotional disturbance" was a mitigator that had a corresponding
aggravator of "extreme indifference to human life." This set of mitigating and
aggravating attitudes indicates that extreme emotional disturbance is a faultbased mitigator.
One may object that extreme emotional disturbance describes an incapacitating condition that sounds more in eligibility and excuse. But this misses the
historical significance of the term, which is descended from the law of provocation. Originally, provocation was simply "a logical inference from the early
meaning of 'malice aforethought. "'248 The idea behind provocation was simply
that one who acted in the heat of passion because of some provoking event
could not have acted with malice aforethought. 249 The Model Penal Code
expanded the category of provocation from its traditional basis in circumstancessuch as catching one's wife in fiagrante delicto-that gave rise to a "heat of

244. Id. at 218-19 (Powell, J., dissenting).
245. See MODEL PENAL CoDE § 210.2(1)(a) (1980) (defining murder); id. § 210.3(l)(a) (defining
manslaughter).
246. Id. § 210.2(l)(b).
247. Id. § 210.3(l)(b).
248. Id. § 210.3 cmt. 5, at 54 (1980).
249. The history of these categories gives further support to the notion that the Model Penal Code's
"extreme indifference" murder is the aggravating converse of its "extreme emotional disturbance"
mitigator. The term "malice aforethought" was coined to distinguish those homicides that were
sufficiently egregious in the circumstances or manner of their commission to merit death. Malice
aforethought could be either express or implied malice. The doctrine of implied malice gave rise to the
offense of depraved heart or depraved mind murder. Gegan, supra note 214, at 437. Depraved heart
murder was committed when the act was "prompted by, or the circumstances indicate that it sprung
from, a wicked, depraved or malignant mind-a mind which, even in its habitual condition, and when
excited by no provocation which would be liable to give undue control to passion in ordinary men, is
cruel, wanton, or malignant, reek.less of human life, regardless of social duty." Maher v. People, 10
Mich. 212, 218 (1862) (emphasis added). The direct descendant of depraved heart murder, and the
aggravating converse of provocation, is the Model Penal Code's category of murder committed
"recklessly under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of human life," the
aggravating converse of extreme emotional disturbance. MODEL PENAL CODE§ 210.2(l)(b) (1980).
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passion." 250 In doing so, the Code drafters gave the mitigation a more subjective cast, focusing on the emotional disturbance that such events cause. But in
doing this, the drafters did not change the mitigator's essential function as a
fault element.
Historically, conceptually, and normatively, then, the crime and defense at
issue in Patterson were indistinguishable from the crime and defense at issue in
Mullaney. The fact that the Maine homicide law in Mullaney defined heat of
passion and manslaughter explicitly in terms of negating malice aforethought
reflected nothing more than Maine's adherence to a less modem homicide
scheme than that of New York. The basic Winship analysis ought not to have
been affected by this circumstance, and it would not have been had the Court
looked beyond the positive law to the history and theory of the substantive
criminal law.
Furthermore, if the Patterson Court had distinguished fault from eligibility,
then it would not have committed the pivotal error of equating extreme emotional disturbance with insanity. In Leland v. Oregon, 251 the Court had decided
that the Due Process Clause permitted states to place the burden of persuasion
of insanity on the defense. In Rivera v. Delaware, 252 the Court reaffirmed this
holding against a Winship challenge. The Patterson Court supposed that it
would have to reconsider these holdings if it were to bar New York from placing
the burden of proving extreme emotional disturbance on the defendant. 253
Nothing was further from the truth. Had the Court not hobbled itself with the
ambiguous and question-begging concept of an "affirmative defense," it easily
could have distinguished Leland and Rivera from Patterson. The distinction
turns on the fundamental difference between proving an eligibility-based defense such as insanity and proving a fault-based mitigator such as extreme
emotional disturbance. 254 Patterson ought to have held, consistently with Mullaney, that the prosecution must disprove a prima facie case of extreme emotional disturbance because the prosecution must prove a violation of the
prohibitory norm in all its aspects, whether they appear in the definition of an
offense, in a justification defense, or in a fault-based mitigation such as provocation or extreme emotional disturbance.
III.

SOLYING THE PuzzLE

The solution to the Apprendi puzzle turns on the distinction between fault and
eligibility, a related distinction between the functions of the jury and the
functions of the sentencing court, and rule-of-law considerations that are unique
to determinations of fault. Enough has been said to permit a statement of the

250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

§ 210.3 cmt. 5A, at 61-63 ( 1980).
343 U.S. 790 (1952).
429 U.S. 877 (1976).
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S . 197, 207 (1977).
See supra text accompanying notes 236-38.
MODEL PENAL CooE
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solution in the first section of this Part. But the solution is not a simple one, and
it requires considerable elaboration, defense, and illustration. This will be the
business of the remaining sections of this Part. Sections III.B and III.c will draw
out the implication that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and state mandatory
sentencing schemes, respectively, are unconstitutional if the Constitution protects traditional criminal law values at all. Section III.o will show how this
solution to the Apprendi puzzle nevertheless preserves discretionary judicial
sentencing. These conclusions follow from the fact that the Williams-McMillan
argument breaks down under a proper understanding of the respective roles of
the jury and the court in the adjudication of wrongdoing, fault, and proportionality in punishment. Section III.E considers four objections to this argument.
Section III.F explains why this solution to the Apprendi problem, unlike that of
the Apprendi Court itself, is not one that applies retroactively to invalidate
millions of sentences.
A. THE SOLUTION, BRIEFLY STATED

Any fact may serve as an element of an offense, an element of a defense, or a
sentencing factor. Accordingly, any fact may be determined by the jury or the
judge, depending on the nature of its relevance to the case. The first step in
solving the Apprendi problem, then, is to abandon the Court's focus on categories of fact and to clarify the respective roles of the jury and the sentencing
court.
If we have a meaningful jury right at all, then the jury's function includes at
least the determination of whether wrongdoing has been committed. Because
fault is an aspect of wrongdoing, fault can be determined only by the body
conducting the deliberations in which wrongdoing is determined, in those same
deliberations. These are, of course, highly fact-specific determinations. The
determination of wrongdoing and fault, therefore, is the jury's province, as is
the determination, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the facts on which wrongdoing
and fault are predicated. No one disputes these principles where the mens rea
elements of an offense are concerned. Much of the argument that follows turns
on a central point-that criminal fault is not confined to those mental states. The
manner and circumstances of the offender's wrongdoing also serve as indicators
of fault, and the jury's determination of fault is inextricable from its determination of wrongdoing. The jury right that unquestionably extends to both the
determination of wrongdoing and mens rea extends to all objective indicators of
fault as well.
The sentencing court's job is to determine a proportionate punishment.
Questions of proportionality are like questions of excuse because proportionality in punishment turns in part on the capabilities and other personal characteristics that make the offender eligible or ineligible for a particular punishment. A
sentencing court makes the proportionality determination and also determines
the facts concerning the offender's capabilities and characteristics as they bear
on the proportionality of his sentence. Because these eligibility-based mitigators
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are not aspects of wrongdoing, they need not be determined by the jury along
with wrongdoing.
Unlike the excuses, the proportionality of a sentence also turns on the nature
of the wrongdoing that the offender has committed and on the kind of fault with
which he did it. The sentencing court thus considers wrongdoing and fault in
arriving at a proportionate sentence. However, the sentencing court does not
determine wrongdoing or fault, nor does it determine the facts on which those
findings are predicated. It is bound by the jury's decision in these matters and
has no occasion to make its own determinations.
This last point is subject to an important qualification that preserves discretionary judicial sentencing, but not the Federal Sentencing Guidelines or state
mandatory sentencing schemes. There is a distinction to be made between
positive fault considerations and interstitial fault considerations. Positive fault
considerations are those that are so closely related to some wrongdoing that
they have been stated in positive law-matters such as extreme indifference to
human life or a purpose to kill-as statutorily defined elements of an offense.
Interstitial fault considerations are not enacted into positive law; they arise only
ex post, in the course of adjudication. They consist of precisely those fault
considerations that are so context-dependent and fine-grained 255 that they cannot be stated ex ante in rules without distorting their significance and function. 256 The jury makes determinations of both positive and interstitial fault in
the adjudication of wrongdoing. But whereas the sentencing court is bound by
the jury's determination of positive fault considerations, as well as the jury's
determination of other elements of the offense, the sentencing court is free to
make its own determinations of interstitial fault.
The basic implications of these principles for the Apprendi puzzle can be
stated succinctly. Fault considerations cannot be enacted into positive law as
sentencing factors simply because fault is an aspect of wrongdoing and because
the sentencing court never determines wrongdoing. If a fault consideration is
enacted into positive law at all, it can only be as an offense element; 257 that is,
as a part of the prohibitory norm, the violation of which constitutes criminal

255. See infra notes 335-38 and accompanying text (offering a definition of "fine-grainedness" in
this context).
256. For example, consider the difference between a mercy killing and a contract killing. Both of
these killings are murder, by virtue of the positive fault consideration of purpose or premeditation
regarding death. But the two murders differ in fault because of the vastly different circumstances
surrounding the two killings: acceding to the request of a loved one who is in intolerable pain versus
making a profit from the coldhearted killing of a stranger. These surrounding circumstances that make
such an enormous difference in how we evaluate the murders are interstitial fault considerations.
257. A fault consideration may also be enacted as an element of a justification because the
prosecution must prove that the defendant has acted with fault with respect to justifications as well as
with respect to the material elements of an offense. This is why, for example, a mistake regarding
justifying circumstances will defeat the justification defense if it is unreasonable, but will not defeat the
defense if it is reasonable. See, e.g., People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 1986) (holding unreasonable
mistake regarding self-defense deprives defendant of that defense). A positive fault consideration
related to a justification is also for the prosecution to prove and for the jury to determine.
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wrongdoing. These positive fault considerations, like the other offense elements, are for the jury to determine. In contrast, interstitial fault considerationsthose that, by definition, have not been enacted into positive law--can be
determined not only by the jury, but also by the sentencing court. Similarly, the
sentencing court has the authority to determine an offender's capabilities and
other characteristics. Any such eligibility-based mitigators could be enacted into
positive law as sentencing factors that are to be determined by the sentencing
court along with the facts on which they are predicated. However, these could
be only advisory sentencing factors within a discretionary sentencing system,
not binding sentencing factors within a mandatory sentencing scheme. A proportionate sentence is a value judgment that resists simplistic consequentialist
formulations because it involves the simultaneous consideration of eligibilitybased mitigators, wrongdoing, fault, and a variety of other matters as well.
Sentencing involves the exercise of expressive-not instrumental-rationality,
and this precludes the ex ante prescription of sentences by the legislative
branch.
This set of principles solves the Apprendi puzzle because it breaks the
Williams-McMillan syllogism. Sentencing courts have extensive discretion in
sentencing and the authority to determine some facts. However, it does not
follow from this alone that the legislature may specify any fact and enact it into
positive law as a sentencing factor. The sentencing court can determine eligibilitybased mitigators and can decide matters of interstitial fault in the course of
deciding a proportionate punishment. But the sentencing court cannot determine
wrongdoing or positive fault, and the determination of a proportionate sentence
overall is a matter of expressive rationality that cannot be determined ex ante by
a system of rules. The enactment of sentencing factors within a mandatory
sentencing scheme is a constitutional loss, not a gain. The Due Process Clause
and the Sixth Amendment prohibit such laws.
B. DETERMINATE SENTENCING REJECTED

As I suggested in the previous Part, my solution to the Apprendi puzzle takes
sides. In the end, the Winship-Mullaney faction wins and the Williams-McMillan
faction loses. Among the greatest fears of the latter faction is the possibility that
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and state determinate sentencing schemes
may be rendered unconstitutional. 258 This is indeed inevitable if the Constitution protects the traditional normative architecture of the criminal law at all. A
further inquiry into the nature of proportionality in punishment helps to explain
why this is so. More generally, this section explains the notion of expressive
rationality and the relevance of this idea to the distribution of responsibility for
sentencing.

258. See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 522-24 (2000) (O' Connor, J., dissenting).
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The conclusion that eligibility-based mitigators could be enacted as sentencing factors may seem to leave room for a version of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines to operate. The distinctions drawn in the foregoing section suggest a
reform that Stith and Cabranes have advanced. Stith and Cabranes argue that the
Guidelines are flawed because they emphasize aspects of the offense but neglect
aspects of the offender other than his criminal history, such as his youth or
social background, that may also serve as sentencing factors. 259 In the terms
that I have advanced, aspects of the offense and criminal history usually are
fault considerations, whereas matters such as youth or social background usually are eligibility considerations. My argument, then, would take the Stith and
Cabranes reform one step further and confine the Guidelines sentencing factors
to aspects of the offender other than his criminal history.
However, not even this much of the Guidelines can survive because any
determinate sentencing scheme misconceives and distorts the proportionality
determination that is at the heart of criminal sentencing. Again, Stith and
Cabranes get at some of the difficulty in their critique of the Guidelines. They
argue that the Guidelines are the product of an Enlightenment tradition that
places too much faith in quantification and calculation, 260 and that determinate
sentencing neglects the ceremonial and aesthetic aspects of sentencing-the
public theater that is essential to give punishment its proper gravity as a
transaction between the individual and society. 2 61 A more rigorous way to make
these points is to say that the Guidelines are the product of the consequentialist
theory of punishment and that, like most current versions of consequentialism,
the Guidelines misconceive value and value judgments in noncognitive terms.
The Guidelines distort sentencing because they fail to recognize that proportionality in sentencing is a matter of expressive rationality instead of a matter of
instrumental rationality. Even if we were to limit sentencing factors to eligibilitybased mitigators, the sentencing decision by nature cannot be given the precision that the Guidelines pretend to achieve.
These claims obviously require further elaboration and defense. Let me begin
with the simple observation that the Guidelines and state determinate sentencing
schemes consist of rules for sentencing. The difficulty is that sentencing is
characteristically resistant to formulation in terms of rules. Rules are by nature
over- and under-inclusive. When any rule confronts the complexity of real life,
it tends to capture some cases that ought not to be captured and to miss some
cases that ought to be captured, relative to the rule's backgroundjustification. 262
This inherent inaccuracy in rules is more tolerable in some areas of life and law
than in others, and we tend to have little tolerance for it in the area of
259. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 24, at 74-75 .
260. Id. at 169.
261. Id. at 81.
262. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED
DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 154 (1991) (describing the relationship between rules and their
background justifications).
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sentencing. For example, in the constitutional regulation of capital punishment,
the Supreme Court initially demanded a rule-like approach to death sentencing,
with the objective of reducing inequality and arbitrariness. 263 Subsequently,
when faced with some egregious cases of overinclusion, the Court demanded
the individualized consideration of desert in death sentencing.2 64 These two
demands cannot be reconciled, of course: Individualized consideration necessarily raises the possibility of arbitrariness and inequality-as when a jury exercises mercy-and gives up the benefits of a rule-based approach along with the
detriments of over- and under-inclusion. Similarly, in Guidelines sentencing, the
federal district courts have exhibited intolerance for the over- and underinclusiveness of rules in sentencing. The judges have complained in the strongest terms of the Guidelines' insensitivity to the individual merits of cases, 265
and many have acquiesced in manipulations of the sentencing rules aimed at
avoiding anomalous and disproportionate sentences. 266
Is this incompatibility between sentencing and rules necessary and inevitable,
so that determinate sentencing systems are misconceived from the start? It is,
and they are. Just sentencing results in a proportionate sentence, and a proportionate sentence is a value judgment. The central flaw of the Guidelines and other
determinate sentencing systems is that their drafters and proponents misunderstand the nature of value judgments. They adhere to a noncognitivist conception
of value, under which values are "subjective" in the way that matters of taste are
said to be subjective: They are matters of feeling that are beyond the reach of
reason. 267 A resulting aspiration to minimize the role of value judgments and to
give greater influence to matters of fact leads to the adoption of consequentialism in the theory of punishment: an emphasis on harm prevention instead of
retribution for wrongdoing as the organizing principle of the criminal law, on
the ground that harms are observable facts whereas the norms that inform the

263. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U .S. 153, 195 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S . 238, 242 (1972).
264. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319-28 (1989); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05
(1978).
265. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 24, at 5 n.12 (citing and quoting extensive criticism of the
Guidelines by judges).
266. MOLLY TREADWAY JOHNSON & SCOTT A. GILBERT, T HE UNITED STATES SENTENCING G UIDELINES:
RESULTS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER 'S 1996 SURVEY 10 (1997) ("Overall, then, these results suggest
that respondents believe that parties often manipulate the guidelines through plea agreements-in part
by stipulating facts-and that judges rarely scrutinize or reject such agreements.").
267. See ALFRED JULES AYER, LANGUAGE, ThuTH AND LoGic 102-20 (2d ed. 1946) (arguing for the
view that value judgments are merely expressions of noncognitive attitudes). But see Hilary Putnam,
Objectivity and the Science-Ethics Distinction, in THE QUALITY OF LrFE 143, 144 (Martha Nussbaum &
Amartya Sen eds., 1993) (explaining the flawed origins of noncognitivism and its debunking in the
1950s and 1960s); but cf Vivian Walsh, Philosophy and Economics, in 3 THE New PALGRAVE: A
D1cr10NARY OF EcoNOMics 861, 868 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987) (describing economists ' persistent
attachment to noncognitivism); Heidi Margaret Hurd, Note, Relativistic Jurisprudence: Skepticism
Founded on Confusion, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1417, 1445-59 (1988) (describing four current jurisprudential strategies for dealing with the supposed arbitrariness of value judgments in law).
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retributive approach are value judgments. 268 Because value judgments are
subjective and unreasoned, the argument goes, their enactment into law always
threatens to be arbitrary and oppressive. In the noncognitivist and consequentialist tradition, retributive punishment long has been criticized in just these
terms. 269 The Guidelines describe the severity of crimes and the proportionality
of punishment in terms of quantifiable harms.270 This approach reflects a
consequentialist theory of punishment, in spite of the drafters' pretense (common among consequentialists) of having adopted no theory at all, in favor of
attention to the facts. 271
The difficulty is that valuation is not unreasoned, all value judgments cannot
be assimilated into matters of taste, and the claim to a greater rationality that
consequentialism makes on the basis of these mistaken premises is an empty
pretense. The assumption that value judgments fall outside the realm of rational
criticism, debate, or consensus reflects a recognition that valuation is premised
in emotion. The mistake is to suppose that emotion is unreasoned. Feelings,
bare somatic states, do not have a rational dimension, but emotions are not mere
feelings. Emotions can distort rational thinking, but it is also demonstrably true

268. See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 161, at 16 ("Although guidelines motivated by a just deserts
rationale would be cloaked in language and form that evoke rationality, using terms such as 'rank order
of seriousness,' the rankings would not, in substantive terms, be wholly objective.").
269. K.G. Armstrong described the prevailing view of retributivism in intellectual circles at the
mid-twentieth century in this way:
Retributive punishment is only a polite name for revenge; it is vindictive, inhumane, barbarous, and immoral. Such an infliction of pain-for-pain's-sake harms the person who suffers the
pain, the person who inflicts it, and the society which permits it; everybody loses, which
brings out its essential pointlessness . ... The only people who today defend the retributive
theory are those who, whether they know it or not, get pleasure and a feeling of virtue from
seeing others suffer, or those who have a hidden theological axe to grind.
Armstrong, supra note 176, at 139.
270. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 24, at 55, 68-70. David Yellen explains how this calculus-ofharms approach has led to discrepancies in sentencing of the kind that the Guidelines were supposed to
eliminate. One source of discrepancies in Guidelines sentencing is the difference between section
3D2.l(d) offenses, to which real-offense sentencing principles apply, and those which are not subject to
section 3D2. l(d), for which the offense of conviction determines the sentence. See Yellen, supra note
29, at 434-38 (describing this difference and the resulting discrepancies). The only difference between
these categories is that the harm done in the former category of offenses is readily quantifiable. "The
Commission decided that for certain types of crimes, amounts would largely determine the sentence.
Then, because they could easily count amounts for nonconviction offenses, they did. This mechanical
approach, apparently unguided by principle, seems destined to accomplish very little of value." Id. at
445.
271. See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 161, at 17; see also STITH & CABRANES, supra note 24, at 53, 55
(attributing the Guidelines' emphasis on quantifiable harms to Commissioner Paul Robinson's influence); supra note 192 and accompanying text (explaining Robinson's consequentialist theory of
punishment). It is interesting to note that Richard Posner sees the Guidelines as one of the few places in
which the economic analysis of law has had an impact on substantive criminal law. See Steve Kurtz,
Sex, Economics, and Other Legal Matters: Judge and Scholar Richard A. Posner Speaks Out on the
Clinton Impeachment, the Microsoft Case, and Nude Dancing, REAsoN, Apr. I, 2001, at 36, 39 (quoting
Posner as saying "there is definitely an economic flavor in the federal sentencing guidelines").
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that rational thought is impossible without the capacity for emotion. 272 Emotions have truth value; that is, one can be mistaken in one's emotions. 273
Emotions can be changed through a process involving their articulation and
rational criticism. 274 And just as emotions are subject to rational evaluation, so
are the valuations and motivations that are premised in emotion. 275 Desires have
propositional content, whereas mere feelings do not. 276 We are fallible regarding our desires, as we are not regarding our feelings. 277 Even a valuation that
ordinarily is deemed a matter of pure taste, such as a liking for a particular food,
is not beyond the reach of reason. 278 In politics and law, questions involving
fundamental values often seem to be beyond rational resolution. They may be
intractable as a matter of fact, but in principle they are not. Indeed, the
persistence of a controversy over value is itself a sign that the participants
believe they are advancing rational arguments. And the historical record of
seemingly intractable controversies about which a rational consensus has been
reached on questions of value suggests that they are right. 279
272. ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES' MISTAKE: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE HUMAN BRAJN 52-79
(1994).
273. GERALD GAUS, VALUE AND JUSTIFICATION: THE FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERAL THEORY 136 (1990). For
example, suppose a hurricane passes through an area, killing dozens, and I stand on the beach watching
it go out to sea. I am crying, not because of the deaths of dozens of people, but because the hurricane is
dissipating into an ordinary storm. My emotions are mistaken, and I could benefit from treatment in
which I was challenged to articulate my feelings and defend them rationally.
274. See id. at 31-34 (noting that psychotherapy assumes that emotions are cognitive); Richard H.
Pildes, Conceptions of Value in Legal Thought, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1520, 1546 (1992) (same).
275. GAUS, supra note 273, at 106--26; ANDREW ORTONY ET AL., THE COGNITIVE STRUCTURE OF
EMOTIONS 34-47 (1988); Andrew Ortony, Value and Emotion, in MEMORIES, THOUGHTS, AND EMOTIONS:
EssAYS IN HONOR OF GEORGE MANDLER 337, 349-51 (WiUiam Knessen et al. eds., 1991); cf RONALD
DESOUSA, THE RATIONALITY OF EMOTION 218-20 (1987) (describing mistakes in desire as arising from
mistakes about the aspect or character of the emotion); JUSTIN OAKLEY, MORALITY AND THE EMOTIONS
7-16 (1992) (describing emotion as a "dynamic" relationship between desire, belief, and affect).
276. MICHAEL SMITH, THE MORAL PROBLEM 104-111 (1994) (arguing that desires are not mere
feelings, because they have propositional content). For example, we say that I feel a desire and that I
feel a pain. But whereas we also say that "I feel a desire to N," we never say "I feel a pain to N."
277. Id. For example, I may realize, after years of studying the violin, that, whereas I thought I was
motivated by a love for music, I was motivated all along by a sibling rivalry with my younger sister, a
naturally gifted cellist. Cf HILARY Du PRE & PIERS DU PRE, HILARY AND JACKIE (1998) (describing a
similar relationship).
278. Wine connoisseurship is the most familiar example of a reasoned approach to a matter of taste.
See generally MICHAEL BoNADIES, SIP BY S1P: AN INSIDER 's GUIDE TO LEARNING ALL AlloUT WINE ( 1998).
Another example is the fact that in Western societies four basic tastes are recognized (bitter, sour,
sweet, salty), but in Asian societies, a fifth is recognized (in Japanese, umami). John Willoughby, A
Chemical Mystery That Excites the Taste Buds, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1998, at F3 ('"It turns out to be
largely a cultural or a linguistic problem,' Professor [Michael] O'Mahony said, 'because umarni is a
new word, it's a Japanese word and the taste basically comes from Japanese flavorings."').
279. The universal condemnation of slavery is an example of this phenomenon. Slavery still exists,
see generally KEvIN BALES, DISPOSABLE PEOPLE: NEw SLAVERY IN THE GLOBAL EcoNOMY (1999); SAMUEL
COTTON, SILENT TERROR: A JouRNEY INTO CONTEMPORARY AFRICAN SLAVERY (1999), but whereas it was
once thought of as an honorable institution in many societies, see, e.g., ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 118 (Ernest
Barker ed. & trans., 1946), it is now condemned, see Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A.
Res. 217 IIl(A), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71 , U.N. Doc. N810, art. 4 (1948), reprinted in INNOVATION
AND INSPIRATION: FIFTY YEARS OF THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 217, 218 (Peter Baehr et
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The misconception of value in noncogmtlve terms is a leading cause of
consequentialism. That is, to misunderstand value in this way usually causes
people to confine their conception of value to states of affairs that are desired as
a matter of fact; to conceive of the rational response to value as the maximization of these states of affairs; and to think of practical reasoning as coextensive
with instrumental, means-ends reasoning toward this maximization. In this way,
the failure to appreciate the rational dimension of value leads to a misconception of rationality itself. It causes one to overlook the rationality involved in
choosing the ends toward which instrumental reasoning is directed. Our ends
are not merely states of affairs that we happen to desire; they are matters that we
rationally deliberate upon, mostly with an eye toward the construction of a
stable identity and the maintenance of a certain character. 280 A serviceable
(though not entirely satisfactory) name for this dimension of rationality is
expressive rationality. 281
Expressive rationality and its cognate, expressive value, in fact have been
recognized widely in legal theory 282-even by the law and economics

al. eds., 1999) ("No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be
prohibited in all their forms."). The fact that this change has been brought about in part by war, as in the
United States, by no means demonstrates that the evolving valuation of slavery is entirely a matter of
force, indoctrination, or other noncognitive means. The arguments of abolitionists throughout history
played at least as great a role.
280. Self-governance at the level of valuation and motivation is a central feature of virtue ethics in
the Aristotelian tradition, see M.F. Burnyeat, Aristotle on Learning to Be Good, in ESSAYS ON
ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS 69, 74-80 (Amelie 0 . Rorty ed., 1980), and it is well recognized in modern theories
of ethics and value, see ELIZABETH s. ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND EcoNOMJCS 132-40 (1993)
(describing the effects on motivation of reflections on value and contrasting this with noncognitivist
accounts of motivation); ROBERT Aum, MORAL KNOWLEDGE AND ETHICAL CHARACTER 157-73 (1997)
(describing control over and responsibility for character traits); GAus, supra note 273, at 300--06
(describing the acquisition of a disposition to act for moral reasons at the level of emotional response);
SMITH, supra note 276, at 165-75 (describing the deliberate acquisition of dispositions as part of a
neo-Humean theory of motivation); BERNARD WILLIAMS, Internal and External Reasons, in MORAL LucK
101, 104 (1985) (describing deliberations over and adjustments to one's "motivational set" as part of a
neo-Humean conception of motivation).
281. "Expressive" is an unsatisfactory name for this kind of rationality because "expressive" is the
term that noncognitivists use to describe matters of value that they take to be beyond the reach of
reason. See, e.g., AYER, supra note 267, at 107-08. The use of "expressive" is unsatisfactory here also
because it suggests that what is at issue is a theory of meaning, whereas what is at issue actually is a
theory of norms. Compare Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148
U. PA. L. REv. 1363 (2000) (construing expressive theories of law as theories of meaning and
criticizing them accordingly), with Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of
Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1503 (2000) (responding to Adler by pointing out that
expressive theories of law are theories of norms).
282. See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, An Expressive Theory of Contract: From Feminist Dilemmas to a
Reconceptualization of Rational Choice in Contract Law, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 1235, 1261-63 (1998);
Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REv. 413, 419-25 (1999); Dan M.
Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. Cm. L. REv. 591, 597-601 (1996); Dan M. Kahan
& Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 269 (1996);
Richard H. Pildes, supra note 274, passim; Richard H. Pildes, The Unintended Cultural Consequences
of Public Policy: A Comment on the Symposium, 89 MICH. L. REv. 936, 938-39 (1991); Richard H.
Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Plural-
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school/ 83 though that treatment of these ideas is fatally flawed. 284 This flaw
has to do with another misunderstood feature of value---0ne that bears on
the problem of proportionality in punishment as well. Economic analysis of
any variety supposes that value is transitive and therefore commensurable.285 But these assumptions have been undermined by recent experimentation that .shows that value is highly context-dependent. 286 Because value
a:ni:ses in an infinite variety of practical contexts, value cannot be transifrve.28;? 'This intransitivity means that these valuations are incommensurable:288 I ,cannot rank them on a single scale, though I can rationally

ism, anil Democratic PoUtics, 9(i) COLUM. L. R!Ev. 2121, 2143-66 ,(1990); Richard H. Pildes & Richard
G. Niemi, Ex:pF.essive Banns, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District
Appearances After Shaw"· Reno, 92 MlcH. L. REV. 483, 506-16 (1993); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R.
Sunstein, Reinventing .the Regulatory State, 62 U. 'C!iI. L. REv. 1, ,6 6-72 (1995); Cass R. Sunstein,
Incommensurability and'Vtl'luation in Law, '92 MICH. L. REv. 779, 820-24 (1994); Cass R. Sunstein, On
the Expressive 'Function .of Law, 144 U. PA. :L. REv. 2021 ,(,1996). These legal scholars have been
influenced principally by (and .in two instances have colla'borated with) three philosophers: Elizabeth
Anderson, Martha 'Nussbaum, and Joseph Raz. See generally ANDERSON, supra note 280; MARTHA
NUSSBAUM, U>VE's 'KNOWLEDGE (1990); JosEPH RAz, THE MORALITY ·OF FREEDOM (1986).
Z.83. ·see Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL Snm. 661, 666-69 (1998)
(describing a "sec0nd generation" of law ana .economics sch@lars); see also Robert Cooter, Models of
Morality in Law and Economics: Self~Control and Self-Improvement for the "Bad Man" of Holmes, 78
B.U. ,L. ,REv. 903 (1998) (describing how legal and social norms change preferences); Ward Farnsworth,
'Do 'Parties ,to Nuisance Cases Bargain After Judgment? A Glimpse Inside the Cathedral, in BEHAVIORAL
LAw ,& EcoNOMICS 302, 314 {Cass R. .Sunstein ed., 2000) (attributing parties' refusal to bargain to
expressive considerations); 'Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, ,62 U. Cm. L. REv.
943, 1044 (1995) (describing the interdependent development of legal and social norms) .
284. See Kyron Huigens, 'Law, ,Economics, and the Skeleton of Value Fallacy, 89 CAL. L. REv. 537
(2001).
285. ,Cf LEONARD J. SAVAGE, THE FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS 69 (2d ed. 1972) ("A function U that
thus arithmetizes the relati0n of preference among acts will be called a utility. It will be shown that the
multiplicity of utilities is not .complicated, every utility being simply related to every other."); James P.
Spica, The •Rationality,of Nonnative Expectations, 24 J. CoNTEMP. L. 259, 277 & n.74 ("Ramsey's third
axiom (concerning the transitivity of preference relations) is characteristically innocuous: 'If option A is
equivalent '[i.e., indifferent] to ,option B :and B to C then A to C."' (citing F.P. RAMSEY, Truth and
Probability,iin iFHJL0SOPHICAL:PAPBRS 3.2, 7:f, ,~lilJH. Mel10r.t!d., ,199~)) ).
286. 'See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman et al., 'Experimental Tests 0f the :Endowment Effect ,and the Coase
Theorem, in BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS, supra note 283, at 211 , 2 I 3. But see Robert E. Scott, The
Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 VA. L. REv. 1603, 1639-46 (2000)
(describing alternative e)lperiments and interpretations of the experimental data).
287. Transitivity means that if.I do not prefer A to B, but I do prefer C to B, then I must prefer C ,to
A. Intransitivity means ,that this relationship does not hold. ·For example, suppose that I am a nov.elist
and a mountaineer. ,I may finl:I it,difficult to say whether I would rather win the Booker Prize or conquer
Mount Everest. If so, it may seem that this is because these achievements are roughly equivalent in
value. But the truth ,is more ,complex than this. Suppose, in addition to the fact that I do not prefer the
Booker Prize to the conquest of Everest, that 1 have a decided preference for winning the Nobel Prize
for Literature ov.er winning the .Booker ,Prize. It does not follow from this ,that I would rather win the
Nobel Prize than conquer Everest. .Mo/ ,v.aluations ,of the Booker Prize, the Nobel Prize, and the
conquest •.of 'Everest are 'intransitive, and they are intransitive because they arise from the vastly
disparate practical contexts of literature and mountaineering.
•
288. See RAZ, supra note 282, at 324-26 (describing incomrnensurability in terms of intransitivity).
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compare them. 289 I value my various activities not because they provide me
with generic satisfactions that I can trade off against one aoot!ner~ but
because of the things that each activity distindive1y allows me to be and' to
express. 290 My practical reasoning is not a matter of instrumentalfy maximizing a generic state of satisfaction; it is a matter of creating and sustaining a
particular identity and characteT:
Just sentencing is. a rational enterprise·, but i't! is not o:mt tnat is ~ect to
calculation because proportionality in punishment is a question of expressive,
not merely instrumental, rationality. Wrongdoing. and fault are normative questions that cannot be reduced to facts in the form of discrete,, quantifiable hanns.
The personal capacities and characteristics of the offender ru;e· relev·a nt to his
sentence, but their precise relevance is difficult to, articulate, let alone. to fit into
a determinate sentencing grid. The various, social ends· of punishmentretribution, deterrence, public cathal.;sis, educ:atiom fa,, S(!)ciaJ norm&,. incapacitation, rehabilitation~are considerations in a just sent'emie,, as- arie· m.attens more
closely concerned with the individual offender, such as tm:e' impact of a-sentence
on his dependents and the possibility. li>f mercy, :But all of tli.ese· competing
considerations have widely divergent origins, and they are neithet transitive nor
commensurable. A proportionate punishment carr be. determined. in only one
way: by the exercise of mature judgment immersed in the li.uman context' of the
particular case.
Determinate sentencing schemes, especially th.e Federal Sentencing. Guidelines, fall well short of this minimum requirement of justice. ln1the words of
Stith and Cabranes:
The· new regime of bureaucratic· sentencing inadvertently mocks the. moral
premises upon which the traditional ritual was based, while denying both
sentencing judges and appeliate judges the opportunity to develop a principled'
sentencing jurisprudence. In order for this. regime of comprehensive, ex ante
sentencing rules to function effectively, the defendant must be reduced to an
inanimate variable in an equation, the probation, officer must operate· as the
"special master" of Guidelines facts, the sentencing judg!!· must weig_h the
crime according. to, tliit: S.1tntencing Guidelines- Commissionis-: calculus, and tlie
role of the courts of appeals i's simply to police sentenuing· judges. Wittiout
principled foundation or application, the awesome power of the state to inflict

289. See Ruth Chang, Comparison and the Justification of Choice, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1569,
1588-91 (1998) (distinguishing incommensurability, from incomparability).
290. The economist will argue that if I actually make a choice between winning the Nobel Prize and
conquering Everest, then I have revealed a preference that can be assessed with economic tools.
Moreover, I have revealed that the values are transitive and commensurable by making this choice. But
these conclusions do not follow, because value has a tragic dimension: An)' choice_necessarily foregoes
some value that does not show up in the analysis of revealed preferences. See Huigens, supra note 284,
at 545-47.
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suffering is wielded as an exercise in bureaucratic regularity, for which no
one, ultimately, bears responsibility.2 91

However, Stith and Cabranes go on to suggest that the alternative to the rigid
bureaucracy of determinate sentencing schemes is a reliance on "highly subjective judgments" 292 and intuition. 293 This is equally mistaken. To say that a
matter cannot be reduced to ex ante prescriptions toward certain consequences
is not to say that it falls beyond the realm of reason. If we can engage in
meaningful reflection on the matter ex post and incorporate the results of those
reflections into our future conduct and into the construction and maintenance of
our identity and character, then this is a rational matter.294 Sentencing is such a
matter.
Proportionate punishment has as much to do with the character of the
punishing majority as it has to do with the character of the offender. In the
individual case, the sentencing judge cannot commensurate and calculate the
many considerations that bear on a proportionate sentence. However, none of
this implies that she cannot rationally compare these considerations according
to governing moral and legal norms. 295 Ultimately, the question the sentencing
judge faces is whether she can impose a given sentence consistently with her
sense of her own personal and professional character. She will avoid harsh and
arbitrary sentences in order to avoid crediting a view of herself as a harsh and
arbitrary judge. At the level of legislation, the question of proportionality comes
down to whether we, as individuals who take a large part of our self-conception
from the society to which we belong, can bear to be part of a society that is
arbitrary and unnecessarily cruel. Disproportionate punishments are barbaric.
We may at times lack the political will to disavow such punishments, but the
political question for each of us is whether we will remain part of a barbaric
society.
C. MANDATORY-MINIMUM AND THREE-STRIKES SCHEMES REJECTED

Mandatory-minimum sentencing schemes are laws such as that at issue in
McMillan: They identify some feature of the offender's crime that is not an
element of the offense and, on the basis of a judicial finding that this feature is
present, require the sentencing court to impose a sentence above a certain floor
that is not the statutory minimum for the offense. The holding of Apprendi does
not apply to such laws, and this was quite deliberate on the Court's part. The
hate crimes law at issue in that case did not impose a mandatory-minimum

291 . STITH & CABRANES, supra note 24, at I 03.
292. Id. at 150.
293. See id. at 169.
294. Rosalind Hursthouse explains this kind of rationality in the context of the choice over abortion.
See Rosalind Hursthouse, Virtue Theory and Abortion, in VIRTUE ETHICS 217, 224 (Roger Crisp &
Michael Slote eds., 1997).
295. See Chang, supra note 289, at 1588-91.
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sentence, and the Court's conservative approach to the question before it
preserved the holding of McMillan. 296 However, as Justice O'Connor pointed
out in her dissent, 297 and as Justice Thomas asserted in his concurrence, 298 the
logic of Apprendi applies just as well to the imposition of mandatory minimums
as it does to increases in the statutory maximum. In both kinds of determinate
sentencing, the offender faces a more onerous sentence than he otherwise
would, based on a sentencing factor that has not been proved to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt. If Winship is evaded by increases in the statutory maximum
sentence, then it is just as clearly evaded by legislative impositions of mandatory minimums. For this reason, the Williams-McMillan faction on the Court
doubted that the space that the Apprendi opinion cleared for McMillan would
remain open for very long. 299
The Apprendi dissenters' fear is justified because a principled treatment of
mandatory-minimum sentencing schemes will not preserve McMillan or mandatory-minimum sentencing schemes generally. Just as Patterson cannot withstand a careful analysis, so McMillan comes out the other way when its vague
and ambiguous terminology is replaced with a more precise vocabulary. To
commit an offense with a firearm is not merely an aggravating factor, it is a
matter of fault, and this precludes, as a constitutional matter, our removing it
from the jury's province. If Pennsylvania were to conclude that to have a
particular intention in the commission of a crime indicated a degree of fault that
was not reflected in existing law, then Pennsylvania ordinarily would include
that mental state in the definition of a new offense or a new degree of an
existing offense. Similarly, if Pennsylvania thought that the use of a firearm in
the commission of an offense indicated a degree of fault that was not reflected
in existing law, then Pennsylvania should have included the use of a firearm in
the definition of a new offense or a new degree of an existing offense. In the
half-century since Williams initiated the debate over sentencing factors versus
offense elements, no one has argued that the mens rea elements of an offense
could be removed from the offense definition and treated as sentencing factors.
This is why the Justices argued in Apprendi over whether a racial purpose could
be characterized as a motive instead of a mens rea.300 All the Justices agreed,
implicitly, that if a racial purpose were a mens rea, then it could not be
converted into a sentencing factor consistently with due process and the jury
guarantee. But criminal fault is not exclusively a matter of mental states, either
as a conceptual or as a practical matter. 301 The reasons that lead us consistently
to treat mental-states indicators of fault as a part of the offense definition should
lead us to treat objective fault considerations in the same way.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
30 I.

Apprendi v. New Jer~y. 530 U.S. 466, 484-88 (2000).
Id. at 532-33 (O' Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 520-23 (Thomas, J., concurring).
See id. at 543-45 (O' Connor, J., dissenting).
See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490-93 ; id. at 553-54 (O' Connor, J. , dissenting).
See supra Part 11.A.3.
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These reasons are similar to those expressed in the Apprendi opinion and
concurrences. Fault justifies the imposition of punishment, just as wrongdoing
justifies punishment, because fault is an aspect of wrongdoing. If the justification provided by a violation of the elements of an offense ought to be determined by a jury, then the justification provided by fault also ought to be
determined by a jury. The Apprendi Court framed this idea in terms of the
features of positive law; that is, in terms of the facts that the legislature actually
has designated as grounds for punishment or as grounds for a degree of
punishment. 302 But in order to avoid the weaknesses of these arguments, we
need to tie the argument to a theoretical account of the way in which fault
justifies punishment. There are competing theoretical accounts of fault, of
course, but one demonstrates better than the others do the intricate connections
between wrongdoing and fault.
Neither consequentialist theories of punishment (usually called deterrence
theories) nor deontological theories of punishment (usually called retributive
theories) distinguish adequately between eligibility and fault. 303 Consequentialist theories recognize no particular connection between fault and wrongdoing,
because they treat fault as an exogenous side constraint on punishment. 304
Deontological theories of punishment focus on the will as the seat of moral
agency, in accordance with their Kantian origins. 305 The resulting conception of
culpability stresses the idea of voluntariness as a necessary condition of just
punishment and treats the intentional states that most often indicate culpability
as various modes of voluntariness.306 Because eligibility predominates over
fault in this volitional conception of culpability, deontological theories also fail
to give much of an account of fault as an aspect of wrongdoing. The strongest
sign that consequentialist and deontological theories of punishment are inadequate is the inability of either theory to explain why criminal fault is not in fact
confined to the presence or absence of mental states.307
A virtue ethics 3 0 8 theory of punishment is superior in these re-

302. See supra Part I.B. l.
303. See supra note 188 (explaining why "deterrence theory of punishment" and "retributive theory
of punishment" are misnomers).
304. See supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
305 . Alan Brudner, Agency and Welfare in the Penal Law, in ACTION AND VALUE IN THE C RIMINAL
LAW 2 1, 29-30 (Stephen Shute et al. eds., 1993).
306. Huigens, supra note 32, at 1233-35; see Stephen J. Morse, The "Guilty Mind:" Mens Rea, in
HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 207, 211 (Dorothy K. Kagehiro & William S. Laufer eds., 1992)
(describing the "just deserts" position as holding that "there is no blameworthiness unless there is an
appropriate mental state, such as intent or knowledge, that marks an actor 's offending conduct as ' hers ' ").
307. See supra notes 2 10-22 and accompanying text.
308. No one should be put o ff by the word " virtue" in thi s context. It has nothing to do with the
political and cultural agenda of some conservative political figures. See, e.g., WILLIAM BENNETT, THE
BooK OF VIRTUES ( 1990). Virtue ethics is the third maj or branch of philosophical ethics. See generally,
e.g., T HREE METHODS OF Ern1cs: A DEBATE (Philip Pettit et al. eds., 1997). Ju st as consequentialism and
deontological morality have served as the bases of theories of punishment, so can virtue ethics serve as
the basis of a theory of punishment. Virtue ethics begins with Aristotle. See generally ARISTOTLE, T HE
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spects. 309 The virtue ethics theory is a character-based theory of punishment. 310 It holds that the inculcation and maintenance of the capacity for
sound practical reasoning (virtue in its correct, technical sense) 311 is a
prominent objective of punishment that can justify punishment. 312 The basic
idea behind virtue ethics is that we govern ourselves at the level of our
motivations and that we are responsible for the state of our motivations. The
virtue ethics theory of punishment posits that the criminal law enforces this
responsibility and plays a role-along with families, religious institutions,
schools, and systems of social norms-in the inculcation of sound practical

N1coMACHEAN ETiflcs (Martin Ostwald trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1962). It was revived in modem
philosophy by Anscombe, see G.E.M. Anscombe, Modem Moral Philosophy, 33 PHILOSOPHY 1 (1958),
reprinted in VIRTUE ETIIlcs, supra note 294, at 26, and is the subject of an extensive literature, see
generally ROSALIND HuRSTHOUSE, ON VIRTUE ETHICS (1999); ALASDAIR MAclNTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (2d ed.
1997); OAKLEY, supra note 275; MICHAEL SLOTE, FROM MORALITY TO VIRTUE (1992); MICHAEL STOCKER,
PLURAL AND CONFLICTING VALUES 338-42 (1990); Roger Crisp & Michael Slate, Introduction to VIRTUE
ETHICS, supra note 294, at 1, 3-4; Justin Oakley, Varieties of Virtue Ethics, 9 RATIO 128, 129 (1996);
Michael Stocker, Values and Purposes, 18 J. PHIL. 747 (1981); Christine Swanton, Pro.files of the
Virtues, 16 PAC. PHIL. Q. 47 (1995); Christine Swanton, Satisficing and Virtue, 90 J. PHIL. 33 (1993).
309. The virtue ethics theory of punishment begins with this passage from The Nicomachean Ethics:
To obtain the right training for virtue from youth up is difficult, unless one has been brought
up under the right laws. To live a life of self-control and tenacity is not pleasant for most
people, especially for the young. Therefore, their upbringing and pursuits must be regulated
by Jaws; for once they have become familiar, they will no longer be painful. But it is perhaps
not enough that they receive the right upbringing and attention only in their youth. Since they
must carry on these pursuits and cultivate them by habit when they have grown up, we
probably need laws for this too, and for the whole of life in general.
ARISTOTLE, supra note 308, at 295-96; see also id. at 34 ("Lawgivers make the citizens good by
inculcating (good) habits in them, and this is the aim of every lawgiver."). Aristotle aside, the virtue
ethics theory of punishment first appeared in the 1970s, see Edmund L . Pincoffs, Legal Responsibility
and Moral Character, 19 WAYNE L. REv. 905, 918 (1973) (arguing that punishment represents a
demand that one develop and exhibit certain character traits), and the theory has been given several full
or partial treatments since then, see Peter Arenella, Character, Choice, and Moral Agency: The
Relevance of Character to Our Moral Culpability Judgments, 1 Soc. PHIL. & PoL'Y 59 ( 1990), reprinted
in CRIME, CULPABILITY, AND REMEDY 59, 61 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1990) (arguing that so-called
rational choice theory is inadequate to describe the criminal law's concern with character); Claire 0 .
Finkelstein, Duress: A Philosophical Account of the Defense in Law, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 251 , 252-53
(1995) (relying on Aristotle's conception of judgment to give an account of duress in terms of states of
character); Huigens, supra note 189; Huigens, supra note 32; Kyron Huigens, Virtue and lnculpation,
108 HARV. L. REv. 1423 (1995). The virtue ethics theory of punishment is one of several theories that
conceptualizes criminal fault in terms of the actor's desires, motivations, or preferences, instead of
discrete mental states. See Guyora Binder, Meaning and Motive in the Law of Homicide , 3 BuFF. CRIM.
L. REv. 755, 766-69 (2000) (review essay) (describing the recent work of Huigens, Samuel Pillsbury,
Dan Kahan, Alan Michaels, and Kenneth Simons in such a manner).
310. See R.A. Duff, Choice and Character and Criminal Liability, 12 L. & PHIL. 345, 345-50 ( 1993)
(describing character-based approaches to the theory of punishment); R.A. Duff, Penal Communications: Recent Work in the Philosophy of Punishment, in 20 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH I
(Michael Tonry ed., 1996) (same).
311. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 308, at 170-73; Huigens, supra note 309, at 1452-56 (describing
Aristotle's identification of virtue with phronesis, or sound practical judgment).
312. See Huigens, supra note 309, at 1458-67.
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judgment. 313 The theory seeks to explain the principal features of just
punishment and the criminal law, including fault, from this perspective.
The virtue ethics theory explains what it means to say that fault is an aspect
of wrongdoing and, thus, the reason that fault must be determined by the jury. It
also explains why fault is not limited to mental states and, thus, the reason that
the features of the offense that have been designated as sentencing factors must
be enacted and adjudicated as offense elements instead.
In a virtue ethics theory of punishment, fault is an inference, drawn in
adjudication, to the effect that the person who has violated a prohibitory norm
has done so in a way that calls the quality of his practical reasoning into
question. 3 14 The inference of fault in adjudication is a necessary complement to
the legislation of offenses. The prohibitory norms that make up the criminal law
are generalizations about proper and improper conduct, drawn from generations
of shared experience. Action-guiding legislation takes as its models those
judgments about the proper course of action in problematic practical situations
that are widely regarded as sound judgments. The generalizations of these
sound judgments are familiar to us, and almost uncontroversial: that property
ought to be secure, that life and bodily integrity ought to be preserved, that
individual autonomy ought to be respected, and so on. A criminal code is a
relatively detailed set of positively enacted ethical generalizations of this kind.
Their violation constitutes criminal wrongdoing. 315
Because they are generalizations of sound practical judgments in the relevant
sphere of human conduct, each of the conduct rules of the criminal law presents
an implicit demand that the accused should engage in sound practical reasoning
in the circumstances in which such a crime may be committed. The requirement
of fault entails a retrospective, adjudicative inquiry into this question. The
question before the jury is whether the acts of the accused, in the particular
circumstances of the alleged crime, displayed inadequate or flawed practical
reasoning, including the deliberations on ends that have gone toward establishing and maintaining the attitudes and standing motivations of the accused. This
determination by the jury turns on a comparison between the defendant's
judgment in the relevant circumstances-as evidenced by the particular manner
and circumstances of his wrongdoing-and a sound judgment in the relevant
circumstances-as evidenced by the applicable conduct rules. This comparison
between the defendant's judgment in the relevant circumstances and the sound
judgment that is implicit in the applicable conduct rule leads to the inference of
fault or no-fault. In this way, the justifying rationale of the conduct rule is
brought to bear on the punishment of the individual offender.316
Both intentional and nonintentional, or objective, fault are determined in this

3 13.
314.
315.
316.

See Huigens, supra note 189, at 1016-34.
See id. at 1028-31.
See id. at 1024-25.
See id. at 1028-31.
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way. In most cases, an intentional state regarding harm or a risk of harm denotes
fault. However, this intentional state does not constitute fault. Fault consists of
the way in which the accused has come to do wrong and the particular way in
which he has done wrong. This fault may or may not be denoted by an
intentional state on the occasion of action. 317
The inference of fault is a necessary step in the imposition of just punishment. Sound practical reasoning is context-dependent. 3 18 That is, we cannot say
what the right decision in any situation is, or was, unless we know not only
what alternatives were available, but also the circumstances under which the
choice was made. If part of the question before the jury is whether the defendant
engaged in sound practical reasoning on the occasion of wrongdoing, then the
conduct rule has to be returned to the level of specific, context-rich practical
judgment from which it arose and in which the offender acted. The jury
performs this specification of the conduct rule when it applies the law to the
facts before it. This adjudicative specification of the norm complements the
legislative generalization of the norm. If part of the justification of punishment
is the inculcation and maintenance of sound practical judgment, then just
punishment cannot be imposed unless and until this step is taken.3 19 We refrain
from punishing those who do wrong without fault because the inculcation of
sound practical judgment is one of the principal functions of punishment. It
would be expressively irrational-even if it might be consequentially effective-to punish one whose actions do evince sound practical reasoning, even if
these actions constitute a nominal violation of the prohibitory norm. 320
This intricate, complementary relationship between wrongdoing and fault
suggests that fault always must be determined by the jury, just as wrongdoing is.
This is too broad an inference because fault is a consideration in setting a
proportionate sentence and the sentencing court also makes some fault determinations. I will explore this qualification and its implications in the next section.
But the validity of mandatory-minimum sentencing schemes is unaffected by
this qualification. Before moving on, then, I will stop to apply the principles that
I have laid out so far to that question, and to the similar case of so-called "three
strikes, you're out" laws.
Enough probably has been said about mandatory-minimum sentencing
schemes. McMillan was incorrectly decided, and the limitation on the Apprendi
holding that is based on McMillan cannot be maintained. It makes no difference
that the law at issue in McMillan, unlike the law at issue in Apprendi, raised the
available minimum punishment instead of the available maximum punishment.
In either case, the law provided for the judicial determination of a matter of
fault. If the Constitution requires the jury to determine wrongdoing beyond a

3 17.
3 18.
3 19.
320.

See id.
See supra Part lll.B.
See Hui gens, supra note 189, at I 029-30.
See Huigens, supra note 32, at 1246-51.
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reasonable doubt, then the Constitution requires the jury to determine fault
beyond a reasonable doubt because fault is an aspect of wrongdoing. No one
would suggest that the mens rea elements of an offense could be made into
sentencing factors for purposes of either a mandatory-minimum sentencing or a
sentencing in excess of the statutory maximum. Objective fault considerations
that are employed for these purposes are objectionable for the same reasons and
to the same degree.
By the same logic, Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly decided, and the
limitation on the Apprendi holding that is based on that case cannot be maintained. The distinction between fault and eligibility does not correspond to a
simple distinction between the offense and the offender. Not all personal
characteristics are eligibility considerations. Indeed, the difference between
fault and eligibility considerations is a functional one, so that a single fact may
appear as one or the other kind of consideration, depending on context. 321 In the
context of a prosecution for illegal entry into the country after a previous
deportation, the fact that an offender was deported because he had been
convicted of violent offenses is a fault consideration. That circumstance makes
the wrongdoing worse than it otherwise would be, and a matter of greater social
concern, because the offender is a dangerous person. Criminal history aggravates the wrongdoing, and this aggravation has a mitigating converse. That the
offender has little or no substantial criminal history appears as a mitigator in
many capital sentencing statutes. 322 More to the point, the circumstance of
criminal history indicates flawed or defective practical judgment because the
offender evidently cannot maintain a peaceful, law-abiding character. If the
wrongdoing of crossing the border must be proved to the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt, then the Constitution requires criminal history to be proved in
the same way because it is a related fault determination that is a necessary step
in the imposition of just punishment.
If criminal history or recidivism is a fault consideration in cases such as
Almendarez-Torres, then the three-strikes sentencing schemes adopted by many
states in the early 1990s are unconstitutional. Three-strikes schemes provide
that an offender must be sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of
parole if he is being sentenced for a felony of a specific class and if he also has
two or more previous convictions for felonies of that class on his record. 323 The
most recent conviction is his "third strike." Were it not for its limitation
321. For example, the age of the offender can be a fault consideration in a statutory rape offense.
The age of the offender, relative to that of the victim, makes the offense better or worse than it may
otherwise be. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE ANN.§ 9A.44.073(1) (West 2000) (defining rape of a child in
the first degree as intercourse between a victim under age twelve and a perpetrator twenty-four months
older than the victim).
322. See, e.g., 720 ILL COMP. STAT. § 5/9-l(c)(l) (2001); OHJo REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B)(5)
(West 1997 & Supp. 2001).
323. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.030(29) (West 1998 & Supp. 2001) (defining
"persistent offender" as an offender with this kind of criminal history); id. § 9.94A.120(4) (mandating
life imprisonment without parole for persistent offenders).
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concerning recidivism, many three-strikes schemes would violate Apprendi
because they authorize life sentences for offenses that otherwise carry a lower
maximum penalty. 324 But even if Almendarez-Torres were overruled, this would
invalidate three-strikes schemes only in part, and in a way that, following
Justice O'Connor's advice, state legislatures would find easy to remedy. 325 A
more sophisticated analysis produces a much stronger argument against these
schemes.
In three-strikes schemes, as in Almendarez-Torres, the previous convictions
are used as fault considerations. The proponents of three-strikes schemes stress
the benefits of permanently incapacitating repeat offenders, as well as these
schemes' supposed enhancement of the criminal law's deterrent power. 326 This
consequentialism matches that of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for crudeness of conception and disdain for the traditional normative architecture of the
criminal law. The objective is to warehouse undesirables; the moral niceties of
punishment be damned. Nevertheless, as in the case of the Guidelines, the basic
features of genuine punishment are discemable. The essential charge against the
repeat offender is not just that he is dangerous, but that he cannot maintain a
peaceful, law-abiding character. His criminal history is a fault consideration
because it tells us that he has flawed or defective practical judgment. If the
wrongdoing of the current offense must be proved to the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt, then the Constitution requires this aspect of his wrongdoing,
the fault implicit in his criminal history, to be proved in the same way.
D. DISCRETIONARY JUDICIAL SENTENCING RETAINED

The intricate, complementary relationship between wrongdoing and fault that
I described in the preceding section suggests that fault always must be determined by the jury, just as wrongdoing is. This is too broad an inference, because
fault is a consideration in setting a proportionate punishment. In the course of
sentencing, the judge makes her own determinations of fault and finds the facts
on which these determinations tum. Fault's particular relevance is to character.
A sentencing court inquires into character even more broadly than the jury does,
and in doing so the judge draws inferences about the quality of the offender's
practical judgment from the manner and circumstances of his wrongdoing-the
quality of a person's practical judgment being a prominent constituent of
character.
On the logic of Williams and McMillan, the fact that the judge draws

324. See, e.g., id. § 9.94A.020(25) (listing seventeen offenses that can constitute a "third strike" but
that would not otherwise carry a statutory maximum penalty of life imprisonment); see also supra notes
120-21 and accompanying text (describing the likelihood of the Court 's overruling Almendarez-Torres
and thus eliminating the exception for recidivism in Apprendi's holdi ng).
325. See supra Part I.B. l.
326. See, e.g., Bill Jones, Why the Three Strikes Law ls Working in California, 11 STAN. L. & PoL' Y
R EV. 23 ( 1999) (presenting statistical and anecdotal evidence of incapacitation and deterrence by a
three-strikes law).
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inferences of fault implies that fault considerations can be enacted into positive
law as sentencing factors instead of as offense elements. 327 If the judge can find
facts that determine fault in her discretion, then to constrain that discretion by
the specification of sentencing factors and mandatory terms is a net constitutional gain. Conversely, if determinate and mandatory sentencing schemes are
unconstitutional, then the institution of discretionary judicial sentencing cannot
be maintained.
However, once we understand wrongdoing, fault, and proportionality, the
Williams-McMillan argument breaks down. If fault considerations are enacted
into positive law at all, then this is evidence that they pertain to wrongdoing and
to the jury's determination of whether punishment is justified in the case. In
contrast, the fault determinations that the sentencing court makes involve
considerations that are not positively enacted into rules, because they are
relevant to a broader inquiry into character that bears on the determination of a
proportionate punishment. This division of labor preserves the discretion of the
sentencing court to make determinations of fault and to find the facts on which
those determinations tum. But it also implies that the very idea of a positive
determinate sentencing factor is contradictory. This point is at the heart of the
solution to the Apprendi puzzle, so allow me to develop it a little further in the
next six paragraphs.
Both the jury and the sentencing court determine fault as well as the facts on
which these fault determinations tum. But these determinations of fault occur in
the context of two different, lexically ordered, questions. The jury's task is to
determine whether any punishment is justified, and as a necessary step in
making this threshold decision, the jury determines whether the offender's
practical judgment is flawed. Punishment is justified by wrongdoing, but only if
the wrongdoing consists of more than a nominal violation of the prohibitory
norm. Because the inculcation and maintenance of sound practical judgment are
justifying purposes of punishment, we need to know that these purposes hold in
each particular case. If the manner and circumstances of the offender's wrongdoing do not indicate that flawed or defective practical judgment lies behind the
act, then to punish in that case would be irrational and unjust. The jury is
concerned with the defendant's character only with respect to the quality of his
practical judgment; it is concerned with his defective practical reasoning-that
is, his fault-only insofar as it is an aspect of wrongdoing that bears on the
justification of punishment in his case.
The sentencing court assumes that punishment is justified in the offender's
case. The judge is concerned with the defendant's character as such, and only in
part with the quality of his practical judgment. The defective practical reasoning
that makes the offender's conduct more than a nominal violation of the prohibitory norm brings him within the sentencing court's authority and responsibility
and plays a role in the determination of a proportionate punishment. But this
327. See supra Part I.A.
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latter task involves a far broader set of concerns than the single fact that the
offender's practical judgment is flawed. The determination of a proportionate
punishment is a matter of expressive rationality, in which a number of incommensurable concerns are compared with an eye to the imposition of a punishment
that accords with the character and self-conception of the punishing majority. 328
The presence and the particulars of fault in the case are relevant, but not
predominant, considerations in determining a proportionate punishment.
The enactment of a fault consideration into positive law is evidence that its
role is to justify punishment and not to be pertinent to proportionality. Enactment into positive law tells us that the fact is of particular relevance to the
prohibitory norm and to the justification of punishment in individual cases of
the prohibitory norm's violation. By providing for the adjudication of a particular fault consideration, the legislature has ensured that the wrongdoing in
question will be clearly condemned in all important respects, that the offender
and others will be deterred in this particular regard, that the community will
experience catharsis regarding this particular aspect of the wrongdoing, and so
on. Furthermore, the very fact that the particular fault consideration has been
tied to the wrongdoing by and within a structure of rules indicates an apparent
recognition on the part of legislators that the consideration bears on the justification of punishment in the individual case. The determination of guilt or innocence always has been hemmed in by rules because it is a threshold question; it
is the point at which a citizen's standing in society will or will not undergo a
radical transformation. This is not the case with sentencing. If the principle of
legality requires a matter such as the quantity of drugs or the weapon involved
in an offense to be committed to a structure of rules, then this is strong evidence
that the matter is a fault consideration that bears on the justification of punishment.
The notion of a positive determinate sentencing factor is, from this perspective,
unsustainable. If the fault consideration is so salient to the wrongdoing that it must be
expressly condemned, and so salient to the threshold justification of punishment that it
must be framed in rules, then it is illogical to express that consideration in rules that
have nothing to do with either the determination of wrongdoing or the threshold
justification of punishment. If the matter in question is a fault consideration that bears
on the justification of punishment, then the structure of rules to which it belongs is that
of offense definitions, and the proper method of proof is that which is required for the
proof of offenses. In other words, the very idea of a positive determinate sentencing
factor is a contradiction: It is a fault consideration that, on the evidence of its being
positively enacted, is a matter for the jury to determine, that nevertheless is not a
matter for the jury to determine. Positive fault considerations, therefore, can be neither
determined by the sentencing court, nor enacted as sentencing factors.
The fault considerations that the sentencing court properly determines neces-

328. See supra notes 285-95 and accompanying text (distinguishing incommensurability from
incomparability and describing sentencing as an expressively rational matter).
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sarily are those that have not been enacted into positive law. The number and
gradation of facts that may bear on fault are virtually infinite, and not all of
them need be or can be positively enacted. In any given case, many considerations that are pertinent to the quality of the offender's practical judgment can
be found in the interstices of the offense definition. Many of these aspects of the
offense are simply too fine-grained to be captured in rules. 329 These interstitial
fault considerations are determined by the jury when it draws the inference of
fault; that is, when the jury specifies the prohibitory norm and brings it down
from the general level of the offense definition to the level of particulars at
which the prohibition originated, at which the defendant made his decisions,
and at which his practical reasoning ought to be assessed retrospectively. 330
Interstitial fault considerations also are determined by the sentencing court
when it performs its distinctive function. In arriving at a proportionate sentence,
the court considers the positive fault that the jury has determined in the course
of rendering a conviction. But it also goes beyond this delimited determination
of fault and considers the manner and circumstances of the particular offense
and the more subtle signs and gradations of fault to be found in the interstices of
the positive law.
The distinction between positive and interstitial fault considerations preserves
discretionary judicial sentencing, but it breaks the Williams-McMillan syllogism
and reinforces the conclusion that determinate sentencing, mandatory-minimum, and three-strikes sentencing schemes are invalid. The sentencing court
can hear and determine the existence of eligibility-based mitigators that pertain
to the capabilities and other characteristics of the offender. The court can hear
and determine facts concerning the offense that bear on interstitial fault considerations. But the litigation of positive fault considerations is barred at sentencing.
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines are invalid because real-offense sentencing
depends on the litigation of fault considerations that have been positively
enacted in the Guidelines, 331 most of which should not have been enacted into
positive law in any form. Mandatory-minimum sentencing schemes, such as
that involved in McMillan, are invalid for the same reason. If the sentencing
factor is so salient to the offense that the legislature feels it necessary to enact it
into positive law, then it is a fault consideration that bears on wrongdoing and
on the threshold determination that punishment is justified in the individual
case. If such a consideration is enacted into law at all, it must be as part of an
offense that is to be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, and to which
other constitutional trial rights apply. Otherwise, it is an interstitial fault consideration that either the jury or the sentencing court or both may determine, each
within the context of its own institutional responsibilities.
329. See infra notes 335-38 and accompanying text (defining "fine-grained" in this context).
330. See supra Part m.s; see also supra note 256 (giving examples of positive and interstitial fault
considerations).
331. I include in this description not only the Guidelines themselves, but also federal offense statutes
that assume a Guidelines approach to sentencing. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2000).
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The case of three-strikes schemes is perhaps the most interesting of the three
kinds of sentencing schemes from this perspective. The Almendarez-Torres
Court pointed out that criminal history is as traditional a sentencing factor as
one can imagine. 332 This is both true and untrue. In the sentencing of most
offenders, criminal history is an interstitial fault consideration. It is not a
consideration that has been enacted as part of the offense for which the offender
is being sentenced, but it is a fault consideration: It indicates the relative ability
of the offender to maintain a law-abiding character and the proper level of
social concern over his actions. The sentencing court naturally has the power to
hear and determine the relevance of this consideration in the course of setting a
proportionate sentence. However, when an offender's criminal history reaches a
certain level, the legislature may conclude that this aspect of the wrongdoing is
particularly salient. The final act of wrongdoing in a series of criminal acts
ought to be particularly condemned, so that others will be deterred in this
particular regard, so that the community will experience catharsis regarding this
particular aspect of the wrongdoing, and so on. If the legislature reaches this
conclusion, then criminal history is no longer merely pertinent to proportionality; it is primarily relevant to wrongdoing and to the threshold determination
that punishment is justified in the individual case. This is a positive fault
consideration, and the Constitution requires that it be pied and proved as an
element of an offense.
E. FOUR OBJECTIONS, BRIEFLY CONSIDERED

The foregoing argument can be further clarified and defended with brief
responses to four objections.
The first objection is that my distinction between positive fault considerations
and interstitial fault considerations turns on the state of positive law, 333 which
means that my argument will be vulnerable to Justice O'Connor's reductio ad
absurdum, in the same way that Justice Stevens's and Justice Thomas's arguments are vulnerable. 334 My argument is not vulnerable in this way, because
positive law plays only an evidentiary, not a determinative, role in a normative
analysis. Justices Stevens and Thomas retain the category of "sentencing factor," and draw only a positive law distinction between sentencing factors and
offense elements. Given that the legislature controls positive law, the legislature
retains the power to convert offense elements to sentencing elements at will,
provided only, as Justice O'Connor points out, that the legislature goes about
this in the right way. My argument avoids Justice O'Connor's reductio because
it draws a normative line between the adjudication of offenses and sentencing.

332. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224,230 (1998).
333 . My argument, again, is that the legislature's enactment of a fault consideration into positive law
is evidence that it is a positive fault consideration; if it is a positive fault consideration, then it must be
enacted as part of an offense definition if enacted into positive law at all. See supra Part Ill.D.
334. See supra Part LB. I.
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If a legislature enacts a fault consideration into law as a sentencing factor, then
it has made a mistake. Its enacting the matter into positive law at all is evidence
that the consideration is particularly salient to the wrongdoing at issue; but if
this is so, then this is all the more reason to adjudicate the matter in conjunction
with wrongdoing, and not separately. On my argument, the enactment of a
sentencing factor implies that the legislature ought to enact a new offense or
offense definition instead; whereas on the argument of Justices Stevens and
Thomas, the legislature's enactment of a sentencing factor is, if done cleverly,
conclusive.
There is another way to describe the normative line between positive fault
and interstitial fault, and it draws a second useful objection. It may be that a
fault consideration should not be enacted into positive law at all, either as a
sentencing factor or as an offense element. Some features of wrongdoing are so
fine-grained that to enact them into rules at all will distort their significance and
function as indicators of fault. In other words, there is an upper limit to the
complexity that a system of rules can accommodate, and the boundary between
positive and interstitial fault considerations tracks this upper limit. The objection to this argument is simply that the notion of a fault consideration's being
too fine-grained is unclear. It seems to be no more useful than the McMillan
"wags the dog" standard. 335 But it is difficult both to articulate a test for
fine-grainedness and to show that determinate sentencing schemes such as the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines cross the line so defined. We know that a matter
is too fine-grained for rules when it is written into a rule and one of two things
happens. First, when elaborations of the rule are permitted, elaborations proliferate and begin to conflict. Second, when elaborations of the rule are not
permitted, the authorities who apply the rules begin to apply them in resultoriented ways. Both of these effects are discernible in the case of the Guidelines. The Guidelines permit a limited role for common-law development, and
within these boundaries, minute and often conflicting elaborations of rules
pertaining to fault have proliferated. 336 On the whole, however, the Guidelines

335. In an abundance of caution, I will note that, for the reasons given in the preceding paragraph,
the line between positive and interstitial fault is not the same line as the one that the "wag the dog"
standard governs, which is the line between sentencing factors and offense elements.
336. For example, scores and sentences under the Guidelines are affected significantly by whether
an offender is "substantially less culpable than the average participant." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 3B 1.2 (1995) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.]. Courts have differed over whether this involves a
comparison to both the other participants in the offense and the "average participant" in such a crime,
see United States v. Snoddy, 139 F.3d 1224, 1228 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Daughtrey, 874 F.2d
213, 216 (4th Cir. 1989); either the other participants in the offense or the "average participant" in such
a crime, see United States v. Andrus, 925 F.2d 335, 338 (9th Cir. 1991 ); the other participants in the
offense but not the "average participant" in such a crime, see United States v. Andrus, 925 F.2d 335,
338 (9th Cir. 1991); or the "average participant" in such a crime but not the other participants in the
offense, see United States v. Zaccardi, 924 F.2d 201,203 (11th Cir. 1991). See JEFRJ WooD, FEDERAL
JuDICIAL CENTER, GUIDELINE SENTENCING: AN OUTLINE OF APPELLATE CASE LAW ON SELECTED ISSUES
135-36 (2000). Similarly, it is far from clear when an offender has engaged in a "crime of violence" in
a "controlled substance offense" as opposed to a "violent felony" in a "serious drug offense." Compare
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have been interpreted so as to bind the lower federal courts into a rigid
framework. 337 And, on the whole, one finds a strong tendency toward resultoriented applications of the Guidelines. 338 When rules follow rather than lead an
analysis in this way then rules have overreached their useful role, and the matter
is too fine-grained for rules.
A third objection denies that sentencing factors are matters of fault at all. The
objection is that the enactment of an aspect of wrongdoing into positive law
does not necessarily mean that the legislature wishes to condemn or to deter the
wrongdoing in this particular respect. The legislature may have some other
reason to enact the consideration into positive law: notably, a good faith effort
to avoid discrepancies and inequalities in sentencing. If this is the case, the
argument goes, then the consideration is not a matter of fault, nor must it be
adjudicated at trial, by the jury, in conjunction with wrongdoing. But this
conclusion does not follow. Any aspect of wrongdoing that is singled out for
purposes of determining the relative severity of the wrongdoing is by definition
a matter of fault. If it is singled out by designation as a sentencing factor, then
this is because a legislature has chosen to provide for the adjudication of a
matter of fault separately from the adjudication of the rest of the wrongdoing.
That the legislature has made such a choice does not imply that the matter is not
one of fault, that the legislature has acted wisely, or that the separate adjudication of fault and wrongdoing is theoretically or morally defensible.
Finally, one may object that, if determinate sentencing schemes are abolished,
then we will be deprived of the means to address problems of discrepancy or
inequality in sentencing. This is not true. To the extent that it is feasible to
address problems of discrepancy and inequality through the enactment of
detailed sentencing factors , it is feasible to address these problems through the
enactment of detailed offense definitions. A conviction for such an offense may
authorize a sentence within only a very narrow range, with the specific sentence
to be determined by a sentencing judge exercising her discretion. If truth in
sentencing is an important consideration, then the offender could be required to
serve this sentence without parole. Certainly there is an upper limit on the
complexity in an offense definition that a jury can be expected to handle. But if

U.S.S.G. § 4B I.I , cmt. n. I, with 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2000). There are plenty of other examples. Actual
facts have to be fit into the less than self-evident categories of "otherwise extensive," U.S.S.G.
§ 3B1.l(a), (b); see WooD, supra, at 127-29, "unusually vulnerable victim," U.S.S.G. § 3AI.I; see
WOOD, supra, at 106-15, "abuse of trust," U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3; see WooD, supra, at 137-46, and "more
than minimal planning," U.S.S.G. § 1B I.I ; see WooD, supra, at I 01-05. A discussion on the difficulties
over "minor" versus "minimal" participants in an offense is in STITH & CABRANES, supra note 24, at
92-93 . The result of the Guidelines' effort to capture these subtle shadings of fault in rules is a huge
expenditure of time, effort, and resources, all of "which, lamentably, is squandered on the obscure." Id.
at 94.
337. See Douglas A. Berman, Balanced and Purposeful Departures: Fixing a Jurisprudence That
Undermines the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 21, 59-72 (2000) (describing
the origins and ill effects of tight constraints on departures from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
338. See JoHNSON & GILBERT, supra note 266, at 10.
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a consideration is too fine-grained to serve as an offense element, then it is too
fine-grained to serve as a sentencing factor. Our experience with Guidelines
sentencing hardly has demonstrated that judges are more adept at overcoming
the natural limits of rules than juries are. Defenders of the Guidelines frequently
tout their system's superiority to a pure offense-based system, under which the
offense of conviction immediately determines the sentence. 339 They may claim
that the system that I have just suggested is offense-based. It is offense-based,
but it does not entirely eliminate discretionary judicial sentencing. Like the
Guidelines themselves, it strikes a balance between determinacy and discretion.
The difference is that it does not sacrifice constitutional trial rights in the process.
F. THE NONRETROACTIVITY OF THE SOLUTION

The principal objection to the analysis presented above may be a practical
one: The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and state mandatory-minimum and
three-strikes schemes have been in force for many years, and hundreds of
thousands of offenders have been sentenced under these systems. 340 If the
Supreme Court were to strike down these schemes on the grounds that I have
laid out, then it is arguable that this holding should be applied retroactively and
that every mandatory sentence ever handed down should be reviewed and
possibly overturned on habeas corpus. If this were the case, then it would count
as a good reason not to adopt my solution to the Apprendi puzzle. 341 But it is
not the case: My solution to the puzzle is nonretroactive.
Ordinarily, a newly created or newly adopted rule of constitutional law
cannot be applied retroactively to a judgment and sentence that has become
final. 342 Two exceptions to this rule of nonretroactivity create the difficulty for
my argument. First, a new rule of constitutional law can be invoked by a

339. See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 161 , at 9-11 (comparing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
favorably to a charge-offense sentencing system); Julie R. O'Sullivan, In Defense of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines ' Modified Real-Offense System, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1342 (1997) (same).
340. See supra notes I 3, 20.
341. The reasons for the rule of nonretroactivity include judicial efficiency, the psychological value
of finality, and the value of comity between state and federal courts. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288,
308 (1989) (plurality opinion); Jordan Steiker, Innocence and Federal Habeas, 41 UCLA L. REv. 303,
361 (1993). These reasons apply with particular force to a retroactive abolition of state and federal
mandatory sentencing. The financial cost of relitigating these cases would be daunting for the richest
society. Even if resentencing at roughly the previous level is a far more likely outcome than release, the
psychological cost of unsettling these convictions would fall heavily on victims and offenders alike
because members of both groups would overestimate the likelihood of release. The impact of abolishing mandatory sentencing would fall mostly on the states because of the sheer number of state
mandatory sentencing cases, which vastly outnumber Federal Sentencing Guidelines cases. See supra
note 20. Because it would be the task of the federal courts to undo these otherwise final sentences,
federalism would be affected in a way that has been of particular concern.
342. Only those defendants who have not been convicted and those offenders whose appeals have
not been decided can invoke the new rule. 2 JAMES S. LIEBMAN & RANDY HERTZ, FEDERAL HABEAS
CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 25.1, at 934 (3d ed. 1998). A new rule of constitutional law is not a
valid ground for a habeas corpus petition simply because the number of final judgments affected by the
new rule is likely to outnumber the nonfinal judgments affected by a large factor.
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prisoner whose conviction is final, if the rule "places 'certain kinds of primary,
private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe. "' 343 This exception has been interpreted to mean that new rules
of substantive criminal law always apply retroactively; the nonretroactivity
doctrine applies only to new rules of criminal procedure. 344 For example, the
exception has been applied to the question of an Eighth Amendment ban on the
death penalty for the mentally impaired. 345 If new substantive criminal law
rules on proportionate punishment apply retroactively, then my solution to the
Apprendi puzzle would seem to apply retroactively. Second, a new rule also
applies retroactively if it is a fundamental rule that ensures accuracy in the
outcome of the trial. 346 This retroactivity principle applies to both trial and
sentencing. 347 It has been applied to new rules concerning the due process
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt 348 and to new rules that protect
the jury right. 349 Because my solution to the Apprendi puzzle draws on the
fundamental principles of just punishment in order to preserve both of these
rights and to adjust the basic relationship between trial and sentencing, it would
seem to apply retroactively.
However, my solution to the Apprendi puzzle does not apply retroactively,
and in this respect it is significantly different from the arguments of the
Apprendi majority. The exceptions to the rule of nonretroactivity for new rules
of law are not really exceptions to that rule at all. The point of both of the
exceptions is to identify new rules of law that are in fact old rules, by virtue of
their status as fundamental law. They are rules "that never before were announced precisely because they are so fundamentally the law that no one
previously thought of violating them." 350 The arguments of the Apprendi opin343. Teague, 489 U.S. at 307 (plurality opinion) (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667,
692 ( 1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
344. See 2 LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 342, § 25.7, at 1021.
345. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 329-30 (1989) (citing Ford v. Wainwright, 47 U.S. 399
(1986)).
346. See Teague, 498 U.S. at 313 (plurality opinion); id. at 320-21 (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment).
347. See 2 LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 342, § 25.7, at 1022 n.22.
348. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Cain, 138 F.3d 552, 553 (5th Cir. 1998) (en bane) (applying retroactively the rule that jury instructions diluting the reasonable doubt standard violate due process (citing
Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990) (per curiam))); see also In re V. v. City of New York, 407 U.S.
203 (1972) (holding In re Winship to be retroactive).
349. Williams v. Dixon, 961 F.2d 448, 456 (4th Cir. 1992) (applying retroactively the rule against
unanimity instructions in capital cases (citing Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988); and McKay v.
North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990))).
350. 2 LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 342, § 25.7, at 1027. Liebman and Hertz apply this description
to rules that fall under the second of the two exceptions to nonretroactivity, but it applies equally well to
the first. In pre-Teague cases, the Supreme Court has taken the view that, in situations in which the first
Teague exception applies, the statute that purported to outlaw the conduct in question was never of any
force or effect, so that no one can be punished for violating it. See United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S.
178, 186-87 (1979); Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 347 (1974). In other words, the apparent
new rule is so fundamentally the law that no crime was ever committed under a statute that the apparent
new rule strikes down. See Chambers v. United States, 22 F.3d 939, 942-43 (9th Cir. 1994) (applying
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ion and concurrences are framed so as to bring the case within this description.
The Justices in the Apprendi majority plainly regard the notion of a sentencing
factor to be a recent innovation that contravenes a well-settled understanding to
the effect that all facts necessary to justify or increase punishment must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury. 351 If, as the dissenters insist, there
are few if any explicit statements of this principle in the case law, then this is
due to the fact that no one thought to challenge the principle until recently, with
the result that no court had occasion to articulate it. On this reading of Apprendi,
the case clearly would have retroactive application, as would the extension of
Apprendi advocated in Justice Thomas's concurrence.
My argument is different from the arguments of the Apprendi Court in this
respect because it does not seek to restore a constitutional consensus. Instead, it
seeks to overturn a consensus. The Apprendi dissenters were right, perhaps
more right than they knew, when they asserted that Apprendi upset a settled
understanding. 352 The settled understanding extends farther back than Patterson
and reaches more broadly than McMillan's approval of sentence enhancements.
Those cases, like Williams, are part of the consequentialist consensus in the
theory of punishment, a consensus that held throughout most of the twentieth
century and that both determinate and indeterminate sentencing philosophies
exemplify. 353 The mandatory sentencing schemes of the states and Congressand the decisions of the Supreme Court that encouraged those schemes-are the
products of this consequentialist consensus. They are the results of good faith
efforts over more than half a century to grapple with the moral and practical
complexities of crime and punishment. I have argued, here and elsewhere, that
the consequentialist theory of punishment is deeply mistaken, but whether
mistaken or not, it set the course of constitutional law and public policy in this
area throughout most of the last century. 354
That being the case, the retroactive annulment of the flawed results of that constitutional consensus is not constitutionally required. The exceptions to the rule of nonretroactivity are meant to identify and apply retroactively the unusual constitutional rule on
which long-standing consensus exists and that has been articulated as a new rule only
because it has never before been challenged. My solution to the Apprendi puzzle
advocates a sharp departure from a consensus view. The strong version of Apprendi's
holding that I advocate requires a fundamental shift in the constitutional analysis of
the criminal law-a shift not only toward a more explicit reliance on the theory of
punishment, but toward reliance on a different theory from the one that is implicit in
the Court's decisions up until now. Because it would overthrow the consequentialist

Davis and Addonizio to a case falling under Teague's first exception), vacated on other grounds, 47 F.3d
1015 (9th Cir. 1995).
351 . See supra note 108.
352. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S . 466, 522-23 (2000) (O' Connor, J., dissenting); id. at
562-66 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
353. See supra Part II.A. I.
354. See Huigens, supra note 189, passim.
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consensus, my solution to the Apprendi puzzle should be treated as a new rule and
applied only prospectively.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court is understandably averse to adopting a particular theory
of punishment for purposes of constitutional analysis. Its institutional integrity
seems to require it to avoid pronouncements on contested moral matters, and the
theory of punishment is a branch of moral philosophy on which little consensus
has been in evidence. However, the Apprendi puzzle is one of several points at
which constitutional law and substantive criminal law intersect, and the Court
has no hope of deciding the constitutional question definitively if it ignores the
assistance that the theory of punishment can provide. The Court's institutional
integrity also is threatened by the use of ill-defined and ambiguous conceptual
tools and by the inconsistent decisionmaking that the Court has displayed
between Williams and Apprendi. Ultimately, the Court's integrity rests not on
the avoidance of controversy, but on consistent, principled decisionmaking.
The Court should abandon once and for all the terminology that it has used up until
now for the constitutional analysis of substantive criminal law questions-terms such
as culpability, aggravation, mitigation, and affirmative defense. It should employ the
more sophisticated terminology of a coherent theory of punishment and speak in
terms of wrongdoing, fault, eligibility, and proportionality. It could then, as I have
argued above, recognize the common threads that run through seemingly different
statutory schemes, such as the homicide laws of Maine and New York. More
importantly, the Court could look beyond the state of positive law, find its footing in
theory and principle, and provide defensible answers to questions such as the constitutional definition of a criminal offense.
The Court has avoided taking such a step up until now, and the inevitable
results have been confusion and the erosion of constitutional standards. The
Court's avoidance of controversy leads only to legislative overreaching and to
crises such as the "erosion of the jury's function to a point against which a line
must necessarily be drawn." 355 The only way to resolve such crises and to avoid
them in the future is to draw defensible lines. As I have argued above, the Court
should not hesitate to declare determinate sentencing, mandatory-minimum
sentencing, and three-strikes schemes invalid. These steps are the logical outcome of a theoretically sound and principled approach to the question of the
constitutional definition of a criminal offense. If the cost of drawing such lines
is enormous, then the Court's timidity is as much to blame as the legislatures'
opportunism. The only way out of this expensive mess is to take a principled
approach that will provide consistent guidance to lawmakers and minimize
further damage to the Court's integrity and prestige.

355. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 244 (1999).

